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Chapter 1
Introduction
Inequality in income and wealth has shown a high persistence over time. This
thesis discusses dierent means to reduce inequality; rstly, through the use of
redistributive taxation, secondly, through a new strategy to improve the opportunity
set of poor households via better access to capital markets.
In 1999, 23% of all people in developing countries lived in extreme poverty,
that is, on less than $US 1.08 a day (Worldbank 2000b). The richest fth of the
population obtained 61% of all income in Bolivia (1968), 44% in the USA (1991),
and 39% in Germany (1984) (Deininger and Squire 1996). Besides an inequality in
incomes, many countries have an even higher level of inequality in wealth, the latter
being particularly persistent since wealth tends to be inherited from one generation
to another.
Why should we worry about inequality? After all, inequality in incomes is a
natural consequence of dierent abilities. People with a higher productivity can
produce more than others and generate higher incomes as a result. In spite of
this link, high inequality is met with widespread concern that is mainly driven
by three aspects. Firstly, the existing levels of inequality are frequently perceived
as excessively high, that is, larger than could be explained by dierent abilities
alone. This is particularly so since the causes of inequality frequently seem to
lie in dierences in economic opportunities. Secondly, there is a growing body of
evidence that high inequality is connected with frequent social unrest, high violence
1
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and crime rates (The Economist 2001a, Kelly 2000). Finally, democratically elected
governments have an obligation to ensure the well-being of all individuals in their
state and thus express a well-founded concern about increasing inequality.
Given that inequality is higher than we would like it to be, what can we do about
it? The following chapters of this thesis discuss two possibilities to reduce inequality.
Firstly: through the use of redistributive taxation (chapter 2), and secondly, through
an improvement in the economic opportunities of low income households via a better
access to capital markets (chapters 3 to 5). Each chapter stands alone and can
be read as such; this introduction presents the common ground and discusses the
underlying ideas.
On a nationwide level, the most direct means to reduce inequality is taxation.
Why not tax the rich and pay transfers to the poor? While this idea has been
appealing to numerous policy makers, economists have long pointed to the adverse
incentive eects of high taxation (Ramsey 1927, for example). If income taxes
are very high, people might work less than otherwise or increasingly work in areas
outside the ocial tax system. If income taxes are progressive, people with the
highest incomes (and, arguably, the highest productivity) have the least incentives
to work an extra hour. One of the fundamental questions in this area then is how
to balance the redistributive benets of taxation and the adverse incentive eects.
One particularly controversial area in this discussion has been the taxation of capital
income. Due to the investing nature of savings, taxes on capital income not only
decrease current income but potentially decrease future growth. This eect has
resulted in overwhelming arguments in favor of zero capital income taxes, even
when there is inequality. The rst part of this thesis analyzes this question in more
detail.
For an economy with arbitrarily many households, chapter 2 shows that if house-
holds are heterogeneous with respect to productivities and endowments, zero capi-
tal income taxes generally are not optimal. We nd that zero capital income taxes
can be optimal only if endowments are homogeneous, if the production function is
weakly separable between labor and capital, and if utility functions are homothetic
and identical across agents. In a simplied model we further show that the extent of
3the inequality and the joint distribution of its dierent components (productivities
and endowments in our model) are crucial for the size of the marginal welfare eects
of taxation. A positive correlation between endowments and productivities increases
the marginal welfare eects of capital income taxation, while a negative correlation
decreases the eects.
While redistribution constitutes a means to improve the situation of poor house-
holds, it addresses the consequences of inequality only and not its causes. What
lies behind the high levels of inequality observed? One important factor is the in-
equality between rich and poor people in their access to institutions (The Economist
2001b). Institutions such as courts or the nancial service sector provide the nec-
essary support for functioning markets. The high barriers low income households
face in accessing these institutions play a large part in the manifestation of poverty.
One way to reduce inequality thus can consist in improving these households' access
to institutions or to build new institutions where none exist. While the discussion
above has focused on direct subsidies to poor households, one could also use these
subsidies to improve poor households' economic opportunities instead. One crucial
question thus is, given the same amount of money available, which strategy is more
eective? The second part of the thesis focuses on a set of institutions that provide
nancial services to poor households and analyzes their eectiveness in increasing
the incomes of their clients.
The missing access to nancial markets is one of the most limiting factors for
the economic opportunities of small entrepreneurs. Deprived from access to for-
mal banks, many of these entrepreneurs pay horrendously high interest rates to
moneylenders (Murinde 1996, Aleem 1993). To reduce the costs of loans for these
entrepreneurs, the concept of micronance was developed in the late 1970's and has
become increasingly popular since. Compared to previous attempts to provide credit
to poor households, the novelty of micronance consists rstly in the use of new in-
centive mechanisms such as group loans or other collateral substitutes, and secondly
in the attempt to cover costs through high interest rates which are a prerequisite
for long-time, sustainable services (Krahnen and Schmidt 1994).
The second part of the thesis asks how these new institutions aect their clients
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and whether they can provide nancial services on a sustainable basis. One im-
portant aspect of such an assessment lies in the analysis of the clients and their
economic situation over time. Chapter 3 examines the development of the clients
from one such institution and their enterprises and asks whether we can observe a
lasting increase in the scale of their businesses and their incomes. For those clients
who take out repeat loans and stay with the micronance institution for some time,
we nd a strong increase in assets and business income. For clients in the commerce
sector, for example, half of the clients who took their rst loan in 1995 and were still
clients of the micronance institution in 2000, have increased their assets by more
than 325% and their business incomes by more than 60% over these years.
For a thorough analysis of the contribution of these loans, it is necessary to ad-
dress selection issues. That is, we need to ask how much of any observed increase
in incomes can actually be attributed to the loans. Clients who obtain loans might
simply be more productive than others and would have achieved a similar growth
without those loans. Chapter 4 discusses the methodological concepts of an impact
analysis and estimates the contribution of loans to growth in assets and to produc-
tion eciency. The results show a strong positive inuence of loans on growth in
assets. We also nd that clients with prior loans generate higher sales revenues from
the same amount of assets than clients without prior loans, indicating increased
eciency. Perhaps surprisingly, these eects are stronger for larger businesses.
In a nal assessment of micronance, chapter 5 analyzes repayment behavior.
Micronance can improve economic opportunities in the long term only if it works
on a sustainable basis. A prerequisite for sustainability are high repayment rates.
Chapter 5 analyzes repayment in a particularly tumultuous situation where a rising
indebtedness of clients, an economic crisis, and increasing competition of micro-
nance institutions coincide with a pronounced increase in late payments and capital
at risk. Our results suggest that the following factors contributed to rising arrears.
Firstly, distributing more loans to clients who already have other loans leads to lower
repayment rates. Secondly, clients with overdue payments in their prior loans are
signicantly more likely to pay late for future loans as well. This strong correlation
suggests that capital at risk could be reduced by following a stricter policy in reject-
5ing loans for clients with a bad repayment record. Thirdly, a tolerance of payments
with a few days overdue leads not only to a higher probability that payments are
late but also to a higher probability that they remain overdue for many days and
add to capital at risk. With respect to the economic environment, we nd that late
payments are not driven by low economic growth. In addition, we nd that clients
with given characteristics are more likely to pay on time when there is high com-
petition and a high supply of micro-loans than otherwise. We also nd that clients
are more likely to pay late in repeat loans than in their rst loans and that women
are more likely to pay late than men.
The results presented in this thesis show two successful means for the reduction of
inequality. The rst part demonstrates that it is desirable to tax capital income and
to use the proceeds to redistribute unless inequality and production functions are of
a very special form. The second part of the thesis discusses micronance as a means
to improve the opportunity set of poor households. We show that micronance has
the potential of increasing the incomes of poor households and that it can maintain
sustainable repayment rates even in dicult times.
Part I
Fiscal Policy
6

Chapter 2
Optimal Capital Income Taxation
and Redistribution

2.1 Introduction
The study of optimal tax systems in a dynamic framework has mainly focused on
eciency aspects.
1
In the present paper we choose a dierent approach, focusing on
the impact of agent heterogeneity on optimal tax rates, where taxes are collected for
redistributional purposes. Under the assumption that the government maximizes a
social welfare function, we ask whether non-zero capital or labor income taxes can
be optimal for dierent sources of inequality. How do correlations between labor
income and wealth interact with the welfare eects of taxation?
To answer these questions, we rst review the literature on capital income tax-
ation with heterogeneous agents and apply the results of the literature on uniform
commodity taxation to a dynamic setting. We then develop a two period model, in
which households are heterogeneous with respect to their endowments and abilities.
Remaining tractable analytically, this model allows us to study the eects of dier-
ent sources of heterogeneity among households on optimal tax rates. In particular,
we show that the optimal capital income tax rate in general is non-zero. The welfare

This chapter has been published in Finanzarchiv (2000), issue 57 (4), pp. 412-434, which
generously has permitted the inclusion in this thesis.
1
See, for example, Chamley (1986) and Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997).
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eects of taxation depend crucially on the joint distribution of initial wealth and
productivities and on the exibility of labor income taxes over time.
How do the results presented in this paper relate to earlier ndings on optimal
capital income taxation? Innite horizon representative agent models in the tradi-
tion of Chamley (1986) show that, in the long run, it is not optimal to nance an
exogenous stream of government expenditures through capital income taxes. How-
ever, there are a few initial periods (their number depending on a possible upper
bound on tax rates) in which the optimal capital income tax is strictly positive, de-
clining to zero afterwards. The main eect of initially high levels of capital income
taxes is to extract the endowments from the consumers. The government builds a
large surplus in the initial periods from which it nances part of its expenditures
thereafter.
A limitation of this approach is its reliance on a representative agent with an
innite horizon. In such a setting, intragenerational distribution is not an issue.
Another limitation of most innite horizon models is the assumption that the gov-
ernment is allowed to build up a substantial surplus in the early periods, which is
often limited only by the assumption that taxes ought to be no higher than 100%.
Tax rates of this magnitude might be hard to implement.
Judd (1985) considers an innite horizon model with two types of agents. In
his most general setting, the agents dier with respect to their initial endowments
and utility functions. Agents derive utility from consumption and leisure. The
government has a xed stream of expenditures over time and raises revenues through
capital and labor income taxation. It redistributes income with a non-negative lump-
sum transfer, which may be dierent for both types of agents. Production is weakly
separable between capital and labor. Within this framework, Judd shows that if
there exists a steady state, then in this steady state it is not optimal to tax capital
income. Chari and Kehoe (1999) build a similar model without lump-sum transfers.
Redistribution, thus, is a side-eect of revenue raising. They conrm Judd's results
and show that the assumption of a weakly separable production function is necessary
for the optimality of zero capital income taxes.
While these models show that the optimal capital income tax rate in the steady
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state is zero, they oer little insight about optimal rates o the steady state. Our
model, in contrast, considers a nite number of periods and shows that zero taxes on
capital income are not optimal if, for example, goods endowments are heterogeneous.
The models discussed above assume perfectly competitive markets. In addition
to these, there are a number of studies analyzing optimal capital income taxes in the
presence of market imperfections. With few exceptions, they nd that the optimal
capital income tax rate is dierent from zero. Judd (1997), for example, shows
how monopolistic competition among rms can lead to the optimality of a negative
tax on capital income. Aiyagari (1995) and Chamley (2001), on the other hand,
nd that incomplete credit markets can lead to the optimality of a positive capital
income tax rate. We do not analyze such market imperfections but show that even
with complete markets it can be optimal to impose a strictly positive tax on capital
income.
The study of optimal capital income taxation is closely related to earlier work
on uniform commodity taxation, such as Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). Their static
analysis can be reinterpreted as a dynamic model where dierent commodities repre-
sent consumption at dierent points in time. The relation between these approaches
will be explored below. In addition, our model is related to the literature on opti-
mal linear income taxation. Sheshinski (1972) shows that in a static setting with
heterogeneity in the agents' productivities, the optimal marginal income tax rate
is strictly positive and less than 100%. The model presented in this paper consid-
ers heterogeneity in two dimensions (in productivities and goods endowments) and
shows under which conditions the one-dimensional result holds.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 builds upon
the existing literature on optimal capital income taxation and uniform commodity
taxation, and discusses its implications for optimal taxation with heterogeneous
agents. In section 2.3, we construct a simplied model emphasizing the interaction
between the households' two-dimensional heterogeneity and marginal welfare eects.
A conclusion is provided in section 2.4.
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2.2 Optimal Taxation with Heterogeneous Agents
This section provides an overview of the eects of heterogeneity on optimal taxa-
tion. The existing literature provides little analysis of optimal capital income tax-
ation with heterogeneous agents.
2
The few articles about this topic largely restrict
themselves to steady state analyses. However, there is a body of literature based
on Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) that considers optimal taxation with multiple fac-
tors and heterogeneous agents. Atkinson and Stiglitz show that it is not optimal
to distort relative prices of consumption goods if a suciently exible income tax
scheme is available. In a dynamic interpretation, their result implies that the opti-
mal capital income tax rates are zero. Their results are relevant for our analysis since
labor in dierent periods and endowments may be interpreted as dierent factors of
production.
3
In the following paragraphs we apply the results of this strand of literature to the
issue of optimal capital income taxation and show under which conditions optimal
capital income tax rates can be zero. We further show how and why the required
sets of assumptions dier with time-separable utility and in the steady state.
2.2.1 Optimal Capital Income Taxation
The literature on commodity taxation shows under which conditions optimal com-
modity tax rates are uniform. Applying the results of this literature to a dynamic
setting, we obtain our rst proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose there is an arbitrary number of agents who are heteroge-
neous with respect to their productivities and goods endowments. Utility is separable
between leisure and consumption and is strictly concave in all arguments. There is
an arbitrary number of goods. A social planner sets linear tax rates on labor and
capital income and distributes lump-sum transfers to maximize welfare, which is de-
2
One exception is Chamley (2001). The focus of his paper, however, is on credit market con-
straints.
3
For a detailed account of the relation between static and dynamic models of this kind see the
rst sections in Judd (1997).
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ned as the weighted sum of all agents' utilities. A capital income tax rate of zero
then fullls the planner's necessary conditions if all of the following conditions hold.
i. Preferences for consumption are homothetic and identical for all households.
ii. Goods endowments are homogeneous or proportional to actual consumption.
iii. Production is either weakly separable between labor and capital
4
or agents have
identical productivities.
If utility is weakly separable only, condition (i) requires that preferences for con-
sumption and leisure are homothetic and identical.
Items (i) and (ii) correspond to the ndings in Bassetto (1999).
5
In a setting
similar to Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), he analyzes properties of optimal commodity
taxes for general homothetic and separable utility functions. His model considers
two types of agents, of whom only one works, and he nds that homothetic and
identical preferences as well as homogeneous or proportional endowments lead to
the optimality of uniform commodity taxes or, in the dynamic interpretation, to a
zero tax on capital income.
Item (iii) of Proposition 1 is analogous to the results of Naito (1999). Re-
examining optimal commodity taxation in a setting close to Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976), he shows that the optimality of uniform commodity taxes is not robust
against the introduction of production functions that are not weakly separable be-
tween labor and capital. For a formal derivation of Proposition 1, see appendix
2.5.1.1.
The following paragraphs discuss the individual conditions of Proposition 1 and show
why each of them is required for the optimality of a zero tax on capital income.
4
In the remainder of the paper, weak separability of a function F (x
1
; x
2
; y) between x and y is
dened as @(
F
x
1
F
x
2
)=@y = 0.
5
Item (i) also corresponds to earlier ndings by Atkinson (1977) and Deaton (1979).
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Homothetic and identical preferences If preferences are not homothetic, lux-
ury goods may exist. That is, wealthier agents consume disproportionately more
of the luxury goods than poorer agents. Thus, while labor income taxes are pro-
portional to the agents' productivities, higher tax rates on the luxury good dis-
proportionately tax the wealthy and, thus, provide a means to redistribute. In a
dynamic interpretation this example translates as follows. If, for example, the desire
for consumption in later periods increases with income, wealthier households save
disproportionately more than poorer ones. A tax on capital income, therefore, dis-
proportionately aects the wealthy. If preferences dier across households, a similar
mechanism works.
Homothetic preferences are required for zero capital income taxes being optimal
only if labor income taxes are restricted to be linear. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976)
show that for suciently exible non-linear labor income taxes uniform commodity
taxation can be optimal if preferences are weakly separable between consumption
and leisure. Homotheticity is not required for this result since non-linear labor
income taxes already provide a means to tax the wealthy disproportionately. Even
if there are luxury goods, an additional tax on these will not improve welfare if labor
income taxes follow an optimal disproportionate scheme.
6
Homogeneous goods endowments Heterogeneous endowments undermine the
optimality of uniform taxation since they lead to dierent intertemporal trading
patterns among agents. If wealthier agents have higher capital holdings due to
higher endowments, a taxation of capital income extracts high revenues from the
wealthier agents which can be used for redistribution. These tax payments are
directly related to dierences in endowments that are generally not captured by the
revenues of linear labor income taxes, which are proportional to productivities.
Weakly separable production The last requirement in Proposition 1 concerns
the production side of the economy. To see why this assumption is important, con-
6
Similar results have been derived by Cremer, Pestieau, and Rochet (1999). Introducing a two-
dimensional heterogeneity in a static Mirrlees-style model with non-linear labor income taxation
and two consumption goods, they show that uniform commodity taxation is not optimal.
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sider the following example. Let the production function be such that rising capital
usage in production implies the decrease of relative productivity of low productivity
households. If this is the case, the government might want to discourage capital
accumulation by taxing capital income in order to prevent a higher discrepancy in
relative productivities. In other words, if production is not weakly separable between
labor and capital, capital income taxes might inuence relative productivities. As a
consequence, non-zero capital income taxes can be optimal even if endowments are
homogeneous and preferences are homothetic and identical across households.
2.2.2 Optimal Labor Income Taxation
In analogy to capital income taxation, we can show under which conditions optimal
labor income taxes can be uniform. Since wage income is indirectly taxed by capital
income over time, we consider present value labor income taxes.
Proposition 2 Consider the same setting as in Proposition 1. Uniform present
value labor income taxation fullls the planner's necessary conditions if all of the
following conditions hold.
i. Preferences for leisure are linearly homogeneous and identical for all house-
holds.
ii. Productivities are homogeneous.
If utility is weakly separable only, condition (i) requires that preferences for con-
sumption and leisure are homothetic and identical.
The intuition behind the conditions is similar to the discussion in the previous
section. Homothetic and identical preferences ensure that the relative labor supply
in dierent periods does not vary across households with dierent wealth. Thus,
varying labor income taxes over time would not tax wealthy households dispro-
portionately. If productivities are heterogeneous, homothetic preferences are not
sucient to ensure a proportional labor supply for all households. Homogeneity
of endowments, however, is irrelevant for the optimality of uniform labor income
taxation. For a formal analysis see appendix 2.5.1.2.
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2.2.3 Time Separable Utility and Optimal Taxation in the
Steady State
While the results presented in Proposition 1 are derived from a static setting with
multiple goods, dynamic analyses virtually always assume time separable utility
functions. How does this assumption modify the requirements for the optimality of
a zero tax on capital income as presented in Proposition 1? Most work on optimal
capital income taxation is further restricted to a steady state analysis. In a steady
state, consumption and labor are constant over time and there are no endowments.
How do these steady state-assumptions modify the above conditions?
Proposition 3 Consider the same environment as in Proposition 1 and assume
utility is time-separable. A capital income tax rate of zero fullls the planner's
necessary conditions if all of the following conditions hold.
i. Preferences for consumption are homothetic and identical for all households.
ii. Goods endowments in periods t and t  1 are homogeneous or proportional to
actual consumption.
iii. Production is weakly separable between labor and capital or agents have iden-
tical productivities.
In a steady state with no endowments and constant consumption and labor, item
(iii) is sucient.
While homotheticity and weakly separable production are required for the same
reasons as before, time separability limits the eects of heterogeneous endowments
to two periods. Capital income taxes in the period with heterogeneous endowments
are used to redistribute while next period's capital income taxes ensure that relative
prices in all following periods are not aected. Longer lasting eects occur only if
the capital income tax rate is restricted, for example, to be no larger than 100%.
7
7
This intuition lies behind the result in Chamley (2001) who nds that the optimal capital
income tax rate is zero in nite time, even if endowments are heterogeneous.
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The mechanisms working in the steady state are similar to those o the steady
state. The requirement of weakly separable production for the optimality of a zero
tax on capital income has been shown by Stiglitz (1985) and Chari and Kehoe
(1999). Homotheticity is not required in the steady state since consumption is
constant by denition, that is, it is not possible to disproportionately tax some
households by varying the tax rate in dierent periods. By denition, there are also
no heterogeneous endowments in the steady state. Because of time-separable utility,
heterogeneous endowments in earlier periods have no eect on the optimal capital
income tax rate in the steady state. For a formal treatment, see appendix 2.5.1.1.
The above discussion has shown the importance of heterogeneity for optimal
taxation in a dynamic setting. Optimal capital income taxes are zero if endowments
are homogeneous, optimal present value labor income taxes are uniform if produc-
tivities are homogeneous. However, we cannot infer how the size and a possible
correlation between these two sources of heterogeneity inuence the determination
of optimal tax rates. In addition, we cannot derive the impact of the planner's
preferences, i.e. how do the determinants of optimal taxation change if the planner
favors wealthier households? To address these issues we develop a more tractable
model in the next section.
2.3 A Simplied Model
This section develops a two period model with two-dimensional heterogeneity. In
order to focus on the interaction of dierent sources of heterogeneity, we use homo-
thetic and identical preferences and weakly separable production.
Consider an economy with N households which are heterogeneous with respect
to their labor productivities n
j
and their non-negative endowments e
j
, where j =
1; ::; N . In each period, there is one consumption good (c
j
1
; c
j
2
) and one type of labor
(l
j
1
; l
j
2
). Second period's utility is discounted with the factor . Utility is log-linear
and identical in every period and across households. That is, household j's utility
in period 1 can be expressed as u
j
1
(c
j
1
; l
j
1
) = a ln(1   l
j
1
) + (1   a) ln(c
j
1
), where l
j
1
is household j's labor supply in the rst period, c
j
1
is its consumption in the rst
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period, and a 2 (0; 1) determines the relative weights of leisure and consumption.
Each household is endowed with one unit of time in every period. Total utility of
household j is
U
j
(c
j
1
; l
j
1
; c
j
2
; l
j
2
) = a ln(1  l
j
1
) + (1  a) ln c
j
1
+ 

a ln(1  l
j
2
) + (1  a) ln c
j
2

: (2.1)
In the rst period, each household has to decide how much to work and how
much to consume. It can save an amount k
j
and will earn interest r on its savings
in the second period. There is no depreciation of capital. The wage of household j
is given by its productivity n
j
and its labor income is l
j
t
n
j
in each period t = 1; 2.
Production is linear with rst period's output given by
P
j
n
j
l
j
1
and second period's
by
P
j
rk
j
+ n
j
l
j
2
.
The government maximizes a social welfare function of the form
P
j
!
j
U
j
through
linear taxation of labor and capital income, where !
j
is the weight assigned to
household j. Since the individual marginal utilities are decreasing in consumption
and leisure, redistribution from wealthier households to poorer households increases
welfareunless the government favors richer households, implying that the welfare
weights are positively correlated with individual utility. We assume that the gov-
ernment cannot observe endowments and productivities directly, it distinguishes the
agents by their incomes only. The capital income tax is (1 
r
) and the labor income
tax (1  
w
).
8
For the moment, we assume that labor taxes cannot be changed over
time.
The households get lump-sum transfers , which are identical in both periods
and across households and may be either positive or negative. We assume that the
government has a commitment technology. That is, once the households have made
their labor/leisure decisions, the government cannot change the tax rates.
9
The
households' budget constraint is:
c
j
1
+ (1  l
j
1
)
w
n
j
+
c
j
2
+ (1  l
j
2
)
w
n
j
1 + r
r
= inc
j
; (2.2)
8
If the government knows the amount of interest earnings and wage income of an individual,
it would be reasonable to believe that it could infer the size of the initial endowment. We rule
this out by assumption since heterogeneous endowments are meant to represent generic dierences
between individuals rather than purely monetary ones.
9
This assumption is crucial for most work on optimal taxation. For an analysis of optimal
taxation without commitment, see Klein and Rios-Rull (1999).
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where inc
j
:= + e
j
+ 
w
n
j
+
+
w
n
j
1+r
r
denotes household j's present value potential
income from its endowments in commodities (e
j
) and work time (
w
n
j
+

w
n
j
1+r
r
) plus
transfers.
The government earns (pays) the same interest rate as the households on any
budget surplus (decit) in the rst period.
10
Let B denote its budget, the govern-
ment's budget constraint is
B =
N
X
j=1

(1  
w
)l
j
1
n
j
  

(1 + r) + (1  
w
)l
j
2
n
j
+ (1  
r
)rk
j
  
	
 0 :
(2.3)
Given the tax rates and transfers, household j maximizes its utility subject
to (2.2). Taking the households' optimal choices as given, the maximized util-
ity of household j depends only on ; 
r
; 
w
; n
j
and e
j
and can be written as
V (; 
r
; 
w
; n
j
; e
j
). The indirect utility function V () is increasing in the household's
productivity n
j
and in its endowment e
j
, since higher values of these variables lead
to higher consumption and lower labor supply in both periods.
2.3.1 Optimal Taxation
This section derives properties of the optimal linear tax schedule with a special
emphasis on capital income taxation. Given the households' choices, the planner
chooses ; 
r
, and 
w
to maximize welfare. Letting W denote the corresponding
Lagrangian, the planner's maximization problem can be written as
max
;
r
;
w
W =
N
X
j=1
!
j
V (; 
r
; 
w
; n
j
; e
j
) + B ; (2.4)
where  is the Lagrange multiplier for the planner's budget constraint. Since we
want to show that a tax rate of zero is generally not optimal, we focus on the analysis
of the planner's rst order conditions evaluated at a tax rate of zero. That is, we
calculate the marginal welfare eect of introducing labor or capital income taxes.
Let us rst consider labor income taxes. The analysis of the necessary conditions
for the maximization in (2.4) leads to the following Proposition:
10
For ease of exposition, we assume that the government has no expenses besides redistribution.
A xed revenue requirement would not change the results since we allow lump-sum taxes.
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Proposition 4 Given the utility and welfare functions specied above, and assum-
ing that the weights !
j
are uncorrelated with productivities and endowments, the
labor income tax 1  
w
is related to welfare as follows:
i. A tax on labor income exceeding or equal to 100% (
w
 0) is never optimal.
ii. Starting from a labor income tax rate of zero and assuming that 
r
>  
1
r
, labor
income taxes increase welfare if productivities are heterogeneous while endow-
ments are not. The increase in welfare rises in the productivities' heterogeneity
as measured by
P
j
n
j
 n
inc
j
.
11
iii. Starting from a labor income tax rate of zero and assuming that 
r
>  
1
r
, labor
income taxes decrease welfare if endowments are heterogeneous while produc-
tivities are not. The decrease in welfare rises in the endowments' heterogeneity
as measured by
P
j
e
j
 e
inc
j
.
Proof. If the labor income tax rate is 100% (i:e: 
w
= 0) nobody works and the
planner does not collect any revenue from labor taxation. Thus, a labor tax rate of
100% is never optimal, see also Sheshinski (1972).
For parts (ii) and (iii) consider the marginal welfare eect of labor income taxes.
If there is no labor taxation (
w
= 1), the marginal eect is:
12
@W
@
w





w
=1
=
N
X
j=1
!
j
(+1)

(1  a)(r
r
+ 2) [n
j
  n]  a(r
r
+ 1) [e
j
  e]
inc
j

; (2.5)
where inc
j
=  + e
j
+ 
w
n
j
+
+
w
n
j
1+r
r
. A negative value of this derivative implies
that an increase in labor income taxes (
w
#) decreases welfare. If ! is uncorrelated
with n and e, we can substitute ! for !
j
in (2.5).
Assume 
r
>  
1
r
. If endowments are homogeneous, e
j
= e and the second
term in the numerator is zero. The sign of (2.5) then is determined by the sign of
P
j
(n
j
  n)=( + e + 
w
n
j
+
+
w
n
j
1+r
r
). If the numerator is positive (n
j
> n), the
11
Throughout the remainder of the text, x refers to the arithmetic average of x, that is, x =
1
N
P
N
j=1
x
j
.
12
For the derivation calculate  from
@W
@
= 0, plug it into
@W
@
w
and simplify.
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denominator is larger than average. That is, positive values obtain a low weight.
Negative values, on the other hand, obtain a high weight. As a consequence, the
sum is negative. The higher the inequality in n, the lower the sum. This proves
part (ii) of the Proposition.
If productivities are homogeneous, n
j
= n and the rst term in the numerator
is zero. The sign of (2.5) then is determined by the sign of  
P
j
(e
j
  e)=( +
e
j
+ 
w
n +
+
w
n
1+r
r
). Using the same arguments as above, it follows that the sum is
positive, rising in the inequality in e. This proves part (iii) of the Proposition. 
Intuitively, if only productivities are heterogeneous more productive households
work more than less productive ones and pay more taxes. Thus, at the margin,
labor income taxation is redistributive and increases welfare. If only endowments
are heterogeneous, the initial welfare eects of labor income taxes are negative,
calling for wage subsidies and lump-sum taxes. Since wealthier households generally
work less, they benet less from subsidies while paying the same lump-sum tax.
Heterogeneity in e is measured by
P
e
j
 e
inc
j
which can be written as Cov
 
e;
1
inc

<
0. If n and e are not correlated, increasing inequality with a mean preserving spread
always implies a decrease in the covariance and, thus, an increase in the marginal
welfare eects of taxation. A positive correlation between n and e further increases
the marginal eects while a negative correlation decreases its value such that the
marginal welfare eects of introducing labor taxes are eventually negative. This is
the case if households with high endowments have a lower than average potential
income (inc
j
< inc) because of their very low productivity.
If agents dier with respect to their productivities only, more productive agents
have a higher income. This property is called agent monotonicity and implies
that income taxes redistribute from highly productive agents to less productive
agents since agents with high income also have a high productivity. Earlier work
on optimal income taxes (Sheshinski, 1972, for example) has shown that, under this
assumption, the optimal linear tax schedule consists of a positive transfer and a
marginal income tax rate which is strictly positive and less than one. This result is
consistent with part (ii) of Proposition 4, where agent monotonicity holds. In part
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(iii), however, agents with high endowments work less and, thus, generate lower
labor income than agents with small endowments, making it optimal to subsidize
labor income instead. If both endowments and productivities are heterogeneous
and uncorrelated the optimality of either taxes or subsidies depends on the relative
size of the heterogeneities and on the households' relative valuation of leisure and
consumption, a.
If the welfare weights vary across households, their correlation with n and e
is crucial for the determination of the optimal tax rate. A negative correlation,
e.g. between the weights and endowments increases the marginal welfare eects
of labor taxes, while a positive correlation decreases them and could even lead to
opposite eects. Intuitively, if the government favors wealthier households, who
generally work less than poorer households, labor subsidies are less desirable.
Now consider the tax rate on capital income, 1  
r
. The following Proposition
establishes the main relations between the capital income tax rate and welfare.
Proposition 5 Given the utility and welfare functions specied above, and assum-
ing that welfare weights, productivities, and endowments are uncorrelated, the capital
income tax 1  
r
is related to welfare as follows:
i. (a) A capital income tax exceeding 100% (
r
< 0) may be optimal if the
inequality in endowments exceeds a lower bound for given weights w
j
.
(b) A conscation of capital as well as interest (
r
  
1
r
) is never optimal.
ii. Starting from a capital income tax rate of zero and assuming 
w
> 0, capi-
tal income taxes increase welfare if either endowments are heterogeneous or
productivities are heterogeneous and (1 + r) > 1, or both. The larger the
heterogeneity as measured by
P
j
e
j
 e
inc
j
and
P
j
n
j
 n
inc
j
, the larger the marginal
welfare increase.
iii. Starting from a capital income tax rate of zero and assuming 
w
> 0, capital
income taxes decrease welfare if productivities are heterogeneous while endow-
ments are not and (1 + r) < 1. The larger the heterogeneity as measured by
P
j
n
j
 n
inc
j
, the larger the marginal welfare decrease.
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Proof. If capital income taxes are 100% (
r
= 0), the marginal welfare impact of
lowering capital income taxes (
r
") is
@W
@
r





r
=0
=
r
1 + r + 
N
X
j=1
!
j


(1 + )
(e
j
  e)  
w
(n
j
  n)(1 + r   )
inc
j
+ r

:
(2.6)
If !; n and e are uncorrelated, we can replace !
j
by !. The only negative term in
(2.6) is
P
j
e
j
 e
inc
j
. It is large in absolute terms if the inequality in endowments is very
high. Thus, the derivative in (2.6) decreases in the endowments' inequality. Given
the weights !
j
,
@W
@
r




r
=0
= 0 implicitly denes a lower bound for heterogeneity in
endowments for which optimal capital income taxes may exceed 100%. This proves
part (ia).
While the optimal capital income tax may exceed 100%, it is never optimal to
tax away all savings. If 
r
  
1
r
, nobody saves and the planner does not collect any
revenue from capital taxation. This proves part (ib).
For parts (ii) and (iii), consider the marginal welfare eects if there are no
capital income taxes (
r
= 1):
@W
@
r





r
=1
= r
N
X
j=1
!
j
(e
j
  e) + 
w
 
 
1
1+r

[n
j
  n]
(r + 1)  inc
j
: (2.7)
Again, a negative value of the derivative indicates that capital income taxes increase
welfare.
The arguments here are similar to those given for Proposition 4. First, we can
substitute ! for !
j
. Second, the terms
P
j
e
j
 e
inc
j
and
P
j
n
j
 n
inc
j
are negative if n
and e vary across agents and are not negatively correlated. Assume 
w
> 0. If
 >
1
1+r
, the partial derivative is negative and increasing in the heterogeneity of n
and e, proving part (ii). If  <
1
1+r
, however, both sources of heterogeneity work
in dierent directions. If only endowments are heterogeneous, (2.7) is negative and
capital income taxes increase welfare. If only productivities are heterogeneous, (2.7)
is positive and capital income taxes decrease welfare. This proves part (iii). 
Let us spend a few more thoughts on (2.7). If productivity is the single source
of heterogeneity, then
@W
@
r




r
=1
is negative as long as  >
1
1+r
. The restriction on
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 implies that the households' discount rate
1

  1 is less than the interest rate r
and is related to the households' optimal savings decision. If  >
1
1+r
, more pro-
ductive households save more to shift more utility to the second period and, thus,
pay a higher amount of capital income taxes than less productive households; re-
distribution occurs through capital income taxes and transfers. If  <
1
1+r
; more
productive households save less and, thus, gain less from capital income subsidies
than less productive households; redistribution occurs through capital income sub-
sidies. If only endowments are heterogeneous the argument is similar: households
with higher endowments save more and, thus, pay more capital income taxes than
households with lower endowments. If both endowments and productivities are het-
erogeneous and if  >
1
1+r
; the eects once again depend on the correlation between
n and e. The marginal welfare impacts are stronger for positive correlation, weaker
or even reversed for negative correlation.
To summarize, we found that the inuence of heterogeneity on the optimal tax
rates depends strongly on the source of the heterogeneity and on possible correla-
tions between the dierent sources. While, at the margin, labor taxes are welfare
enhancing if productivities are heterogeneous, they can reduce welfare if endow-
ments are heterogeneous. Capital income taxes increase welfare if endowments are
heterogeneous while the eect of heterogeneous productivities depends on the sign
of   
1
1+r
. If welfare weights vary across households, the marginal welfare eects
crucially depend on the weights' correlation with the households' endowments and
productivities. The results conrm the intuition: if the government favors well-
to-do households, marginal welfare eects of taxation are lower; if it favors poorer
households, they are higher.
2.3.2 Optimal Taxation with Time-dependent Labor Taxes
Up to now, the planner was restricted to tax labor income in both periods with
the same tax rate 1  
w
. The present section modies the above analysis to allow
time-varying labor income taxation. (1   
w1
) is the rst period's labor income
tax and (1   
w2
) is the second period's labor income tax. As before, we assume
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that the government credibly commits to second period's labor and capital income
taxes before households make their labor/leisure choices. What are the eects on
the relation between capital income taxes and welfare?
Proposition 6 Consider the environment as described above, with labor income
taxes free to vary between both periods. If labor taxes are at their optimal values,
then, starting from a capital income tax rate of zero:
i. An increase in the capital income tax rate has no rst order eects if endow-
ments are homogeneous.
ii. An increase in the capital income tax rate increases welfare if endowments are
heterogeneous and the correlation between n and e is not too negative, given
the weights !
j
.
iii. An increase in the capital income tax rate decreases welfare if endowments and
productivities are heterogeneous and their correlation is suciently negative,
given the weights !
j
.
Proof. If there are no capital income taxes and if labor taxes are at their optimal
values, the marginal welfare impact of capital income taxation is
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It follows directly that
@W
@
r




r
=1
= 0 if endowments are homogeneous, proving part
(i). The derivative is negative if e is heterogeneous and not correlated with n and
!. The derivative is positive only if there is a suciently negative correlation since
negative values of the sum (e
j
< e) are associated with very high values of n
j
leading
to lower than average weights (inc
j
< inc). The critical level is implicitly given by
P
!
j
(e
j
 e)
inc
j
= 0. This proves parts (ii) and (iii) of the Proposition. 
Proposition 6 indicates that the optimality of a positive tax rate on capital
income is solely driven by heterogeneity in endowments. This result is analogous
13
For the derivation of this expression see appendix 2.5.2.
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to Proposition 1, where we have shown that optimal capital income taxes can be
zero if production is weakly separable, preferences are identical and homothetic,
and there are no heterogeneous endowments. Equation (2.8), however, also shows
how correlations between productivities, endowments and welfare weights change
the marginal welfare eects of capital income taxation. At the margin, capital
income taxes increase welfare if n and e are not correlated. If they are positively
correlated, the marginal welfare eect of capital income taxation increases since
households with higher interest earnings tend to be more productive as well and
thus have a higher income than others. However, if they are negatively correlated,
the size of the marginal welfare improvement decreases since households with higher
endowments tend to be less productive. For very high levels of negative correlation
where households with higher endowments tend to have lower overall utility than
others because of their low productivityit is desirable to pay interest subsidies
instead of imposing taxes. These results are compatible with the ndings of Domeij
and Heathcote (2000), who examine the quantitative eects of eliminating capital
income taxes. They nd that if households are heterogeneous, a vast majority prefers
the original tax system. If the population is homogeneous, however, a tax cut would
be preferred.
How do welfare weights inuence the marginal eects? A negative correlation
between weights and endowments or productivitiesimplying that the government
favors poorer householdsstrengthens the marginal welfare improvement of capital
income taxation. A positive correlation, on the other hand, lowers the positive
impact of capital income taxation. When comparing these results with the previous
section where labor taxes were restricted to be constant over time we nd that the
expressions determining the marginal welfare impact of capital income taxes are very
similar (equations 2.7 and 2.8). Optimal capital income taxes are largely determined
by the correlation between endowments and productivities in both cases. If the
planner is restricted to identical labor taxes in both periods, capital income taxes
can be employed to substitute for the loss of exibility. That is, even if endowments
are homogeneous, the planner might nd it optimal to tax interest income. If he can
vary labor income taxes over time, it is not optimal for him to tax capital income.
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2.4 Conclusion
The analysis in the previous sections has discussed the inuence of heterogeneity
among households on optimal tax rates. While steady state analyses, such as Judd
(1985), have found that the optimal capital income tax rate in the steady state is
zero, we have shown that o the steady state this is generally not the case.
For an economy with arbitrarily many heterogeneous households, we have shown
that if households are heterogeneous with respect to productivities and endowments,
zero capital income taxes generally are not optimal. Emphasizing the analogy be-
tween commodity taxes and capital income taxes, we have found that zero capital
income taxation can be optimal only if endowments are homogeneous, if production
is weakly separable between labor and capital, and if utility functions are homothetic
and identical across agents. In a simplied model we have shown that the extent of
the inequality and the joint distribution of its dierent components (productivities
and endowments in our model) are crucial for the size of the marginal welfare eects
of taxation. A positive correlation between endowments and productivities increases
the marginal welfare eects of capital income taxation, while a negative correlation
decreases the eects. Correlation of the households' characteristics, thus, plays an
important role in determining the optimal tax policy.
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2.5 Appendix
2.5.1 Derivation of Propositions 1 to 3
The following model is an extension of Bassetto (1999).
14
There are N households,
preferences are separable between consumption and leisure. Household j's utility is
given by U
j
(G
j
(c
j
); H
j
(1  l
j
)), where G
j
() is its subutility from consumption, and
H
j
() is its subutility from leisure.
15
c
j
= (c
j
1
; c
j
2
; ::) is the vector of its consumption
and l
j
= (l
j
1
; l
j
2
; ::) is the vector of its time spent working, where subscripts refer to
the time period. The endowment of time is one for each household in every period.
The intertemporal technology constraint is given by F

P
N
j=1
c
j
+ g; l
1
; ::; l
N

 0,
where g is government consumption and F () is assumed to be twice continuously
dierentiable, increasing in the rst argument and decreasing in labor. In the fol-
lowing, we use the primal approach or Ramsey approach to determine properties
of optimal tax rates.
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, sells them at a price q
t
and pays wages
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t
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household j's endowment in period t, and 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From the rst order conditions, it follows that
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, where functions with subscripts (U
k
; H
k
; G
k
) denote partial derivatives.
14
Bassetto (1999) considers two agents, of whom only one works. We extend his model to an
arbitrary number of heterogeneous agents who are all working.
15
In what follows, t; k refer to dierent periods, while j refers to households.
16
For a comprehensive overview see Chari and Kehoe (1999).
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Normalizing p
1
to 1 we can write the implementability constraint as
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Since all agents face the same consumption prices, marginal rates of substitution
must be equal for all households in competitive equilibrium. The analogy holds for
wages, given heterogeneous productivities. That is,
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After using the households' necessary conditions to manipulate the implementability
constraint (2.11), the planner's maximization problem can be written as
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where 
j
; 
j
k
; 
j
k
, and  are Lagrange multipliers.
2.5.1.1 Proof of Propositions 1 and 3
This section derives the properties of optimal commodity tax rates over time and
closely follows Bassetto (1999). Commodity taxes are determined by
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and commodity taxation is uniform if
G
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F
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t
is independent of t. The following para-
graphs examine under which conditions uniform commodity taxation is compatible
with the planner's necessary conditions.
Using the fact that the rst order condition w.r.t. 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. The r.h.s is independent of t if the following terms are
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is the multiplier on the equality of marginal
rates of substitution. We can show that the constraint is not binding if the previous
conditions hold, implying that 
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rst order
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As a consequence of (2.14), G
1
t
=F
c
t
does not depend on t. From (2.15) we then see
that, for any j, G
j
t
=F
c
t
does not depend on t either. Thus, G
1
t
=G
j
t
is constant 8 j.
Consequently, the constraint on the equality of marginal rates of substitution (2.12)
is not binding and 
j
k
= 0 8k; j.
17
This is equivalent to production being weakly separable between labor and capital.
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Weakly separable utility If utility is denoted by U
j
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; 1  l
j
), weak separability
implies U
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. Using this relation and going through the same steps
as above, one nds that the only dierence to the earlier analysis with strongly
separable preferences is that preferences need to be homothetic and identical for all
elements of the utility function.
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The rst term on the r.h.s is a multiple of G
1
t
and moves to the l.h.s. of (2.13). The
second term is zero if endowments in period t are homogeneous since
P
j

j
= 0.
In the steady state As in a steady state, assume that after period  < t con-
sumption and labor are constant and there are no endowments. Since utility is
time-separable, G
t
and G
tt
are constant. Again, the analysis follows the same steps
as above with slight changes for the following two terms.
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Again, the rst term moves to the l.h.s. of (2.13). For t >  the second term is time
invariant since consumption is constant.
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2.5.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
This section derives properties of optimal labor income taxes over time. Labor
income taxes are determined by 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= 0 8 k; j. In analogy to the proof of Proposition 1 above, one can show that if the
above conditions hold the respective constraint is not binding, that is, 
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Weakly separable utility If utility is denoted by U
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), weak separability
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. Using this relation and going through the same steps
as above, one nds that the only dierence to the earlier analysis with strongly
separable preferences is that preferences need to be homothetic and identical for all
elements of the utility function.
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2.5.2 Derivation of the Partial Derivative with Respect to 
r
The partial derivatives of the planner's welfare function are modied the following
way. Firstly, calculate  from
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If 
w1
and 
w2
are at their optimal values, the respective partial derivatives are
zero and one can easily calculate
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r
from the above equation.
Part II
Improving Access to Financial
Institutions through
Micronance
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Chapter 3
Investigating Micronance: Caja Los
Andes, Bolivia
3.1 Introduction
During the last 20 years, micronancea new concept for the provision of credits
to otherwise credit constrained poor householdshas spread to most parts of the
world. Compared to previous attempts to provide credit to the poor, the novelty
of micronance consists in a) the use of new incentive mechanisms such as group
loans or the choice of collateral based on the borrower's subjective valuation, and
b) themore or less successfulattempt to cover costs through high interest rates
which at the same time make these loans unattractive to better o borrowers. A
recent overview is provided in Morduch (2000).
Although micronance is highly popular among donors of development aid, the
impact of these loans is not very well documented. Endogeneity of program place-
ments and the absence of data on rejected loan applicants make it hard to nd good
control groups for a rigorous econometric analysis.
1
Acknowledging these problems,
the present study is limited to the analysis of the clients from one microlender: Caja
Los Andes in Bolivia. The foremost purpose of the following sections is to provide a
description of the data set with a focus on the development of the clients over time.
1
See Pitt and Khandker (1998) for a discussion of these issues.
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Branch of observation Gross Loan
Year La Paz Sucre Cochab. Tarija Trinidad St. Cruz Total Portfolio
12/1992 1,518 1,518 0.7
12/1993 4,128 4,128 1.4
12/1994 9,846 309 10,155 2.9
12/1995 13,704 1,673 1,541 730 17,648 6.0
12/1996 18,771 2,465 3,615 1,785 26,636 11.7
12/1997 22,318 2,909 4,082 2,341 538 32,182 20.3
12/1998 24,008 3,319 4,235 3,393 1,432 36,387 28.4
12/1999 25,237 4,091 5,667 4,181 2,003 471 41,650 35.6
06/2000 23,207 3,804 6,546 4,105 1,749 911 40,322 40.8
Source: own calculations and IPC GmbH (2000).
Table 3.1: Number of active clients by branch and gross loan portfolio over time. A
client is active if he or she has a loan outstanding at some time during the respective
year. The gross loan portfolio is in million $US.
The data analyzed is from various parts of Bolivia. The micronance market in
Bolivia is one of the most developed and most competitive micronance markets in
existence today, its characteristics thus might serve as an indicator for future trends
in other markets (Von Stauenberg 2001). The data set from Caja Los Andes is
provided through the Interdisziplinäre Project Consult (IPC) GmbH in Frankfurt,
who has supported Caja Los Andes and its predecessor Pro-Credito since 1992. The
data consists of time series on individual borrowers including details on the loans
taken, personal information, and information about the clients' businesses.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a brief
overview of Caja Los Andes and micronance in Bolivia. A descriptive analysis of
the data set then is given in section 3.3, while section 3.4 provides a preliminary
examination of a few hypotheses.
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3.2 General Information about Bolivia
3.2.1 Caja Los Andes
Caja Los Andes FFP S.A. is a registered savings and loan company with its main
branch in La Paz, Bolivia.
2
Its operations are dedicated to the provision of sustain-
able nancial services to the economically disfavored. In July 2000 (when the data
was collected) it oered credits to small and micro enterprises in rural and urban
areas and also to the general public, the latter being secured by gold pawning. It
also oered savings accounts and xed deposits. Both loans and deposits are either
in Bolivianos or in $US, acknowledging the widespread dollarization of the Bolivian
economy.
In December 1999, Caja Los Andes was serving 36,815 clients. 39,335 loans were
outstanding amounting to $US 35.9 Mio. 54% of these loans were made to women.
The high concentration of micro-enterprises in the commerce sector is mirrored in
the distribution of the outstanding loans, 44% of which went to commerce, 21% to
production, 12% to the service industry, and 12% to agriculture related businesses.
These numbers represent the outstanding loans in all branches, among which there
are considerable dierences. Agriculture, for example, plays a dominant role in
rural branches, amounting to 70% of all outstanding loans there. For more details
see Caja Los Andes (1999) and tables 3.23 and 3.24 in the appendix for the main
branch in La Paz.
The origins of Caja Los Andes go back to a non-prot organization, Pro-Credito,
which was founded in 1992 to provide credits to poor households in La Paz, Bolivia.
During the rst ve years it received technical support from IPC GmbH, Germany.
The funds provided under this contract became the most important source of equity
for Caja Los Andes. Soon after the beginning of its operations, branches in Sucre
(1994), Cochabamba and Tarija (1995) were opened. In 1995 Pro-Credito trans-
formed to a registered private savings and loan company. The formal registration
2
FFP stands for Fondo Financiero Privado which is a registered savings and loan company sub-
ject to a US$ 1 Mio. minimum equity requirement and certain restrictions on assets and liabilities.
The legal category FFP has been created as an institutional form for small banks (Rhyne 2001).
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Institution Amount in $US
International/Foreign Institutions
BID/FOMIN, CAF, PROFUND, HIVOS-TRIODOS, FMO, IFC 10,373,547
Subordinate obligations
PRO-CREDITO, PROFUND 1,596,644
National second tier institutions
FUNDA-PRO, NAFIBO, FCD, Prefectura del Beni 12,362,999
National nancial institutions 1,741,392
Deposits from the public and from other institutions 8,675,556
Total 34,750,137
Source: Caja Los Andes (1999)
Table 3.2: Sources of capital, 12-31-1999.
made it possible to take deposits and also facilitated growth through the acquisition
of long-term nancing from international nancial markets. The number of clients
and the amount of loans disbursed increased considerably and more branches were
opened, see table 3.1. The number of new clients per year has increased from 1,518
in 1992 to 11,831 in 1999, see table 3.22 in the appendix. Since many clients take
repeat loans, the number of active clients is considerably higher, it rose from 1,518
in 1992 to 41,650 in 1999. While the main branch in La Paz still accounts for the
largest fraction of this increase, the younger branches together served about 45% of
the new clients and 40% of all active clients in 1999. In the rst half of 2000, Caja
Los Andes served 40,332 clients, 17% of whom were new customers. This growth is
mirrored in the number of loans disbursed, displayed in table 3.21, and in the rise
of the gross loan portfolio from $US 0.7 Mio. in 1992 to $US 40.8 Mio. in June 2000
as shown in table 3.1.
The fast growth rates made it necessary to tap new sources of capital. During
recent years the liabilities to national second tier institutions and international in-
stitutions have particularly grown (from $US 2.1 Mio. in 1997 to $US 12.4 Mio. in
1999 and from $US 3.1 Mio. to $US 10.4 Mio, respectively), see Caja Los Andes
(1999). For the current composition of Caja Los Andes' liabilities see table 3.2.
The formal registration allowed to oer savings accounts and xed deposits as well.
From only 647 accounts in 1996 the number increased to 11,550 in December 1999.
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year sta out. loan gross loan admin. interest arrears equity roe
contracts portfolio costs costs >30 after
/ sta / sta days taxes
1995 94 170 64,000 27% 9.5% 0.5% 1.237 3%
1996 110 263 108,000 20% 9.0% 0.5% 1.824 18%
1997 143 207 143,000 14% 9.3% 0.8% 2.809 38%
1998 213 164 134,000 13% 9.1% 1.8% 3.686 27%
1999 270 146 133,000 13% 8.5% 3.8% 4.139 14%
Source: IPC GmbH (2000).
Table 3.3: Business indicators for Caja Los Andes. Costs are relative to average
gross portfolio. roe = return on equity.
While most of the savings accounts contain very small sums only with an average
of $US 99 in 1999, the average xed deposit was $US 50,689.
Throughout its time of operation, Caja Los Andes has improved its eciency
and generated considerable prots. An overview of these indicators for the years
1995 to 1999 is provided in table 3.3. The administrative costs as percentage of
the average gross portfolio decreased from 27% to 13% and the average outstanding
loan portfolio per sta member increased from $US 64,000 to $US 133,000. The
decreasing costs are partly passed on to the clients in the form of lower interest
rates, contributing to the decline of income per average gross portfolio from 40% in
1995 to 29% in 1999. While most indicators show considerable improvement during
recent years, arrears rates have increased from 0.5% in December 1995 to 3.8% in
December 1999 and to 7.3% in June 2000, see IPC GmbH (2000). Arrears rates,
however, have increased considerably in all parts of Bolivia's banking system due
to a recession beginning in late 1998, see also section 3.2.2.2 and Von Stauenberg
(2001).
While the bank initially gave loans to micro-enterprises only (i.e. very small en-
terprises), the target group has broadened in recent years. Caja Los Andes has
opened a new small enterprise division which gives substantially larger loans. Be-
tween January 1999 and June 2000 these loans made up 3.9% of all loans and about
14% of the amount disbursed.
3
Table 3.4 displays the median and the mean of the
3
A loan belongs to the small enterprise group when the business has assets of at least $US
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Branch of observation
Year cbb lpb scz sre tdd tja Total
1992 367 367
624 624
1993 285 285
545 545
1994 205 161 204
427 294 424
1995 232 238 193 195 232
354 510 346 290 472
1996 332 271 267 271 272
522 587 441 404 551
1997 430 347 344 419 339 356
738 803 616 728 519 755
1998 483 470 440 404 440 469
887 995 802 799 742 929
1999 465 525 586 437 464 520 511
935 1,131 829 845 882 1,006 1,037
June 2000 495 602 692 428 432 595 560
913 1,293 946 885 837 1,173 1,144
Table 3.4: Median and mean of the amount of disbursed loans by year and branch.
Values are in 1992 $US. cbb=Cochabamba, lpb = La Paz, scz = Santa Cruz, sre =
Sucre, tdd = Trinidad, tja = Tarija.
loan amounts handed out.
4
The data show an increase in both values. For further
characteristics of disbursed loans see section 3.3.2 and tables 3.23 and 3.24 in the
appendix for July 2000 data of the La Paz branch.
20,000 and a monthly sales revenue of at least $US 6,000. In July 2000, small enterprise loans were
disbursed in the non-agricultural sectors in La Paz, Cochabamba, and Tarija only.
4
The original data is partly in Bolivianos, partly in $US. I have converted Bolivianos to $US
using daily exchange rates and then deated it to 1992 using the US GNP deator provided by
the Federal Reserve Bank.
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3.2.2 Economic Environment
This section briey describes important characteristics of the Bolivian economy.
Section 3.2.2.1 presents basic economic and social data of the 1990's and section
3.2.2.2 describes the micronance market in Bolivia with a special emphasis on
recent developments.
3.2.2.1 Economic and Social Information about Bolivia
Bolivia is one of the poorest countries in South America. After economic reforms
and continuing market liberalization in the 1980's, the early nineties were charac-
terized by relatively high GDP growth with declining unemployment, see gures 3.1
and 3.2. Beginning in late 1998 and continuing throughout 1999 and 2000, however,
an economic crisis emerged leading to severe job cuts. In part, this crisis was caused
by the devaluation of the Brazilian Real making Bolivian exports less competitive,
by an increase of trade restrictions by the main Bolivian trading partners, Chile
and Argentina, and by the large scale eradication of coca plantations. In 1999 Bo-
livian GNP per capita was $US 1,000 (Worldbank 2000a), corresponding to $US
3000 after purchasing power adjustment (CIA 1999). Wages are low; in 2000 police
ocers and teachers went on strike for wage increases to a monthly level of $US 100.
While ination has been moderate in the 1990's (generally below 10%, 3.3% in 1999
(Worldbank 2000a)), there is continuing devaluation against the $US, see gure 3.3.
During the time frame covered by our data set the exchange rate nearly doubled
from 3.75 Bolivianos per $US on January 31st 1992 to 6.17 on July 31st 2000.
Bolivia is landlocked and covers a wide variety of dierent climates, the altitude
ranging from 90m to 6,542m. The infrastructure is poorly developed, the high
costs due to the dicult terrain slow down improvements. Inequality is high with a
Gini coecient for income of 0.52 (1993, Inter-American Development Bank (1999)).
There is widespread illiteracy with an overall rate of 16.4% and a rate of 22% among
women (1997, Inter-American Development Bank (1999)).
The Bolivian economy is characterized by a large micro-enterprise sector. In
study conducted by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), Orlando and
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Figure 3.1: Bolivian Gross Domestic Product at market prices in $US. Source:
IADB.
Pollack (2000) report that in the mid 1990's the Bolivian micro-enterprise sector
represented 57% of total employment (compared to 54% in all of Latin America).
5
Most micro-enterprise workers are self-employed. Between 1990 and 1995, 84% of
all new jobs in Latin America were created in the micro-enterprise sector. This sec-
tor is characterized by low wages, low human capital, and relatively large poverty.
Women's earnings in the micro-enterprise sector are considerably lower than men's.
In Bolivia, women obtain roughly 53% of men's earnings. While the self-employed
microentrepreneurs earn more than workers in the formal sector, employed workers
in micro-enterprises gain very low wages and a large proportion lives in poverty.
Among the micro-enterprises the industry sector has the most poor earners, the
commerce sector the fewest. The sectoral distribution of workers among Bolivian
micro-enterprises is as follows: 20.3% industrial, 11.0% construction, 39.9% com-
merce, 26.4% services, and 2.6% others. The average number of years of schooling
are considerably lower in the micro-enterprise sector than in the general population,
they are 6.8 years in Bolivia's micronance sector.
5
The IADB denes a micro-enterprise as having no more than 10 workers and total assets below
$US 20.000. Orlando and Pollack (2000), however, consider the number of workers only.
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Unemployment in Bolivia
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Figure 3.2: Unemployment rates by gender. Source: ILO.
3.2.2.2 Micronance in Bolivia
Bolivia is deemed the most active micronance market worldwide. There are many
institutions, covering all big cities and most rural areas as well. While there is con-
siderable competition in the big cities, the micronance market in smaller towns
and rural areas is less developed. There are currently three associations for micro-
nance institutions, ASOFIN (urban micronance), CIPAME (support for micro-
enterprises), and nrural (rural micronance). The institutions covered in these
associations had a combined portfolio of $US 2.8 Mio. in December 1990, growing
to $US 382.7 Mio. in December 1999, which corresponds to roughly 0.5% of Bolivia's
GNP. In June 2000 these institutions served 195,087 borrowersonly slightly fewer
than the commercial banks with 218,956.
In December 1999, the largest institution was BancoSol with a portfolio of $US 82
Mio. The urban loans of all covered institutions totaled to $US 287 Mio. in December
1999. Their distribution is as follows: 51% to commerce, 14% to production, 17%
to services, 9% to house improvements, 8% to consumption, and the rest to other
destinations. Annual interest rates for loans in $US typically range from 25% to
35%, for loans in Bolivianos from 35% to 45% (nominal rates). Most institutions
charge a at rate commission between one and four per cent and loan sizes vary
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Figure 3.3: Ination and exchange rate indices for Bolivia. Source: IADB.
between a minimum of $US 50 and a maximum of $US 120,000. Most institutions
obtain funds from international aid institutions, e.g. in the form of long term loans
with very low interest rates
6
.
Bolivia's banking supervisory authority (Superintendencia de Bancos y Enti-
dades Financieras, S.B.E.F.) provides credit records to all registered banks and pri-
vate savings and loan companies. The institutions obtain credit information about
all clients in their area including the amount of debts outstanding, the amount of
guarantees outstanding, the amount and type of bad debts, and the name of the
bank where the record originates from. While all registered institutions are partic-
ipating, there is no information from Non-Governmental Organizations and other
informal lenders (an inclusion of these institutions is planned).
The last two years have been characterized by challenging developments. In
1997, two banks began to oer consumer loans to the micronance institutions'
client base. These loans were disbursed based on credit scoring alone, no in-depth
analysis of the clients' repayment capacity was made. Anecdotes about these lending
practices abound: clients were asked whether they obtained a loan from one of the
established microlenders. If so, they were oered a considerably higher consumer
6
this data is from ASOFIN (2000), for a brief overview of the special characteristics of micro-
nance in Bolivia see also Rhyne (2001) and Inter-American Development Bank (1998)
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loan without a further analysis of their repayment capacity.
7
Other clients were
randomly assigned to a group. In these group loans the clients were co-debtors of all
group members, frequently without knowing each other. Many clients borrowed large
sums and eventually found themselves unable to fulll their repayment obligations.
This over-indebtedness of many clients leads to repayment problems of micro-loans
taken earlier from other institutions, see also Rhyne (2001) and ASOFIN (July and
December 1999) for a discussion of these issues.
The clients' repayment problems were reinforced by the economic crisis beginning
in late 1998. Many clients faced severe drops in their incomes. As a consequence,
repayment became even more dicult contributing to a severe rise in arrears, see
table 3.3. The crisis not only aected the microlenders but the whole banking sector
of the Bolivian economy. Between December 1999 and June 2000 the portfolio of
the whole banking sector fell by 3.8% and portfolio in arrears for more than 30 days
rose from 6.60% to 7.72%. Average annualized return on equity fell from 8.7% to
3.0% during the same time (source: banking supervisory authority S.B.E.F.). The
crisis led to considerable job cuts. Many of the newly unemployed began to work in
the informal sector, mostly as street vendors, leading to a rising competition which
exacerbated the situation there.
8 9
3.3 Description of the Dataset
The data set covers the time from March 1992 to June 2000. It includes data from
Caja Los Andes' predecessor Pro-Credito.
10
There is information on all six branches;
7
These loans tend to have higher interest rates, covering part of the high costs of default.
8
See various issues of Nueva Economica in July/August 2000.
9
For more information on micronance in Bolivia see Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-
Vega, and Rogriguez-Meza (2000), who describe client characteristics, and Rhyne (2001) and Von
Stauenberg (2001) for an overview about recent developments. In an earlier study, Gonzalez-Vega,
Meyer, Navajas, Schreiner, Rodriguez-Meza, and Monje (1996) analyze the client proles of ve
relatively large microlenders in Bolivia with a special emphasis on their nancial needs. Navajas,
Conning, and Gonzalez-Vega (1999) analyze recent developments with a theoretical model, the
focus being the competition between BancoSol, who uses mostly group loans, and Caja Los Andes,
who focuses on individual loans.
10
In personal conversation it was ensured that the operations and the client selection have not
changed after the registration as a private bank. While the fraction of clients with relatively large
loans has increased, Caja Los Andes still serves a large number of clients with very small loans.
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Business gender
sector male female Total
Agriculture 74.74 25.26 100.00
20.80 6.05 12.87
Commerce 29.35 70.65 100.00
29.29 60.67 46.15
Stockbreeding 48.83 51.17 100.00
0.65 0.59 0.62
Production 53.35 46.65 100.00
26.52 19.96 22.99
Service 60.57 39.43 100.00
22.74 12.74 17.36
Table 3.5: Loans disbursed between 01/1999 and 06/2000 by gender and business
sector (in %).
their dierent sizes are documented in tables 3.1, 3.21, and 3.22. The branch in La
Paz includes El Alto, a city with over a million inhabitants and a very large client
base. Operations in Santa Cruz, on the other hand, have only begun recently and
Caja Los Andes tries to establish a foothold in its highly competitive market.
The data set includes information on the clients, such as gender, age, and civil
status. The loan data includes information on the amount applied for, the amount
granted, terms and conditions, and repayment behavior, among many other vari-
ables. Furthermore there are estimated balance sheets for most clients. Whenever
a client applies for a loan, a loan ocer goes to the business and estimates the as-
sets, liabilities, sales revenues, expenses, and number of employees, and more. This
information is gathered irregularly. Clients with a good repayment performance
eventually obtain an automatic credit line and can take out new loans without a
detailed business check. The following sections provide a description of some char-
acteristics of these data.
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3.3.1 Clients
Of all loans disbursed between 01/1999 and 06/2000, 46% went to men and 54%
to women. The distribution varies considerably between sectors: While of all loans
in agriculture only 26% went to women, 71% of all loans to the commerce sector
went to women, see also table 3.5.
11
The clients' civil status is frequently used
as an indicator of stability by the loan ocers. Between 01/1999 and 06/2000
most loans went to married people (67%). Again, there are dierences between the
business sectors. 74% of all agricultural loans are disbursed to married clients while
the fraction of married clients in commerce and service loans is lower with 65%
and 62%, respectively. Regional dierences abound as well, the fraction of married
clients in Santa Cruz being 46% only. While between 01/1999 and 06/2000 15%
of the active clients lived alone, 22% lived in households with 10 or more persons.
Households in Santa Cruz tend to be relatively small, with 19% single households
and 18% living in households with 10 or more people.
What is the age of the clients taking their rst loans from Caja Los Andes? From
January to June 2000 24% of the new customers were in their twenties, while most
clients were between thirty and forty (33%). 25% were between forty and fty, 13%
between fty and sixty, and 4% were older than sixty when taking their rst loan.
Due to the high competition in the Bolivian micronance market, many clients
have multiple loans at dierent institutions. Of all clients who had an outstanding
loan at Caja Los Andes between January and June 2000, 34% had loans with other
regulated institutions as well.
12
For clients with loans between $US 5,000 and $US
10,000 the number is 49%, for even larger loans the number is 53%. In other words,
clients with larger loans tend to have loans from other (regulated) sources as well
while clients with smaller loans more often either do not want other loans or do not
have access to these sources; see also section 3.3.4 .
Many clients take repeat loans from Caja Los Andes. Of all clients taking their
rst loan in 1992, 88% took a second loan at some later point in time, 79% took a
11
If no other sources are mentioned, the information provided in the tables is based on calcula-
tions from Caja Los Andes' data set.
12
Source: calculations based on the credit information of the S.B.E.F. These numbers include
loans from other regulated institutions only.
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Figure 3.4: Median and mean loan sizes compared to GNP per capita. All values
are in 1992 $US, source: own calculations and Worldbank (2000a).
third loan and 70% took four or more loans from Caja Los Andes until June 2000.
Over time, these numbers have decreased slightly. Of all clients who took their rst
loan in 1995 only 81% took a second loan and, so far, only 55% took a fourth loan,
see table 3.30 in the appendix.
3.3.2 Loans
The number of loans disbursed has increased considerably during the rst years of
operation from 3,989 in 1992 to 39,377 in 1996. In recent years, the number of loans
disbursed has decreased slightly to 35,089 in 1999, see table 3.21 for an overview.
Although the number of disbursed loans has decreased, the total amount outstanding
has increased each year, owing to an increase in the average loan life and loan size.
The number of loans outstanding has increased from 1,183 at December 31st 1992
to 35,171 at June 30th 2000, see table 3.6.
The development of loan sizes has followed two dierent phases. Initially (1992),
62% of all loans were below $US 500. The fraction of these small loans increased
until 1995. Since 1995, however, loan sizes have increased, which can best be seen in
table 3.4. The average loan size has increased from $US 472 in 1995 to $US 1,144 in
June 2000. The 10th percentile has increased from $US 77 to $US 170 over the same
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Date Branch of observation
Outstand. cbb lpb scz sre tdd tja Total
31.12.92 1,183 1,183
31.12.93 3,299 3,299
31.12.94 7,435 294 7,729
31.12.95 1,278 10,779 1,193 592 13,842
31.12.96 2,493 15,661 1,840 1,281 21,275
31.12.97 2,759 17,154 2,198 514 1,775 24,400
31.12.98 3,118 19,635 2,561 1,197 2,780 29,291
31.12.99 4,476 20,226 431 3,151 1,593 3,294 33,171
31.06.00 4,845 21,210 857 3,261 1,487 3,511 35,171
Table 3.6: Number of outstanding loans by year and branch.
time period and the 90th from $US 966 to $US 2,578 (all values are in 1992 $US).
When compared to GNP per capita, the mean loan size has increased considerably
stronger, see also gure 3.4.
For very small loans, not only the fraction but also the number of these loans has
decreased over time. While in 1995 23,937 loans with less than $US 500 (1992 values)
were distributed, constituting 76.68% of loan contracts, this number has fallen to
17,242 (49.54%) in 1999. The fraction of loans between $US 500 and $US 5,000, on
the other hand, has increased considerably from 22.64% in 1995 to 47.56% in 1999.
The fraction of loans larger than $US 5,000 has increased from 0.69% to 2.89%.
For further details see table 3.25 in the appendix. The change in the distribution
of loans disbursed is amplied when considering the amounts of all disbursed loans
in a certain range, see table 3.27. The amounts disbursed in loans of less than
$US 500 have decreased after 1996 while the amounts disbursed in larger loans have
increased.
To see whether this change in loan sizes reects a change in Caja Los Andes'
policy or changing demands for loans, consider the amounts applied for. Over all
observations, the median relation between amount approved and amount applied
for is 97%, while 10% of all loan amounts are less or equal to 50% of the applied
amounts. The median has increased from 0.75 in 1993 to 1 in 1999/2000, the number
is lower for rst loans and higher for consecutive loans. In other words, clients are
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Business sector
gender Agriculture Commerce Stockbreed. Production Service Total
male 157 123 170 109 123 122
424 512 526 389 468 440
1,709 6,328 2,633 3,485 4,039 4,348
female 146 90 166 90 85 90
405 327 514 301 302 320
1,399 2,608 1,733 2,148 2,578 2,434
Total 152 96 169 99 97 99
420 361 516 343 391 362
1,709 3,517 2,186 2,709 3,417 3,077
Table 3.7: 10th percentile, median, and 90th percentile of loan sizes by gender and
business sector. January 1999 to June 2000, amounts are in 1992 $US.
more likely to obtain the desired amount when they apply in later years and/or for
repeat loans.
Loan sizes vary considerably by business sector and by gender. The largest
loans are distributed in the stockbreeding and agriculture sectors with medians
of $US 516 and $US 420 for 1999/June 2000, respectively. Male clients take out
considerably larger loans than female clients, the medians being $US 440 and $US
320, respectively, see table 3.7. The dierences are most pronounced in the non-
agricultural sectors. Loans tend to increase as the client takes repeat loans. The
median loan size growth rate is 41%. For 1999/June 2000, 1.46% of rst loans (new
clients) were above $US 5,000, 2.48% of second loans, 3.92% of third loans, and
5.18% of fourth or higher loans. Again, the values are in 1992 $US.
Interest rates vary. For loans denominated in $US in 01/1999 to 06/2000, 248
(1%) had a monthly interest rate of less than 2% (nominal rates). The bulk of
the loans (76%) had a monthly interest rate between 2.5% and 3.5%. For loans
denominated in Bolivianos, the rate is between 3% and 3.5%, for loans denominated
in ination adjusted Bolivianos, the rate is either 2% or 2.5%. The link between
interest and loan sizes is unclear. While loans below $US 500 and loans above $US
5000 tend to have relatively low rates, rates are higher for the intermediate range,
see table 3.26 in the appendix.
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Year loan Currency code
is taken US Dollar Boliviano in. adj.
1992 0.00 98.34 1.66
1993 0.00 83.51 16.49
1994 0.00 97.85 2.15
1995 1.22 96.21 2.57
1996 12.66 84.75 2.59
1997 27.39 67.67 4.94
1998 33.04 59.12 7.84
1999 37.28 55.40 7.32
June 2000 43.16 54.35 2.50
Table 3.8: Distribution of currencies of disbursed loans over time in percentage
values.
Initially, most loans (98%) were disbursed in Bolivianos with a small fraction
of loans in ination adjusted Bolivianos, see table 3.8. Since 1995 Caja Los Andes
oers loans denominated in $US, in the rst half of 2000 these loans made up 43%
of all loans disbursed. Larger loans tend to be denominated in $US more frequently,
see table 3.28 in the appendix.
Over the years of operation, the average duration of loans has increased con-
siderably from 80 days in 1992 to 531 days in 2000, see table 3.29. The service
sector on average has the loans with the longest duration (502 days in 1999) while
the agriculture sector has the shortest loans (360 in 1999). The duration increases
slightly for repeat loans. Between 01/1999 and 06/2000, the average duration for
rst loans was 420 days, 464 days for second loans, and 515 days for third or higher
loans. The distribution between new loans, second, third and further loans has been
relatively stable over time. Between 30% and 40% of all loans disbursed in any year
are new loans, roughly 20% are second loans, and between 40% and 50% are third
or higher loans.
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Number of days late this payment
year 0 1-2 3-9 10-29 30
1996 75.12 12.09 9.75 2.51 0.53
1997 68.01 13.05 12.66 4.86 1.43
1998 63.90 12.87 14.74 6.18 2.31
1999 75.46 6.35 9.19 5.38 3.62
2000 75.45 4.73 8.17 6.47 5.18
Table 3.9: Fraction of payments with arrears over time (in %).
3.3.3 Repayment Behavior
The data contains detailed information about the clients' payments. In the rst
years of operation (1992 to 1994) only the maximum number of days in arrears has
been recorded in most cases (days in arrears correspond to days overdue). In later
years the data contains information about the exact date of each payment and the
number of days each payment was late or early. Table 3.9 displays the fraction
of clients with arrears of a given size over time. There is a strong increase in the
fraction of payments with arrears of 30 days or more from 0.53% in 1996 to 5.18%
in 2000.
Repayment behavior varies by loan size. It is worst for loans of a size between
$US 1,000 and $US 10,000 (values are in 1992 $US) where the fraction of all pay-
ments that were at least 30 days late rose from 0.38% in 1996 to 6.00% in the rst
half of 2000 (see table 3.31 in the appendix). For loans smaller than $US 100 this
fraction has been lower in all years and it rose from 0.33% to 3.16%. When com-
paring dierent sectors we nd that the fraction of payments at least 30 days late is
especially high in the agricultural sectors (8.30% in the rst half of 2000) and lower
in the other sectors.
After the severe repayment problems beginning in 1998 there is a strong increase
in the fraction of payments without arrears and a decrease in the fraction of payments
a few (one to nine) days late. Between 1998 and 1999 the former rose from 64%
to 76% and the latter declined from 27% to 15%. These numbers reect Caja Los
Andes' increased concern about late repayments and the ensuing rise in repayment
enforcement. Table ?? shows the number of payments 1 or 2 days late relative to
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Branch of observation
year cbb lpb scz sre tdd tja
1995 0.15 0.12 0.17 0.12
1996 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.13
1997 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.11 0.15
1998 0.26 0.20 0.19 0.15 0.18
1999 0.12 0.07 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.07
2000 0.07 0.03 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.08
Table 3.10: The ratio of the number of payments one or two days late to punctual
payments as a proxy for the enforcement of punctual repayment.
punctual payments for each branch. A stronger repayment enforcement is visible in
La Paz, Cochabamba, and Tarija.
3.3.4 Businesses
Whenever a client applies for a new loan, balance information is estimated by the
loan ocer. Since 1995, there have been roughly 30.000 balance observations per
year. Divided by the number of active clients given in table 3.1 this yields close to
one observation per active client per year, the number decreasing slightly.
For all clients active between January 1999 and June 2000, 98% owned their busi-
nesses. 0.74% had a formal registration; all of these businesses are non-agricultural.
Half of all businesses were founded before or in 1993, 25% before or in 1987. The
highest fraction of old businesses is found in agriculture and stockbreeding, with 6%
and 11% founded before 1960, respectively. The youngest sector are the services,
with 42% founded between 1996 and 2000, see table 3.12.
Most businesses have no employees (95% for business information between Jan-
uary 1999 and June 2000). Businesses with at least one employee are most frequently
found in the production sector. Of all businesses in 01/1999 to 06/2000, 11% of all
production businesses, 7% of all service businesses, and 3% of all commerce busi-
nesses had at least one employee.
During the same time, median assets held were $US 2,843, see table 3.13. The
stockbreeding sector has the highest assets with a median of $US 10,282 and the
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Branch of observation
Year cbb lpb scz sre tdd tja Total
1992 1,332 1,332
1993 8,544 8,544
1994 21,756 397 22,153
1995 2,691 30,022 3,754 1,400 37,867
1996 6,596 33,665 4,224 3,468 47,953
1997 5,909 22,054 3,925 788 3,600 36,276
1998 5,778 19,244 4,038 2,010 5,371 36,441
1999 4,679 24,665 620 4,456 2,383 2,503 39,306
June 2000 1,455 11,822 684 2,103 991 654 17,709
Total 27,108 173,104 1,304 22,897 6,172 16,996 247,581
Table 3.11: Number of balance observations by year and branch.
10th percentile as high as $US 33,504. The production sector has the lowest median
assets with $US 2,105. Assets in the commerce sector are relatively low as well with
a median of $US 3,409, compared to $US 5,836 in agriculture and $US 3,409 in
services. Asset holdings dier across regions with the highest median asset holdings
in Cochabamba of 3,989. Between 01/1999 and 06/2000 businesses classied as
small enterprises had median assets of $US 41,641 whereas micro-enterprises had
median assets of $US 2,475. Women had median assets of $US 2,178 compared to
$US 3,592 for men. Over time, median assets over all branches have increased from
$US 1,175 in 1992 to $US 3,048 in 2000. Again, all values are in 1992 $US.
The data also contains information about liabilities which makes it possible to
year of business
foundation Freq. Percent
before 1960 713 1.35
sixties 1,390 2.63
seventies 4,078 7.71
eighties 10,529 19.91
90 to 95 18,015 34.06
96 to 2000 18,163 34.34
Table 3.12: Year of business foundation of all clients active between January 1999
and June 2000.
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Business Branch of observation
Sector cbb lpb scz sre tdd tja Total
Agriculture 3,414 1,035 1,304 1,920 1,236 1,575
8,528 2,832 4,671 11,822 3,692 5,836
27,159 8,884 15,401 20,636 13,794 20,264
Commerce 713 402 792 351 738 605 432
3,637 2,193 3,703 1,987 3,485 2,655 2,473
15,025 18,475 16,536 15,470 15,902 14,379 17,268
Stockbreeding 3,259 944 271 2,961
10,659 37,107 1,385 10,282
33,504 73,270 5,870 33,504
Production 1,084 491 324 318 620 494 477
4,252 2,023 1,908 1,390 2,296 1,890 2,105
17,894 11,774 11,162 9,894 11,147 11,533 12,094
Service 606 444 663 799 656 777 553
3,419 3,138 3,224 4,611 2,666 3,530 3,409
16,694 14,309 18,780 21,510 12,391 20,392 16,060
Total 1,186 442 663 424 699 675 488
5,989 2,316 3,188 3,089 3,119 3,031 2,843
22,028 15,147 15,893 16,643 14,928 15,221 16,245
Table 3.13: 10th percentile, median, and 90th percentile of assets by branch and
business sector for observations between January 1999 and June 2000. Values are
in 1992 $US.
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Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Trade Credits 20.3 17.9 13.7 9.7 5.9 5.7 5.4 6.1 6.4
Other Loans 10.4 6.6 7.3 7.5 10.5 8.7 10.2 23.1 27.0
Table 3.14: Fraction of clients with trade credits and loans from other sources (in
%).
calculate equity. However, this information is not very reliable for numerous reasons:
rstly, all loans from informal lenders or relatives have to be self-reported and it
might not lie in the households' interest to report the correct amount. Secondly, data
from loans from other regulated institutions is available from the superintendency,
but the data is frequently either not received in time or not recorded correctly. For
these reasons we will consider some brief statistics only. Median equity in 01/1999 to
06/2000 was $US 2,647, with the 10th percentile $US 455, the 90th percentile $US
15,426. Median equity is highest in the stockbreeding and agricultural sectors with
$US 11,461 and $US 5,906, respectively. Median annualized equity growth equals
6.1% and tends to be slightly higher in the commerce sector than in the production
sector.
More than 81% of all balance information contain neither trade credits nor loans
from other sources. The importance of trade credits has decreased considerably
over time. While in 1992 20.3% of all businesses obtained trade credits, only 6.4%
did so in 2000, see table 3.14. This decline is similar in all branches and for all
business sectors. The number of businesses with loans from other sources, however,
has increased from a low of 6.6% in 1993 to 27% in 2000, indicating the increasing
availability of loans. These numbers are particularly high in Cochabamba and Santa
Cruz, with 28% and 50%, respectively. For small businesses with assets below $US
1,000 the fraction of businesses with trade credits has been smaller (16% in 1992
and 3% in 2000). In contrast to larger businesses, the fraction of these businesses
having loans from other sources has decreased from 1992 (7.2%) to 1998 (2.4%) and
increased again to 8.5% in 2000. The better availability of loans for larger businesses
is similarly evident when regarding the average liability over assets. While it is 0.04
for businesses with assets between $US 1,000 and 5,000, it is 0.15 for businesses with
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assets above $US 50,000. Again, all values are in 1992 $US.
The balance data also contains information on business and non-business in-
come. Since the distinction between both is dicult for agricultural businesses,
there is only few and not very reliable income information for the respective sectors.
In the following paragraphs, we focus on the non-agricultural sectorscommerce,
production, and services.
Median monthly business income between 01/1999 and 06/2000 was $US 186,
see table 3.15. It was highest in Santa Cruz and Cochabamba, with a median of
$US 210 and $US 211, respectively. When comparing dierent business sectors one
nds that the median income is highest in services with $US 206. Between 01/1999
and 06/2000, small enterprises had a median business income of $US 1,043 while
micro-enterprises had a median business income of 181. The median for males was
$US 219 while the median for females was $US 160.
The data also includes information about non-business income which allows to
calculate the total income of a client. For 1999/June 2000 median total monthly
income was $US 246, mean total monthly income $US 335. Over time, the median
has decreased in real terms from $US 333 in 1992 to $US 241 in 2000. Again there
are dierences between the median income of small enterprises ($US 1,093) and
micro-enterprises ($US 241), between men ($US 262) and women ($US 236). Values
are in 1992 $US. For all observations the median share of business income in total
income is 0.85. It is highest in the production sector, where more than half of the
clients obtain all their income from their businesses.
We now can calculate the return on assets for each business. The median monthly
return on assets between 01/1999 and 06/2000 is 7% for the commerce sector, 9% for
production activities, and 6% for services. While the 10th percentile is 2% for these
three branches, the 90th percentile is between 23% and 25%. When distinguishing
between small and micro-enterprises we nd that between 01/1999 and 06/2000
small enterprises had a median return on assets of 2.4% while micro-enterprises had
a median return on assets of 7.4%. The median for males was 6.4% and the median
for females was 7.5%, corresponding to the dierences in assets.
Since we have multiple observations of the same clients, we can calculate annu-
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Business Branch of observation
sector cbb lpb scz sre tdd tja Total
Commerce 60 47 58 35 67 64 48
191 173 206 146 199 187 175
477 583 455 486 512 519 549
Production 90 69 30 17 80 74 64
254 191 197 122 181 204 190
555 487 410 346 432 447 479
Service 81 69 99 59 81 76 71
212 211 233 188 182 219 206
507 501 476 436 446 544 483
Total 67 56 61 36 73 69 55
211 187 210 155 191 201 186
511 537 458 441 483 519 514
Table 3.15: 10th percentile, median, mean, and 90th percentile of monthly business
income by branch and business sector for observations between January 1999 and
June 2000.
alized growth rates e.g. for assets using
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We nd that between 01/1999 and 06/2000 median annualized asset growth is 0.13.
Asset growth is highest in commerce with a median of 0.16 and in the Trinidad
branch with a median of 0.29. From 1993 to 1999 median asset growth has in-
creased from 0.02 to 0.15, falling to 0.07 in the rst half of 2000. Asset growth is
highest for smaller businesses. If assets are below $US 1,000, asset growth in the
non-agricultural sectors has risen from a median of 0.04 in 1994 to 0.27 in 1999.
Correspondingly, asset growth is higher for women and micro-enterprises than for
men and small enterprises.
For January to June 2000 the median annualized growth in business income was -
0.02 in all non-agricultural sectors. The 10th percentile was -0.64, the 90th percentile
1.08. The relatively low numbers reect the economic crisis. The branches which
were hit the most were Tarija, with a median growth in business income of -0.07,
and Sucre with a median of -0.04. Small enterprises seem to have suered the most
3.4. HYPOTHESES 59
Business Branch of observation
sector cbb lpb scz sre tdd tja Total
Commerce 0.014 0.017 0.011 0.012 0.014 0.020 0.016
0.053 0.075 0.061 0.077 0.057 0.071 0.071
0.185 0.243 0.186 0.249 0.193 0.205 0.230
Production 0.016 0.023 0.026 0.005 0.018 0.023 0.021
0.058 0.093 0.094 0.085 0.075 0.106 0.089
0.170 0.258 0.256 0.288 0.262 0.311 0.257
Service 0.016 0.019 0.016 0.009 0.018 0.016 0.016
0.062 0.069 0.063 0.040 0.069 0.057 0.062
0.241 0.283 0.257 0.164 0.220 0.192 0.248
Table 3.16: 10th percentile, median, and 90th percentile of monthly return on assets
by branch and business sector for observations between January 1999 and June 2000.
with a median growth of -0.06 in 01/1999 to 06/2000, women are slightly better o
than men with a median of 0.005 (compared to -0.005 for men).
Median growth in total income was -0.01 in 2000 (0.01 in 1999) while it was 0.04
in 1997 and 1998. Again, small enterprises have lost the most with a median of
-0.05 in 01/1999 to 06/2000. Median sales growth has been zero in the rst half of
2000, down from 0.03 in 1999 and 0.06 in 1998. Again, micro-enterprises are better
o with median sales growth of 0.02 in 01/1999 to 06/2000; so are women with 0.02
compared to men with 0.01.
3.4 Hypotheses
3.4.1 Return on Assets Decreases for Clients
This section examines the following hypothesis:
A successful provision of micronance implies an alleviation of credit constraints
for micro-enterprises and it allows the business to increase the capital level used in
production. Assuming decreasing returns to scale and a sub-optimal initial level of
capital, the increase in assets moves the return on assets downwards closer to the
market interest rate. This eect should be more pronounced for very small busi-
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Year of Year of rst observation
observation 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1992 877
1993 2,172 1,429
1994 2,058 1,822 884
1995 2,734 2,508 1,284 1,006
1996 1,303 2,913 1,649 1,327 827
1997 1,886 3,826 2,030 1,908 1,156 945
1998 3,429 3,935 2,838 2,600 1,707 1,343 1,067
1999 4,595 5,574 4,493 4,212 2,881 2,627 1,685 1,881
2000 1,998 5,320 4,236 4,282 3,479 3,128 2,395 2,379 2,346
Table 3.17: Median assets by year of rst observation (cohort), commerce sector.
Values are in 1992 $US.
nesses, since they face the greatest credit constraints.
Consider, for example, a Cobb-Douglas production function Y = AL

K
1 
with
a marginal return on capital ofMRK = A(1 )
 
L
K


. If the business does not face
credit constraints, the optimal level of capital is such that the marginal return on
capital equals the market interest rate. Credit constraints reduce the level of capital
used. All else equal, the marginal return on capital is higher for credit constrained
rms since MRK decreases in K. Put dierently, the alleviation of binding credit
constraints leads to a decrease in the return on capital. In the following paragraphs,
we proceed in two steps. Firstly, we show that capital usage increases for clients
who take out repeat loans, where we approximate capital by the sum of all assets.
Secondly, we show that the return on capital decreases over time for these clients.
13
Since the amount of assets held varies considerably between sectors, the following
analysis focuses on the commerce sector which is where most of Caja Los Andes'
clients have their businesses. The developments in the other sectors are similar.
Table 3.17 shows that initial assets in the commerce sector have risen from a median
of $US 877 in 1992 to a median of $US 2,346 in 2000, again all values are in 1992
$US. When regarding the median assets by cohort we also nd a rise in most cases.
13
The amount of labor stays constant over time for the largest part of the sample. A decreasing
productivity parameter A would also lead to a decline of the return on capital, e.g. during the
economic crisis. To avoid attributing a productivity based decline in the MRK to better capital
supply we not only consider the return on assets but also the development of assets over time.
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Year of Year of rst observation (cohort)
observ. 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1992 0.356
1993 0.278 0.278
1994 0.186 0.208 0.225
1995 0.134 0.154 0.178 0.210
1996 0.131 0.135 0.149 0.169 0.196
1997 0.137 0.124 0.137 0.140 0.167 0.195
1998 0.104 0.121 0.119 0.122 0.139 0.166 0.196
1999 0.058 0.077 0.082 0.086 0.103 0.117 0.145 0.177
2000 0.101 0.060 0.067 0.076 0.088 0.092 0.114 0.137 0.181
Table 3.18: Monthly median return on assets by year and cohort for clients with
initial assets below $US 1,000. Commerce sector.
For clients with their rst balance observation in 1994, for example, median assets
have risen from $US 884 in 1994 to $US 4,236 in 2000 (+380%). This strong increase
in assets supports our hypothesis.
14
Regarding the return on assets, we nd a considerable decrease from a median
monthly return on assets of 20.9% in 1992 to 6.6% in 2000.
15
This decrease has
two possible sources. Firstly, capital supply for small and micro-enterprises has
improved in the Bolivian economy, see also section 3.2.2.2. Thus, even new clients
should have a higher leverage than they used to in earlier years. Secondly, clients
taking repeat loans from Caja Los Andes, mostly of growing size, can increase their
assets.
To separate these eects, we can compare the median return on assets of dierent
cohorts. Consider the commerce sector and micro-enterprises with initial assets
below $US 1,000 as presented in table 3.18. The median return on assets for new
clients has decreased from 36% in 1992 to 18% in 2000. Again we also nd a decrease
14
While we do not control for selection bias at this point, we can rule out that the increase in
assets solely stems from a dropout of clients with low assets. When we make the same cohort
analysis restricted to clients which we observe at least three times, for example, the rise in assets
is similar.
15
One can think of other possible explanations of the declining return on assets, e.g. the recession
beginning in 1998 or increasing competition from the rising number of urban poor. While we can
rule out the recession as the main cause since it begins only in late 1998 while return on assets
declines in earlier years as well, a more comprehensive econometric analysis is needed to single out
other factors.
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of the return on assets for each cohort. Clients taking their rst loan in 1994, for
example, had a median monthly return on assets of 22.5%, declining to 6.7% in
2000. In addition, we nd that clients who have been with Caja Los Andes for a
longer time (earlier cohorts) have a lower return on assets than new clients. In 1998,
for example, new clients had a median return on assets of 19.6%, while clients with
their rst observation in 1994 had a median return on assets of 11.9%. These eects
indicate a positive inuence of the loans from Caja Los Andes on the clients' use of
assets.
While the numbers presented above show a rise in assets and a decline in return
on assets consistent with our hypothesis, selection bias is a considerable problem
here. We have multiple observations only of those clients who take repeat loans.
These clients could well be more successful than others. These issues can be tackled
in a more comprehensive regression analysis which includes the estimation of survival
probabilities. This is left for future work (chapter 4).
3.4.2 Business Income Increases for Clients
This section examines the following hypothesis:
The provision of micronance should lead to a rise in business income through a)
a reduction in interest costs and b) the alleviation of capital constraints. Thus,
business income should be higher for clients after their second, third etc. loans.
Again, this eect should be larger for smaller businesses since they face larger credit
constraints.
To examine this hypothesis consider the median monthly business income for
dierent cohorts as shown in table 3.19. The table again shows two eects. Firstly,
median business income increases over time e.g. from $US 160 for clients taking
their rst loan in 1994 to $US 284 in 1998 (+78%). Secondly, for any given year,
clients who are longer with Caja Los Andes than others (earlier cohorts) tend to
have higher business income as well. For observations made in 1997, for example,
new clients had a median business income of $US 139, clients with a rst loan in
1996 had a median of 162, and clients with a rst loan in 1993 had a median of 283.
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Year of Year of rst observation (cohort)
observ. 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1992 226
1993 349 241
1994 196 251 160
1995 249 314 187 156
1996 195 296 208 177 133
1997 238 283 241 213 162 139
1998 310 385 284 247 194 176 156
1999 378 294 248 243 214 200 170 162
2000 538 324 245 249 181 190 171 167 157
Table 3.19: Median monthly business income by year and cohort for clients in the
commerce sector. Values are in 1992 $US.
In 1999 and 2000 median business income decreases for most cohorts, coinciding
with the recession beginning in late 1998. With the exception of this decrease the
development of median business income of dierent cohorts over time is consistent
with our hypothesis since it shows that median business income grows over time.
How does this compare to the development of smaller businesses? Table 3.20
lists median business income for clients with initial assets below $US 1,000 by the
year of the rst client observation (cohort). The table shows the same two eects.
Firstly, business income increases over time e.g. from $US 107 for clients taking
their rst loan in 1994 to $US 196 in 1999. Secondly, for any given year clients who
are longer with Caja Los Andes than others (earlier cohorts) tend to have higher
business income as well. For observations made in 1997, for example, new clients
had a median business income of $US 93, clients with a rst loan in 1995 had a
median of 140, and clients with a rst loan in 1992 had a median of 158. When
we compare the change in business income of the low asset group (table 3.20) with
the total sample (table 3.19) we nd that the relative increase in median business
income is smaller for the low asset group. That is, the median business income of
the 1993 cohort, for example, has grown 60% until 1998 for all commerce businesses
(385 compared to 241) while it has grown 33% only for the low asset group (194
compared to 146). This could indicate the existence of scale eects and stands in
contrast to our hypothesis.
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Year of Year of rst observation (cohort)
observ. 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
1992 150
1993 164 146
1994 190 155 107
1995 184 198 134 100
1996 180 160 146 118 92
1997 158 156 152 140 113 93
1998 233 194 166 150 129 112 97
1999 270 199 196 156 140 117 110 89
2000 134 235 145 153 130 119 103 94 84
Table 3.20: Median monthly business income by year and cohort for clients with
initial assets below $US 1,000, commerce sector. Values are in 1992 $US.
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3.5 Appendix
A short note on the tables Branches are abbreviated as follows: cbb = Cochabamba,
lpb = La Paz, scz = Santa Cruz, sre = Sucre, tdd = Trinidad, and tja = Tarija.
Unless mentioned otherwise, all tables are based on own calculations from Caja Los
Andes' data set and all values are in 1992 $US.
Branch of observation
Year cbb lpb scz sre tdd tja Total
1992 3,849 3,849
1993 7,621 7,621
1994 19,078 324 19,402
1995 2,393 22,879 3,108 1,122 29,502
1996 5,195 25,614 3,326 2,597 36,732
1997 4,537 24,657 3,066 570 2,513 35,343
1998 3,978 22,263 3,027 1,518 3,241 34,027
1999 5,019 18,269 452 3,330 1,647 3,374 32,091
June 2000 3,834 9,354 521 1,508 590 1,942 17,749
Table 3.21: Number of loans disbursed by year and branch.
Year of Branch of observation
rst loan cbb lpb scz sre tdd tja Total
1992 1,518 1,518
1993 2,843 2,843
1994 6,344 306 6,650
1995 1,511 5,918 1,373 724 9,526
1996 2,285 7,765 1,151 1,150 12,351
1997 1,462 6,800 912 534 969 10,677
1998 1,318 6,514 953 909 1,501 11,195
1999 2,404 5,661 436 1,317 762 1,251 11,831
June 2000 1,928 3,086 460 581 146 709 6,910
Table 3.22: Number of new clients by year and branch.
66 CHAPTER 3. CAJA LOS ANDES, BOLIVIA
Sector number of contracts % amount %
Service 3,797 17.3 41,151,615.18 18.1
Commerce 10,854 49.3 124,021,906.33 54.4
Production 6,431 29.2 57,663,027.46 25.3
Agriculture 876 4.0 4,975,832.79 2.2
Stockbreeding 1 0.0 3,000.00 0.0
others 35 0.2 63,137.70 0.0
total 21,994 100.0 227,878,519.47 100.0
Type of guarantee number of contracts % amount %
chattel 8,545 38.9 67,824,600.68 29.8
mixed 65 0.3 7,187,885.56 3.2
chattel and personal 13,249 60.2 134,675,868.72 59.1
mortgage and personal 1 0.0 372,000.00 0.2
mortgage and chattel 134 0.6 17,818,164.50 7.8
total 21,994 100.0 227,878,519.47 100.0
payment frequency number of contracts % amount %
weekly 75 0.3 500,245.59 0.2
bi-weekly 752 3.4 3,893,133.42 1.7
monthly 16,301 74.1 151,959,623.49 66.7
three-monthly 6 0.0 1,333,389.67 0.6
two-monthly 2 0.0 44,600.00 0.0
irregular 4,858 22.1 70,147,527.30 30.8
total 21,994 100.0 227,878,519.47 100.0
loan destination number of contracts % amount %
working capital 17,448 79.3 162,074,853.63 71.1
xed capital 3,513 16.0 54,450,521.03 23.9
mixed (work.+ xed) 941 4.3 10,981,454.93 4.8
house improvement 17 0.1 160,305.38 0.1
consumption 58 0.3 131,331.50 0.1
freely disposable 17 0.1 80,053.00 0.0
total 21,994 100.0 227,878,519.47 100.0
Table 3.23: Characteristics of loans outstanding on July 31st, 2000, in La Paz.
Source: Caja Los Andes.
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duration number of contracts % amount %
up to 3 months 69 0.3 524,038.40 0.2
4 to 6 months 296 1.3 1,068,495.15 0.5
7 to 9 months 755 3.4 2,149,446.40 0.9
10 to 12 months 4,699 21.4 17,888,516.27 7.9
13 to 18 months 6,621 30.1 44,902,951.67 19.7
19 to 24 months 5,261 23.9 64,600,597.35 28.3
more than 24 months 4,293 19.5 96,744,474.24 42.5
total 21,994 100.0 227,878,519.47 100.0
sex number of contracts % amount %
females 12,456 56.6 113,007,504.50 49.6
males 9,538 43.4 114,871,014.96 50.4
total 21,994 100.0 227,878,519.47 100.0
type number of contracts % amount %
new 6,600 30.0 51,416,220.23 22.6
recurrent 15,394 70.0 176,462,299.23 77.4
Total 21,994 100.0 227,878,519.47 100.0
days in arrears number of contracts % amount %
no arrears 19,375 88.1 203,058,952.78 89.1
1 to 10 464 2.1 4,264,664.10 1.9
11 to 20 381 1.7 3,715,814.00 1.6
21 to 30 394 1.8 3,706,097.89 1.6
31 to 90 446 2.0 4,563,210.42 2.0
more than 90 934 4.2 8,569,780.28 3.8
total 21,994 100.0 227,878,519.47 100.0
Table 3.24: Characteristics of loans outstanding on July 31st, 2000, in La Paz,
continued. Source: Caja Los Andes
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Sizes of disbursed loans
Year < 500 500-5000 > 5000 Total
1992 2,473 1,474 18 3,965
(62.37%) (37.18%) (0.45%) (100.00%)
1993 5,474 2,305 39 7,818
(70.02%) (29.48%) (0.50%) (100.00%)
1994 15,429 4,603 80 20,112
(76.72%) (22.89%) (0.40%) (100.00%)
1995 23,937 7,067 214 31,218
(76.68%) (22.64%) (0.69%) (100.00%)
1996 27,526 11,020 367 38,913
(70.74%) (28.32%) (0.94%) (100.00%)
1997 22,487 14,249 692 37,428
(60.08%) (38.07%) (1.85%) (100.00%)
1998 20,165 15,258 912 36,335
(55.50%) (41.99%) (2.51%) (100.00%)
1999 17,242 16,554 1,007 34,803
(49.54%) (47.56%) (2.89%) (100.00%)
June 2000 8,519 9,221 637 18,377
(46.36%) (50.18%) (3.47%) (100.00%)
Table 3.25: Development of loan sizes over time by number of disbursed loans.
Interest rates
Loan sizes < 1.5 1.5 to 2 2 to 2.5 2.5 to 3 Total
< 500 2.21 33.73 64.06 100.00
500-5000 0.01 0.12 19.26 80.60 100.00
> 5000 4.22 8.13 37.65 50.00 100.00
Total 0.34 0.97 22.20 76.48 100.00
Table 3.26: Distribution of interest rates for various loan sizes for loans denominated
in $US between 01/1999 and 06/2000 (in %).
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Sizes of disbursed loans
Year < 500 500-5000 > 5000 Total
1992 573,631 1,734,374 169,164 2,477,169
(23.16%) (70.01%) (6.83%) (100.00%)
1993 1,204,141 2,814,441 249,212 4,267,793
(28.21%) (65.95%) (5.84%) (100.00%)
1994 2,874,960 5,170,278 501,757 8,546,995
(33.64%) (60.49%) (5.87%) (100.00%)
1995 4,916,332 8,255,053 1,526,004 14,697,389
(33.45%) (56.17%) (10.38%) (100.00%)
1996 5,919,510 12,840,243 2,705,629 21,465,381
(27.58%) (59.82%) (12.60%) (100.00%)
1997 5,345,655 17,901,772 5,224,518 28,471,945
(18.78%) (62.88%) (18.35%) (100.00%)
1998 5,430,785 22,402,337 7,323,485 35,156,607
(15.45%) (63.72%) (20.83%) (100.00%)
1999 4,782,291 23,755,821 8,207,702 36,745,815
(13.01%) (64.65%) (22.34%) (100.00%)
June 2000 2,401,577 13,445,719 5,188,436 21,035,732
(11.42%) (63.92%) (24.66%) (100.00%)
Table 3.27: Development of total amount disbursed by loan size over time.
Currency
Loan Size Boliviano US Dollar Ination adj. Bolivianos
< 500 85.73 8.24 6.03
500-5000 29.16 65.65 5.19
> 5000 0.30 99.57 0.12
Table 3.28: Distributions of currencies by loan size (in %).
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Business Sector
Year Agriculture Commerce Stockbreeding Production Service Total
1992 77 75 88 76 80
1993 63 95 100 87 96
1994 78 109 117 103 111
1995 121 145 141 158 133 147
1996 191 202 235 212 193 204
1997 250 290 265 300 305 293
1998 303 359 319 373 392 363
1999 360 455 325 466 502 458
June 2000 425 522 434 525 601 531
Table 3.29: Mean length of loans in days by year and business sector.
rst, second .. Year of rst loan (cohort)
approved loan 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total
1st 1,518 2,844 6,647 9,495 12,31 10,658 43,472
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
2nd 1,333 2,429 5,6 7,697 9,47 7,702 34,231
(87.81) (85.41) (84.25) (81.06) (76.93) (72.26) (78.74)
3rd 1,199 2,042 4,779 6,386 7,378 5,076 26,86
(78.99) (71.8 ) (71.9 ) (67.26) (59.94) (47.63) (61.79)
4rth 1,071 1,723 3,997 5,193 5,255 2,609 19,848
(70.55) (60.58) (60.13) (54.69) (42.69) (24.48) (45.66)
Table 3.30: Number of clients with a rst, second, third, and fourth loan by year of
rst loan (%).
Loan size
Year <100 100-300 300-1,000 1,000-10,000  10; 000
1996 0.33 0.60 0.58 0.38
1997 1.34 1.44 1.50 1.29
1998 1.54 1.96 2.35 2.69 0.85
1999 2.40 2.89 3.63 4.13 4.46
2000 3.16 3.76 5.19 6.00 5.47
Table 3.31: Fraction of clients with arrears of  30 days by loan size (in %).
Chapter 4
The Impact of Micronance Loans
on the Clients' Enterprises:
Evidence from Caja Los Andes,
Bolivia
4.1 Introduction
Most developing countries have a large informal sector, constituted of small un-
registered businesses. Since jobs in the ocial sector are scarce, people become
micro-entrepreneurs, selling goods on the streets, adding to their income through
home-production, or farming whatever piece of land available. The prevalence of
the informal sector is especially large in South America, where many countries'
legal system makes a formal registration extremely dicult. A 1983 household sur-
vey in Bolivia's capital La Paz found that 57% of the labor force was involved in
the informal sector and that 89% of all retailers were informal (Rhyne 2001, p. 43).
Wages and incomes in the informal sector are low and a large part of micro-enterprise
workers live in poverty.
1
Most micro-enterprises suer from an inadequately low level of capital since their
owners usually do not have access to the formal banking sector. Even if loans from
the formal sector are available, transaction costs tend to be very high, estimated
at 2% to 30% of the loan size (Murinde 1996, table 3.10). To alleviate short term
1
An assessment of the micro-enterprise sector in South American can be found in Orlando and
Pollack (2000). An account of the informal sector in Peru is provided in De Soto (1989).
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capital needs, many of these households borrow from moneylenders who charge very
high interest rates. In a survey of rural moneylenders in Nigeria, Aleem (1993)
nds that the average annual rate charged was 79%. An evaluation report from a
rural project in Vietnam nds that moneylenders unchallenged by credit programs
charged around 15% per month (Kervyn 2001). The poorest households thus have
extremely high borrowing costs.
2
Politicians have attempted to reduce the interest rates paid by the poor through
various measures. Some countries imposed interest ceilings, others set up develop-
ment banks making available inexpensive loans. A large part of this money, however,
never reached the targeted population. Since the funds were oered with highly at-
tractive interest rates, a large proportion got diverted to more inuential groups of
the population. If the loans got distributed to the poor, they often were understood
as gifts rather than loans and rarely were repaid.
3
After the poor success of these development banks new approaches were tried.
It was recognized that interest rates had to be raised to ensure an operation on a
cost-covering basis and to make the loans unattractive to richer borrowers. While
the rates have increased substantially, they are still considerably lower than the
moneylenders'. In addition, new incentive schemes have been designed to generate
high repayment rates, a prerequisite for long-term credit services. One of the rst
and most well known examples for these new institutions, the Grameen bank, was
set up in Bangladesh in 1976 and serves over two million clients by now. Since
most households cannot provide collateral, the Grameen bank distributes group
loans only. All participants in the group are jointly liable for the loan amount and
are granted consecutive loans only if the loan is repaid in full. The loan amount is
increased over time, raising the potential gains from each consecutive loan. Through
this mechanism the bank trusts in the group members to ensure that only reliable
persons participate in the group and that the loan is repaid in full. The Grameen and
other micronance banks have achieved astonishingly high repayment rates through
2
A slightly dierent view is expressed in Kochar (1997). Using data from a eld study in rural
India the author nds that borrowing constraints are less severe than commonly assumed.
3
A comprehensive overview of the experience with development banks is given in Krahnen and
Schmidt (1994).
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these and related methods, becoming a model for development nance worldwide.
4
At the time of writing this paper, there was an ongoing discussion among mi-
cronance practitioners and supporters about the use of subsidies (see the articles
and opinions in various issues of The MicroBanking Bulletin for some examples).
One group argues that micronance provides an excellent means to help the poor,
who benet from lower interest rates and improved access to loans. The costs of
these small loans are very high and it is argued that the poor need help to cover
these costs since they would have to pay unacceptably high interest rates otherwise.
Others argue that micronance can provide long-term services only if it eventually
operates on a sustainable basis. While proponents of the rst view want to push
loan sizes further downwards to serve an even poorer clientele, the others argue
that very poor households cannot be served on a cost-covering basis and frequently
require aid rather than loans.
At the heart of this discussion lies the question how much clients actually benet
from micronance loans and whether or not poorer households benet more than
others. As long as the majority of micronance institutions uses subsidies in one
form or another,
5
one has to compare costs and benets of supporting micronance
programs to alternative ways of development aid. As long as the impact of micro-
nance programs has not been assessed, the discussion about the use of subsidies has
to remain inconclusive.
How can the impact of these programs be measured? To begin with, micronance
institutions can oer substantially lower rates than moneylenders due to their larger
scale of operations and lower costs of funds. The direct impact then can be measured
by the reduction in borrowing costs. The biggest obstacle for more comprehensive
studies analyzing the impact of the loans on the clients and their businesses is
the lack of adequate data. Most institutions collect very little data from their
4
For more information see The MicroBanking Bulletin, which regularly publishes key indicators
for micronance institutions worldwide. Morduch (2000) provides a recent overview of micronance
and discusses the underlying concepts. Since the emergence of group loans there have been a
number of theoretical studies on the so-called social collateral analyzing the incentive mechanisms
inside these groups, see Conning (2000) for an example. Practices in individual micronance lending
are discussed in Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2000) and Churchill (1999).
5
The MicroBanking Bulletin covered 49 institutions in October 1997 out of which 21 were fully
self-sucient. In September 2000, it covered 179 out of which 65 were fully self-sucient.
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clients. Since virtually none of the clients keep accounting books, information on
their businesses is hard to come by. Even if this basic data is available, data on
control groups almost never is. That is, even if we do observe the increase in income
of the microlender's clients, we know nothing about non-clients and, in particular,
do not know if and by how much their income increases as well. When we observe
an increase in the clients' incomes, it is unclear how much of this increase is due
to the loans and how much is due to the selection on the side of the bank. If the
bank approves loan applications for relatively productive people, increasing incomes
of clients might be induced by their higher productivity, independently of any loans.
Finally, the placement of micronance programs is endogenous. A micronance
institution opens its doors at a place where it is likely to achieve a raise in incomes.
From increases in income in this location it is hard to infer whether a similar raise
had been achieved in other places as well. This selection is particularly severe in
countries where only few and relatively small micronance institutions operate.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the impact of micro-loans on the clients'
businesses. In particular, we analyze their contribution to productivity and growth.
For the majority of clients, we nd a positive impact of prior loans on productivity
that increases with business size. That is, in terms of productivity, larger businesses
tend to benet more from micronance loans than smaller businesses. Besides the
analysis of productivity, the examination of growth is of particular relevance for
an impact analysis. Many micronance programs have been developed with the
specic goal of increasing the scale of the clients' businesses. Many practitioners, on
the other hand, suspect that the loans and the saving in borrowing costs are merely
used for additional consumption instead of investment. If this were the case, neither
assets nor incomes would rise. Our results, however, show a positive and signicant
inuence of prior loans on growth in assets.
Throughout our analysis we address selection issues by estimating a two-stage
selection model using clients with rejected loan applications as a control group. The
analysis is based on data from Caja Los Andes in Bolivia. The data set includes valu-
able information about the clients' businesses in form of estimated balance sheets.
Because of the widespread availability of micro-loans in Bolivia, the selectivity of
4.2. LITERATURE 75
the data is limited. Bolivia is one of the most developed and most competitive mi-
cronance markets in existence today, Rhyne (2001, p. 19) estimates that between
one third and one fourth of all Bolivian micro-enterprises are active borrowers.
The paper proceeds with an overview of related studies in section 4.2. Section 4.3
provides a brief description of the data set used and section 4.4 discusses the mea-
surement of impact and the underlying theoretical concepts. Section 4.5 continues
with a discussion of the econometric issues arising from the selection processes in-
herent in our data. Section 4.6 provides estimates for the selection equations and
analyzes the impact of micronance loans on growth and productivity. A discussion
of the results is presented in chapter 4.7.
4.2 Literature
Due to a lack of suitable data, there exists only a small number of studies that ana-
lyze the impact of micronance loans. There is a detailed micro-survey of households
in Taiwan, including information on assets, loans, and savings. Besley and Levenson
(1996) and Kan (2000) use this survey and nd that a household's participation in
an informal savings group (a rotating savings and credit association) has a positive
impact on household investment.
In 1991/1992 the Bangladesh Institute for Development studies and the World-
bank jointly conducted a survey of households in rural Bangladesh to examine the
impact of three micronance programs. The survey was designed to include a num-
ber of control groups such as villages without access to one of these programs and
households not eligible for participation. This survey has been used by a number of
studies since. Pitt and Khandker (1998), for example, analyze the impact of group
loans from one of these micronance programs with a focus on gender-specic ef-
fects. They nd that annual household expenditure increases by a larger amount
if women are the recipients of these loans. In a follow-up analysis, Pitt, Khandker,
Chowdhury, and Millimet (1998) examine the impact of group loans on children's
health and nd a signicant positive impact of loans to mothers and a non-signicant
impact of loans to fathers. Morduch (1998), on the other hand, does not nd any
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evidence for higher consumption levels or increased school enrollment. However, he
does nd evidence for lower variability of consumption implying that participating
households better manage to smooth consumption over time. In an overview article
(Morduch 2000) he discusses these and other ndings. The eects of these programs
on wages and employment are examined in Khandker, Samad, and Khan (1998)
and Pitt (1999), who nd evidence for increases in wages and self-employment. Mc-
Kernan (2000) and Madajewicz (1999) analyze the impact of participation in these
programs on prots. While McKernan nds a signicant impact with prots increas-
ing by roughly 175%, Madajewicz focuses on the distinction of group loans versus
individual loans. She nds that when compared to individual loans, group loans
from the Grameen bank increase prots by 8% for households with no land and by
less for wealthier households (with a negative inuence on prots for households
with more than 2 acres of land). That is, wealthier households benet more from
individual loans than from group loans.
Coleman (1999, 2001) analyzes a micronance program in Northeast Thailand.
Correcting for selection bias, he nds that the impact of micronance institutions
on household wealth is either non-signicant or negative. He attributes the negative
impact to the small size of the loans. Being too small for investment, the loans are
used for consumption and households turn to moneylenders to nance the repay-
ments, leading to a vicious circle. When he distinguishes between wealthy and poor
clients, he nds that only the wealthy clients benet from the loans. The results by
Coleman and Madajewicz have a similar structure in that they show the large in-
uence of wealth. While the authors nd negative or insignicant eects if averages
are considered, there are signicantly positive eects for groups with high wealth
(Coleman (2001) and individual loans in Madajewicz (1999)) or low wealth (group
loans in Madajewicz (1999)).
6
In recent years, the Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise Services (AIMS)
project has provided guidelines for impact analyses based on data already collected
6
For further analyses of informal capital markets see Ho, Braverman, and Stiglitz (1993), who
provide a collection of articles on rural credit markets including many case studies, and Mon-
tiel, Agenor, and Ul Haque (1993) who provide an empirical and theoretical overview of informal
nancial markets.
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by most institutions.
7
One strategy suggested consists in the comparison of clients
who have passed the bank's screening but who have not yet received a loan, with
clients who have received a loan some time ago. Through the restriction to clients
who have passed the bank's screening, selection bias is reduced. Mosley (2001) and
Copestake, Bhalotra, and Johnson (2001) use this approach to asses the impact of
micro-loans in Bolivia and Zambia, respectively. Both nd a positive impact of loans
on the clients' economic situation and Mosley also nds evidence for poorer clients
beneting less because they prefer low-risk and low-return investments.
While these studies reduce selection bias in restricting their analysis to clients
who have passed the bank's screening, their results are of a limited generality since
they apply to clients only. That is, we cannot infer whether similar benets would
have been achieved if the program was extended to a larger part of the population.
The benets observed could be explained by the selection of the clients: if the
bank selects those clients that make the best use of additional funds, we cannot
expect similar benets for other potential clients. In addition, neither paper models
drop-out of clients. When comparing experienced clients with new clients these
experienced clients have continued taking loans through some time which makes
them a selective sample. The analysis presented in the following sections avoids
both sources of bias through the estimation of a selection model.
While most of the above mentioned studies provide evidence for a positive inu-
ence of micro-loans on household welfare, they do not explicitly model the micro-
enterprises through which the increase in incomes is achieved. One exception is
McKernan (2000), who estimates a reduced form prot equation. While she nds
that participation in a micronance group increases prots, the analysis is restricted
to contemporaneous eects. That is, prots are higher while participating in the
program. The data do not allow inferences about longer term eects such as growth
of the businesses. In addition, most of these studies use data from Asian countries
7
One such guideline is Learning from Clients: Assessment Tools for Micronance Practition-
ers. The AIMS project is implemented by Management Systems International, Washington D. C.,
in partnership with the Harvard Institute for International Development, the University of Mis-
souri, and the Small Enterprise Education and Promotion Network. For more information see
http://www.mip.org/componen/aims.htm.
78 CHAPTER 4. THE IMPACT OF MICROFINANCE LOANS
where the samples consist of very poor households in a restricted rural economic en-
vironment. Micronance in South America, in contrast, caters to a dierent group
of clients. The loans distributed are considerably larger and are targeted to the
better-o households among the poor. Interest rates charged are higher and more
institutions work on a cost covering basis.
8
As a consequence, we can expect the
structure of the micro-enterprises and the way income is generated to dier consid-
erably.
Besides the impact studies discussed above, there is a large body of literature
on small rm growth in developed countries, most of which follows the debate on
Gibrat's law (stating that growth is independent of rm size). Evans (1987a, 1987b),
for example, uses data on US manufacturing companies and nds a negative connec-
tion between rm size, rm age, and growth. McPherson (1996) uses survey data
from four African countries and analyzes growth determinants for a small micro-
enterprise sample nding a signicant inuence of business sectors, human capital,
gender, and rm size on growth. This paper adds to this literature in analyzing
growth determinants for a large micro-enterprise sample focusing on the inuence
of prior loans on growth.
4.3 Data
The data we use for our analysis has been provided by Caja Los Andes, Bolivia. It
consists of information on 76.000 clients and 28.000 rejected loan applications and
covers the time fromMai 1992 to June 2000. Caja Los Andes FFP S.A. is a registered
savings and loan company with its main branch in La Paz, Bolivia.
9
In July 2000
(when the data was collected) it oered credits to small and micro-enterprises in
rural and urban areas. It also oered savings accounts and xed deposits. Both
loans and deposits are either in Bolivianos or in $US, acknowledging the widespread
8
Of the institutions covered in The MicroBanking Bulletin (2000), 77% of the South-American
institutions were nancially self-sucient compared to 55% of the Asian institutions. While only
39% of the South-American institutions specically target the lowest income group (average loan
balance $US 250), 79% of the Asian institutions do so (average loan balance $US 83).
9
FFP stands for Fondo Financiero Privado. The legal category FFP has been created as an
institutional form for small banks in Bolivia (Rhyne 2001).
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dollarization of the Bolivian economy. In December 1999, Caja Los Andes was
serving 36,815 clients with outstanding loans amounting to $US 35.9 Mio. 54% of
these loans were made to women. The high concentration of micro-enterprises in
the commerce sector is mirrored in the distribution of the outstanding loans, 44%
of which went to commerce, 21% to production, 12% to the service industry, and
12% to agriculture related businesses. Since the data for agricultural businesses
diers from the rest of the data, we conne the following analysis to the commerce,
production, and service sectors.
10
Caja Los Andes does not give group loans but secures the loans through chattel
items such as televisions or other household items. While these have little value for
Caja Los Andes, the owner values them very highly and has a strong incentive to
repay the loan. Besides chattel items, personal guarantees are used and larger loans
can be secured by mortgages as well. When a new client applies for a loan, the loan
ocer records the application. He visits the client's business and estimates balance
sheet data if there are no obvious reasons for a rejection of the loan (these could be
the age of the client, less than one year of business experience, or a bad repayment
record with other banks). The loan ocer then suggests whether and for which
amount this loan should be approved and a committee decides (more experienced
loan ocers decide by themselves). When the client later on applies for another
loan, the loan ocer visits again and makes an update of the balance information.
Clients with a very good repayment performance eventually obtain an automatic
credit line and balance information is collected irregularly.
While Caja Los Andes initially gave loans to micro-enterprises only (i.e. very
small enterprises), the target group has broadened in recent years. Caja Los Andes
has opened a new small enterprise division which gives substantially larger loans.
The median loan amount disbursed has increased from $US 367 in 1992 to $US 565
in January-June 2000. A part of this increase in loan sizes is due to a change in
management policy: In spite of relatively high interest rates very small loans are
10
The data for agricultural businesses contains information about assets and liabilities but does
not contain information about income and expenditures. This is because a large part of the
proceeds of agricultural businesses are consumed directly and the income generated is hard to
measure.
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Figure 4.1: Median assets by cohort in 1992 $US. Sample: clients with initial assets
below 1,000 (1992 $US), commerce, production, and service sectors.
hardly sustainable and larger loans are distributed to ensure cost coverage. The
increase is also driven by an increasing need for funds from clients with fast growing
businesses. The data show a substantial development of the clients over time as
depicted in gure 4.1. Median assets for all clients who took their rst loans in
1993 have increased from $US 600 in 1993 to $US 3,300 in 2000 (values are in 1992
$US).
11
While these numbers are impressive, it is unclear whether the increase can
be attributed to the loans from Caja Los Andes. Clients might simply be selected
based on their good growth prospects. Moreover, the data from 2000, for example, is
based on those clients that take repeat loans in 2000. These are hardly representative
for all clients who took a rst loan in 1993. Section 4.5 presents the econometric
theory underlying these selection processes and discusses a consistent estimator.
11
The data is discussed in more detail in chapter 3. More information about the development
of micronance in Bolivia is provided in Rhyne (2001), Gonzalez-Vega, Meyer, Navajas, Schreiner,
Rodriguez-Meza, and Monje (1996), Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer, Gonzalez-Vega, and Rogriguez-
Meza (2000), and Inter-American Development Bank (1998). A lively account of Caja Los Andes'
work can also be found in Frankfurter Rundschau (1998, 17. Oktober).
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4.4 Measurement of Impact
Given the data, how can we measure the impact of loans from Caja Los Andes on the
clients and their businesses? At the heart of this question lies the clients' use of their
loans. While a part of these loans is invested directly into the clients' businesses and
increases assets, many clients also use a part of their loan to nance consumption
expenditures. When a client obtains a loan, he faces an intertemporal optimization
problem for the decision how much of this loan to invest in his business and how
much to consume directly. If clients were not capital constrained, the optimal level
of assets would solely be driven by prices, expected returns, and interest rates, that
is, it would be such that the marginal return on assets equals the interest rate paid
on the loan. Since most of Caja Los Andes' clients do face constraints on the size of
their loans, however, the levels of prior assets and of income (from their businesses
and from other sources) play a crucial role for their decision how much to invest. To
see this, consider an example where it would be optimal to use assets worth $1,000.
If the client can freely chose the size of the loan, he will increase his assets to this
level. If he obtains a loan of $200 only, for example, the size of initial assets and of
his income determine whether it is optimal (and feasible) for him to increase assets
to $1,000.
One possibility to measure the impact of the loan thus lies in an analysis of
asset growth.
12
If the clients invest the additional funds and use them productively,
assets should be higher than before even after the loan has been repaid. If it is
optimal for the client to invest into his enterprise when he takes out a loan, it is
optimal to use a part of the additional revenues for investment as well (assuming
well-behaved preferences). If loans from Caja Los Andes contribute to an increase in
assets, higher loans should lead to higher growth rates as long as the level of assets
is sub-optimal (everything else equal). In addition, clients with a higher income
from their businesses and from other sources are able to invest larger amounts than
others.
12
Alternatively, one could analyze growth in equity. Our information about liabilities, however,
tend to be underestimated and we consider assets only. We do, however, subtract the amount of
outstanding loans from Caja Los Andes.
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To assess these factors, we estimate the determinants of growth in assets. In
analogy to Evans (1987b) we estimate growth through a logarithmic expansion of
log assets. Our estimation equation thus has the form
lnK
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where K are assets and A contains additional variables, among which are the num-
ber and log average size of prior loans and income. Since the time between two
observations diers considerably, we use annualized growth rates. Assuming that
the return on assets exceeds the interest rate, we expect that the size of prior loans
has a positive inuence on growth.
13
Even if loans lead to an increase in the clients' assets, it is unclear whether or not
the clients use these additional assets eectively. A second step of our impact analy-
sis therefore examines the productivity of clients. In other words, how eectively do
clients with prior loans use their additional assets? In a way, this analysis examines
how smoothly clients can move upward on their production function. A priori, it is
unclear to what extent the scale of a business can be increased smoothly. On the one
hand, ecient use of larger assets might require other skills than running a small
trade shop, for example. On the other hand, the bank's estimation of balance sheet
information and the requirement of regular repayments might improve the clients'
management skills and lead to higher productivity.
To examine the eects of prior loans on productivity, we compare new clients
with an approved loan application but before the loan has been distributed with
repeat clients which we observe after they have repaid their loans. Everything else
equal, do repeat clients generate as many revenues from the additional funds as new
clients do with their own funds? Given the same amount of assets, do repeat clients
obtain higher or lower sales revenues than new clients?
We conduct the analysis through the estimation of a translog production function
of the form
ln(Y ) = D+ ln(A)+ 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(4.2)
13
A formal analysis of the clients' intertemporal decision would reveal few additional insights
relevant to the following analysis and is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Figure 4.2: Step-wise selection. Shaded circles refer to unobserved groups.
where Y are sales, D is a dummy variable with a value of one if the client had prior
loans, K are assets, L is the number of employees including the owner, and A is
a measure of productivity determined by individual characteristics. The translog
function is a generalization of the Cobb-Douglas production function, relaxing the
assumption of a unitary elasticity of substitution, see Greene (2000, chapter 7.5).
If clients use their additional assets eciently, they should generate sales revenues
which are at least as high as the new clients' (given the same asset level).  de-
termines the dierences in sales revenues between new and repeat clients.  6= 0
corresponds to a shift in the production function and the sign of  shows whether
or not the clients use the additional funds eectively.
4.5 Selection
The client data used for our analysis is no random sample of micro-enterprises. Not
all micro-enterprise owners have access to a micronance institution. Of these, only
a part apply for a loan. While we can expect loan applicants to dier from the gen-
eral population in a number of characteristics (location and economic environment,
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entrepreneurial skills, capital usage and willingness to incur debt, for example) we
cannot incorporate these dierences into our analysis since we do not observe the
whole population. Clients enter our data set at the time of their application. After
the submission of an application, the loan ocer records additional balance infor-
mation only if he takes a loan approval into consideration. Further along time, only
successful clients can repay their loan on time and are granted consecutive loans.
The longer the client stays with Caja Los Andes, the more selection processes he
has passed. This step-wise selection can considerably bias the results of an impact
analysis, it is illustrated in gure 4.2. The shaded circles refer to groups of the
population we do not observe. In the following paragraphs we discuss the eects of
two selection processes we observe (loan approval and the existence of a 2nd balance
observation) in terms of their eects on enterprise growth.
14
The rst selection occurs when a client applies for a loan. There is self-selection
on the side of the clients as well as selection from Caja Los Andes who approves
only 73% of all loan applications. Quite possibly, clients whose enterprises have a
high growth potential are more likely to obtain a loan than others. If this is the
case, clients should have higher growth rates than non-clients independently of any
loans from Caja Los Andes. If we contributed all the clients' growth to the loans,
we would overestimate the eects of the loans. To incorporate this selection in our
growth analysis, we can use data on rejected loan applications. Since there is no
comparable database about the general population, we cannot model the clients'
self selection.
A second source of selection bias lies in the existence of a second balance in-
formation which is recorded only if the client applies for a second loan. One could
imagine that clients who had high growth rates in the past are more likely to apply
for a second loan. As a consequence, the observation of high growth rates would not
be driven by loans from Caja Los Andes but mainly by self selection on the side of
the clients, leading to an over-estimation of the impact of prior loans on growth.
In the following paragraphs we formally describe the selection problem arising
for the analysis of growth rates. Let X = (X
0
; X
1
; X
2
) denote the observed client
14
A discussion of the collection of balance information follows in section 4.6.1.
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characteristics. We are interested in a particular outcome y, growth in assets. y,
however, is observed only if the client's rst loan application is approved and if he
applies for a second loan. Let z
1
denote a binary variable with a value of one if the
loan is approved and let z
2
denote a binary variable with a value of one if a second
balance observation is recorded. Formally, we are looking for
E(yjX) = E(yjX; z
1
 z
2
= 1)  P (z
1
 z
2
= 1jX)
+ E(yjX; z
1
 z
2
= 0)  P (z
1
 z
2
= 0jX) : (4.3)
While we observe (yjX; z
1
z
2
= 1) and can estimate P (z
1
z
2
= 1jX) and P (z
1
z
2
=
0jX), we do not observe (yjX; z
1
 z
2
= 0). One possibility to address this selection
problem is through a latent variable model in analogy to Heckman (1976). Assuming
a linear relationship and letting y

, z

1
and z

2
denote the unobserved latent variables,
we can write
y

= X
0
 + u ; with (ujX
0
)  N(0; 
u
) ; (4.4)
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We want to estimate E(yjz

1
> 0; z

2
> 0). Letting 
0i
denote the coecient of
correlation between u and v
i
, this term can be modied to
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(4.10)
The step from (4.9) to (4.10) is based on the property E(XjX > c) =
(c)
1 (c)
for the
mean of a truncated standard normally distributed variable, see Maddala (1983).
For a more general discussion of two-stage selection models see also Tunali (1983).
The estimation then proceeds as follows. We rst estimate (4.5) for i = 1; 2
and use the linear predictions X
1
^
1
and X
2
^
2
to determine the inverse Mill's Ratios
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^
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)
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)
(X
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^
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)
. Equation (4.10) then can be estimated by a simple
OLS regression with the additional terms
^

1
and
^

2
.
15
With this stepwise estimation,
we can consistently estimate , 
01
= 
u

01
and 
02
= 
u

02
. 
01
> 0 implies that
a higher probability of the approval of the rst loan application goes along with a
higher expected growth rate y. 
02
> 0 implies that a higher probability of having
a second balance observation goes along with a higher growth rate. If 
01
= 0 and

02
= 0, selection bias is not a problem.
While the observation of growth rates is characterized by censored-sampling
where we observe growth for a subset of clients only, the analysis of clients' sales
revenues can use a richer set of data. In any given year, we observe balance informa-
tion for new clients with approved loans and for clients applying for repeat loans.
16
Expected sales revenues for clients with no prior loans have to be conditioned on
only one selection process (loan approval). At this moment, it is unclear whether
the client will have a second balance observation at some later point in time or
not. Expected sales for clients with one or more prior loans, however, have to be
conditioned on two selection processes, loan approval and the existence of a second
balance observation. Letting D denote a dummy variable with a value of one for
second balance observations and zero otherwise, we can estimate the eects of prior
loans analogously to (4.10).
E(yjD = 1 _D = 0) = X
0
 +D   + 
u;v1

1
+D  
u;v2

2
; (4.11)
where  measures the eects of prior loans. We can estimate equation (4.11) with
the two-step estimator described above.
17
15
In a general model, correlation terms for v
1
and v
2
would also enter (4.9) and (4.10), see
Maddala (1983) or Tunali (1983). For our data, however, we cannot reject the hypothesis of zero
correlation between v
1
and v
2
. That is, unobserved characteristics determining the probability
of a loan approval are not correlated with the probability of the existence of a second balance
observation.
16
We also observe balance information for some rejected applications. We use this information
to determine the selection process but exclude it from the production estimates to keep the model
manageable.
17
This model is restrictive in that it assumes that 
0
is identical for new clients and for clients
after their rst loans. Various alternative specications, however, have shown little variation in
the coecients between those two groups. Our estimates include some interaction terms between
D and X
0
to capture these dierences.
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This two-step estimation procedure has frequently been criticized because of
the underlying normality assumptions and weak identication. Both lead to low
robustness, that is, slight changes in specications may alter the results substantially.
In response to these issues, a number of semi- or non-parametric procedures have
been developed in the last two decades. While these estimators avoid some of the
problems of parametric estimation, there is growing evidence that the specication
of the main equation is more relevant for the robustness of the results than the
degree of parameterization. Parametric procedures like the one outlined above tend
to perform well if the mean of the model is correctly specied, see Vella (1998) for
a more comprehensive discussion. While the parametric approach does have some
shortcomings, the data set used here includes many imprecisely estimated values.
We choose the relatively simple approach outlined above despite its shortcomings
since it allows us to control the results of the intermediate steps and to avoid spurious
conclusions. In addition, we carefully design the estimation to ensure high robustness
and identiability.
While the two-step estimator is consistent, identication is weak if it is solely
based on the functional form. This is because the inverse Mill's Ratio
(X)
(X)
is close
to linear for a considerable range of values. In this case, one cannot distinguish be-
tween the selection process and the equation of interest. Technically, the correction
term would be a linear combination of the other explaining variables, that is, the
(X
0
X) matrix does not have a full rank. The underlying problem is identical to the
case of high multicollinearity: identication is weak and the variances of the esti-
mated coecients are high. One possibility to circumvent this problem is to impose
exclusion restrictions. Through the inclusion of variables in the selection equation
that are not included in the main equation, one ensures that the correction term is
not a linear combination of the other explaining variables and that (X
0
X) has a full
rank.
18
While the upper range of our estimates for X^ generally is beyond the linear
range and the model would be identied by functional form alone, we use exclusion
restrictions to improve the identication of the model. The choice of these variables
18
See Tunali (1983) and Vella (1998) for a more detailed discussion of identication issues.
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is crucial for the robustness of the results. If we exclude relevant explaining vari-
ables from the main equations, we will attribute an inordinately large part of their
variation to the selection processes. Our data contain a few variables which can be
used for exclusion restrictions, these are discussed in the following paragraphs.
When estimating the probability of loan approval, we include the amount applied
for and a dummy variable for being on the black list. These variables are excluded
from the estimation of growth in assets and from the estimation of sales revenues.
The amount applied for is mostly driven by a lack of personal funds or by unexpected
cash shortages, both of which do not determine the client's productivity. The black
list is based on the client's credit history with other banks.
19
Repayment problems
are frequently caused by unexpected expenses and strongly depend on the client's
character. In addition, these entries frequently have been made some time before
the application and thus do not determine the client's current business situation.
The above arguments suggest that these variables are largely unrelated to current
and future sales revenues and growth.
When estimating the probability of a second balance observation, we use the
length of the prior loan in days, the client's highest number of days overdue, and the
ratio of amount applied for over the amount approved as explaining variables. These
variables are excluded from the estimation of sales revenues and growth in assets.
The length of the loan is mainly determined by the clients' repayment capacity and
by the use of the loan. The calculation of the repayment capacity is based on prior
incomes only, that is, it does not take into account the additional income generated
with the help of the new loan. The length of the loan should thus be unrelated
to future sales and growth in assets. Repayment behavior is partly determined by
character, and partly by unexpected changes in the clients' expenses and income.
The ratio of amount applied for over the amount approved is driven by dierences
between the client and the loan ocer in assessing the client's need for funds and
his repayment capacity.
19
Although being on the black list should imply an immediate rejection of the application, this
is not always the case. 0.4% of all approved loan applications are for clients on the black list.
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4.6 Estimation
This section begins with a description of the selection equations for the two stages
described above. We then incorporate the predicted selection to calculate impact
estimates. Finally, we discuss dierences between micro-enterprises and larger en-
terprises.
20
4.6.1 Selection Estimates
As discussed in section 4.4, we estimate the probability of being selected at each
stage with a Probit model. The results are discussed in the following paragraphs.
4.6.1.1 Loan Approval
When estimating the probability of a loan approval we rst have to decide on which
data this estimation should be based. We have basic data such as the amount applied
for and business sectors for all clients. In addition, there is balance information for
all approved loan applications and for roughly 7% of all rejected loan applications.
This leaves us with two possibilities to determine the structure of the selection bias:
a. To infer the selection process from the balance information available treating
the 7% of rejected applicants as a random sample of all rejected applicants.
b. To infer the selection process from the basic data available for all applicants.
Both variants have shortcomings. Treating the 7% as a random sample as in (a)
yields biased estimates since these 7% have passed a rst selection: the loan ocer
takes a loan approval into consideration. If we use the basic data only, as in (b), the
predictive power is very low and the results suer from omitted variable bias since we
20
For the estimation, we adjust the sample as follows. To reduce the impact of outliers we
drop observations whose assets are above the 99th or below the 1st percentile. Loans and balance
observations were kept only if the dates matche and the calculated income after repayment is
consistent (leading to a loss of 25% of our observations). The analysis is restricted to the rst and
second balance observations of each client to include as few selection processes as possible. Balance
observations are required to be at least 90 days apart, otherwise the more recent one is dropped.
Estimates for the second selection process (existence of a 2nd balance observations) are calculated
for those clients only who had their rst loan in or before 1997 to allow sucient time for a second
balance observation to occur. The year 1992 is excluded.
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cannot use important factors such as liabilities over assets or guarantee information
as explaining variables. Keeping in mind the shortcomings of both approaches we
will calculate two sets of estimates, one corresponding to each (a) and (b).
21
The results of the probit estimates can be found in table 4.4. The estimated
coecients show that the inuence of the amount applied for is highly non-linear,
with highest values for loan amounts slightly above $US 100 and decreasing there-
after. Clients in the commerce sector are more likely to obtain a loan than clients in
the production sector. Having a bad repayment record with other banks (being on
a black list, which is based on information from the banking supervisory authority
in Bolivia) and being single have a signicant negative impact on loan approval.
When we base our estimates on observations with balance information (column (a)
in table 4.4), we nd that being single no longer has a signicant negative impact.
In addition, the probability of approval increases for a lower liabilities over assets
ratio.
When comparing variable means between rejected applications and approved
applications, we nd that liabilities over assets are higher for rejected applications
(0.06 compared to 0.03). Rejected applicants are on the black list more frequently
(1.8% compared to 0.4%). They are single more often (71.9% compared to 19.7%)
and there are fewer women (56.2% compared to 61.2%). They are less frequently in
the commerce sector (50.3% compared to 54.0%) and more frequently in the service
sector (29.7% compared to 17.5%). For more details see table 4.5.
4.6.1.2 Existence of a Second Balance Observation
In a second step, we estimate the probability of the existence of a second balance
observation given that the rst loan application has been approved (table 4.6). We
nd that a second balance observation is more likely for larger approved loans. It
is less likely for a high ratio of the amount applied for over the approved amount.
That is, if Caja Los Andes gives a loan that is considerably smaller than the amount
21
One could think of a selection model with three selection stages. Since the decision to record
a balance observation and to approve a loan are driven by the same considerations, however, the
identifying power of such an approach would be very low.
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asked for by the client, this client is less likely to have a second balance observation.
There could be two possible reasons: either the client chooses to take (larger) loans
from another source and does not want to stay with Caja Los Andes, or Caja
Los Andes gives relatively small loans to clients who are more likely to have late
payments and thus do not obtain future loans. In addition, the probability of a
second balance observation is higher for women, for non-singles, and older businesses.
These characteristics tend to go along with stability and are frequently used by
loan ocers to assess the credit-worthiness of clients. The probability of a second
balance information diminishes strongly if the client has a bad repayment record.
The higher the maximum number of days overdue, the lower the probability of a
second balance information. This dependency reects Caja Los Andes' policy of
rejecting applications from clients with a bad repayment record.
When comparing variable means, we nd the most pronounced dierence in
the maximum number of days in arrears. While the average is 33.5 days for clients
without a second balance observation, it is 2.4 days for clients with a second balance
observation. Among clients with a second balance observation there are more women
(64% compared to 59%) and businesses tend to be older (1.62 compared to 1.56 in
logarithms). For more details see table 4.7.
4.6.2 Impact Estimates
This section quanties the eects of loans from Caja Los Andes on its clients' en-
terprises. Section 4.6.2.1 analyzes how the number and average size of prior loans
contribute to the growth of the micro-enterprise and section 4.6.2.2 continues with
an examination of production. Everything else equal, we ask whether clients with
prior loans generate higher sales revenues than other clients.
4.6.2.1 The Impact of Micronance Loans on Growth
This section analyzes the determinants of micro-enterprise growth and asks whether
prior loans contribute to growth. The question of growth in assets is of particular
relevance sine it constitutes a prerequisite for an increase in business income. In
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addition, when we can show positive growth eects of prior loans we can infer that
the savings in borrowing costs and the additional funds are used productively and
lead to a lasting expansion of the business beyond providing additional short term
capital.
To examine whether micronance loans contribute to business growth, we esti-
mate annualized growth rates for assets between the clients' rst and second balance
observations as discussed in section 4.4. To capture the inuence of prior loans we
generate two variables indicating to what extent the client has used loans from Caja
Los Andes. These variables are the number of approved loans from Caja Los Andes
prior ( 60 days) to the balance observation (NUMPRIAP) and the average size of
approved prior loans (APRISIZE). To incorporate the two sources of selection bias
into our estimates, we follow the steps described in section 4.5 and use the selection
estimates discussed in section 4.6.1.
The results of the growth estimates corresponding to equation (4.1) are presented
in table 4.8. There are considerable size eects with growth rates being higher for
lower initial assets and growth being higher for clients with higher income. The
log of the number of days passed between the two balance observations, ln(time),
is highly signicant with a negative coecient. That is, average annualized growth
tends to decrease if the time span between two balance observations is relatively
large. It is unclear whether this is due to a strong immediate impact of a loan
which diminishes over time or due to the endogenous decision when to apply for
a new loan. Businesses with high growth rates in the past might need to apply
for a new loan earlier than businesses with lower growth. In addition, loan ocers
might decide not to record a new balance observation if the business has undergone
few changes.
22
Growth is between three to four percentage points lower for female
clients and decreases with business age.
The number and average size of prior loans have a signicant inuence on growth
rates. The eect of the number of prior loans varies by sectors and with assets. While
it is insignicant in the service sector, its coecient is negative in the commerce
22
As a check for the robustness of our results with respect to endogeneity of ln(time), we ran
control regressions without this variable and found no mentionable changes in other coecients.
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and production sectors with a positive interaction eect with assets. That is, the
combined eect is negative for small businesses, positive otherwise. The average
prior loan size (APRISIZE) has a positive coecient which is signicant in all sectors.
Besides the absolute size of prior loans, the size of these loans relative to assets also
has a signicant inuence. Taken together, these eects imply that clients with low
initial assets benet from larger loan sizes but not from taking multiple loans of
the same size. As an example for the inuence of loan sizes, gure 4.3 compares
the inuence of one prior loan of $US 600 to one prior loan of $US 500 (all values
are in 1992 $US). Given two clients that are identical with respect to all measured
characteristics, but dier in their loan sizes, the client obtaining the larger loan
has between $200 and $400 in additional assets after one year.
23
The additional
increase in assets is largest for clients with relatively low initial assets and in the
commerce sector. While a stronger increase in assets for clients with larger loans
is not surprising at rst sight, this increase is calculated after the loans have been
paid back. That is, the increase in assets has to be nanced by additional income
generated through prior loans.
The large eect of prior loans on growth has to be taken with a grain of salt,
however. While our estimates include correction terms for the approval of loan
applications, we do not correct for the size of the loans approved. The average size
of prior loans is partly determined by the loan ocer's assessment of the client's
repayment capacity and partly by the client's perceived need for additional funds.
While the former is unrelated to future growth rates (the repayment capacity is
calculated without taking the additional income through the loan into account), the
latter is higher for clients planning to expand their businesses. APRISIZE thus is
partly endogenous and we have to interpret the eects cautiously. The number of
prior loans could also be driven by the loan ocer's assessment. There are multiple
loans between two consecutive balance observations only if the loan ocer did not
record a new balance observation when the client applied for a second loan (or
when the balance information has been deleted or overwritten, which has happened
23
We consider clients with initial assets between $1,000 and $5000 only since a loan size of $500 is
most frequently observed in this range. Outside of this range, additional assets are slightly higher.
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Add. assets after one year, loan $600 vs $500, Selection (a)
Assets minus outst. Caja loans
 Commerce  Production
 Service
1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
100
200
300
400
Figure 4.3: Additional assets after one year for a loan of $US 600 compared to a
loan of $500. Calculations are based on columns 1, 3, and 5 in table 4.8. Sample:
First loan in or before 1997 with a corresponding balance observation in or after
1993, rst application not rejected.
frequently). The loan ocer might not record a new balance observation if, for
example, the business has not changed very much since the last visit. If this is the
case, a high number of prior loans is a signal for few changes and the coecients
of NUMPRIAP are subject to endogeneity bias. Recognizing the potential bias of
these variables, the production analysis in the next section uses a cross-sectional
approach and thus avoids the use of these variables.
The eects of selection bias can bee seen from the coecients for the two cor-
rection terms. The coecient of 
1
is mostly insignicant (positive and signicant
in the production sector) and the coecient of 
2
is negative and signicant at the
1% level in the commerce and production sectors. In other words, the estimated co-
ecients indicate that Caja Los Andes selects clients who tend to have high growth
rates in the future while the probability of having a second balance observation is
negatively correlated with growth. There are unobserved characteristics which at
the same time make it more likely to observe a second balance observation and low
growth rates. One possible reason for this eect could be that the most successful
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Add. growth for one prior loan 0.1*assets, Production
Assets minus outst. Caja loans
 OLS  Selection (a)
 Selection (b)
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
.5
1
1.5
Figure 4.4: The eect of one prior loan on growth in assets in the production sector,
when the loan equals 10 percent of assets. Sample: First loan in or before 1997 with
a corresponding balance observation in or after 1993, rst application not rejected.
clients need larger loans and look for other sources. The incorporation of the selec-
tion eects changes the estimated inuence of prior loans as depicted in gure 4.4,
where we compare the eects of one prior loan of a size corresponding to 10 percent
of prior assets. The estimated eects on growth are highest for the OLS estimates,
while a consideration of the selection eects reduces these eects.
One reason why we are interested in asset growth is that it is a prerequisite for
growth in business income. To asses the extent to which growth in assets translates
into growth in business income, table 4.1 shows the median of growth in business
income relative to growth in assets by previous asset sizes. We nd that the median
ratio is close to 0.3. That is, if assets grow by 10 percent, business income grows
by 3 percent. Businesses of a median size ($US 500-5000) are the best in translat-
ing growth in assets to growth in business income, although the variation between
dierent asset ranges is low.
While growth in total assets is a good measure for the size of a commerce business,
xed assets might be more appropriate for the production sector since they determine
the production capacity. In addition, asset growth could also be driven by unwanted
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Asset range (1992 $US) <300 300-500 500-1,000 1,000-5,000 >5,000
median(growth in business inc.
/growth in assets) 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.29
Table 4.1: Growth in business income relative to growth in assets for various asset
ranges.
inventory buildup and does not necessary mirror an increase in the scale of the
business. To acknowledge these sectoral dierence, we report separate estimates for
growth in xed assets in the production sector in table 4.9. The main results remain
valid, while the estimation has a lower explanatory power and levels of signicance
are reduced.
4.6.2.2 The Impact of Micronance Loans on Productivity
This section examines micro-enterprise production. To compare the use of assets
between new and experienced clients, we analyze sales revenues. Using the balance
and client information available, we can estimate a translog production function ac-
cording to equations (4.2) and (4.11) by the two-step procedure discussed in section
4.5. We report results separately for the commerce, service, and production sectors.
Since the revenue structure diers considerably in the years of the economic crisis
(1999 and 2000), we drop these years. We use the probit estimates discussed in
section 4.6.1 to calculate
^

1
and
^

2
. The productivity estimates are reported in
tables 4.10 to 4.12.
Our model has a relatively high explanatory power for the commerce and pro-
duction sectors with R
2
values of 63% and 55%, respectively. The processes in
the service sector, however, are not explained as well by our model with an R
2
of
31% only. The explanatory power suers from incomplete information on labor use
where we observe only the number of employees and not the hours worked. While
a relatively large part of sales in the service sector is determined by the number
of employees, the amount of assets is more relevant for production and commerce
sectors. When testing the translog specication we can reject the hypothesis that

2
= 
4
= 
5
at the 1% level.
24
24
Among the micro-enterprises in our sample, 96% have no employees. When we restrict the
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Selection (a) Selection (b) OLS
Commerce 3.7 4.6 1.4
(3.74)** (4.55)** (2.09)*
Production 11.9 12.7 5.9
(8.27)** (8.80)** (6.46)**
Service 15.2 16.1 8.9
(6.82)** (7.23)** (6.15)**
Table 4.2: Average percentage increase of sales revenues for clients with prior loans
by sector and estimation method. The number corresponds to the estimated co-
ecient on D from the rst three columns in tables 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12. Robust
t-statistics are in parentheses. * indicates signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%.
For more details see the tables in the appendix.
Given the same amount of assets and employees, which type of client generates
higher sales revenues? The results displayed in tables 4.10 to 4.12 show that sales
revenues are higher for older clients, for women in the service sector, men in the
production sector, and for older businesses in the commerce and production sectors.
The positive eects decline with asset size. We also nd a signicant positive in-
uence of liabilities over assets. Everything else equal, clients with higher liabilities
generate higher sales revenues. This positive connection suggests that clients who
take loans tend to be more productive than other clients. The results also show
that there is a positive correlation between the decision of a loan approval (
1
) and
sales revenues while there is a negative correlation between the existence of a sec-
ond balance observation (
2
) and sales. That is, clients who have a second balance
observation tend to be less productive than other clients. Both correction terms are
signicant at the 1% level.
We now turn to our main question: how eectively do clients use their additional
funds? Given the same amount of assets and employees and all other characteristics
being identical, do clients with prior loans obtain sales revenues comparable to
those of new clients? This dierence in sales revenues goes beyond an increase in
sample to these businesses, the main results remain unchanged. An additional check for robustness
using other functional forms revealed no changes in the main results.
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assets made possible through the loan. It is solely driven by changes in productivity
e. g. through better accounting practices made necessary for the repayment of the
loan. We can measure the inuence of additional prior loans through the coecient
on the dummy variable for observations with prior loans (D). In a rst set of
regressions we restricted the inuence of prior loans to a proportional increase in
sales revenues. Table 4.2 lists the estimated coecients for the three sets of estimates
and for each sector. Taking into account the selection eects (columns 1 and 2)
we nd that commerce businesses with prior loans have approximately 4% higher
sales revenues than businesses without prior loans, production businesses have 12%
higher sales revenues, and service businesses have 16% higher sales revenues. All
coecients are signicant at the 1% level. When we compare these results with
simple OLS estimates, we nd that the OLS estimates underestimate the impact of
prior loans. While this underestimation is surprising at rst sight, it corresponds to
the estimated selection eects. If the clients that we observe after they have taken
out a rst loan are on average less productive than others, a simple comparison of
these clients with new clients must underestimate the eects of the loans. More
details can be found in tables 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12.
To take a closer look at the inuence of prior loans on dierent types of clients,
we consider an interaction with log assets and with the log of the number of days as
a client. The coecients are signicant at the 1% level for the commerce sector and
partly signicant for the production and service sectors. While there is a positive
inuence of assets, the time a client has been with Caja Los Andes has a negative
inuence. That is, given the same size of assets, the positive impact on sales revenues
is largest for clients with a relatively short time between their rst and second
balance observation.
25
Figure 4.5 depicts the combined eects of these variables for
a client who has been with Caja Los Andes for 240 days. The eects of prior loans
are negative for small businesses in the commerce sector, mostly positive otherwise
and increase with assets. Clients with prior loans thus have experienced a shift in
25
As mentioned above, the coecient of time has to be interpreted cautiously. Since the time
passed between two balance observations is driven by the length of the prior loan and the loan
ocers' decision when to record another balance observation, there could be endogeneity bias.
Dropping ln(time) from the regressions we nd that the other coecients remain similar.
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Add. log sales for clients with prior loans, Selection (a)
ln(assets)
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Figure 4.5: The inuence of prior loans on log sales by log assets and sector. Sample:
balance observation in 1993 to 1998, rst application not rejected. 2nd balance
observations are included only if the rst balance observations was in or before
1997. The graphs are based on the coecients of D, D  ln(assets), and D  ln(time)
from the fourth columns of tables 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12, assuming time = 240.
their production function. That is, given the same amount of assets and all other
measured characteristics being identical, clients with prior loans generate higher
sales revenues than others. Figure 4.6 depicts the shift in the production function
for the production sector.
From our estimated production function, we can determine marginal sales rev-
enues for new clients without employees as
@Y
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where 
1
has to be adjusted for interaction terms. From our parameter estimates it
follows that marginal sales revenues are decreasing for the asset range considered.
We can calculate the predicted marginal revenues for an example. Consider a male
new client in La Paz in the rst quarter of 1996 aged 30 with a business aged 4
years. Figure 4.7 shows the predicted monthly marginal sales revenues by asset size
and business sector.
26
It is as high as 1.50 for small businesses in the commerce
26
For the shape of the production function for all three sectors see gure 4.8 in the appendix.
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Sales revenues and assets, Production, Selection (a)
Total assets
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Figure 4.6: Estimated link between sales and assets for production businesses with
and without prior loans. Sample: balance observation in 1993 to 1998, rst appli-
cation not rejected. 2nd balance observations are included only if the rst balance
observations was in or before 1997. The graphs are based on the fourth column of
table 4.11, assuming time = 240.
sector. It is lowest for the service sector with values below 0.2. That is, out of
100 additional dollars in assets, clients in the commerce sector generate up to 150
dollars additional sales revenues per month. In other words, these clients turn over
any additional inventory in less than a month.
In sum, we nd a signicant inuence of prior loans on sales revenues in the
commerce and production sectors. Prior loans increase sales for suciently large
businesses. The puzzling result that smaller commerce businesses might not benet
from prior loans calls for a further analysis.
27
27
While the above analysis has been conned to sales revenues, the results have direct impli-
cations for business income due to the duality of cost functions and production functions. We
estimate production functions rather than cost functions since a thorough estimation of costs func-
tions would require disaggregated price data which is not available for our data set. Robustness
checks have conrmed that the inuence of prior loans on costs (and, thus, prots) has a similar
structure as the inuence on sales.
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Marginal sales revenues 1996, no prior loans, Selection (a)
ln(assets)
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Figure 4.7: Predicted monthly marginal sales revenues by business sector for a male
client in La Paz in 1996 with 30 years of age and a 4 year old business.
4.6.3 Size Eects
The results above have shown a number of dierences between very small and rela-
tively large enterprises. While there are pure size eects with growth rates as well as
marginal sales revenues being considerably higher for smaller enterprises, the anal-
ysis of the clients' production structure showed a stronger impact of prior loans for
larger businesses. While larger businesses can achieve sales revenues by up to 20%
higher than similar businesses without prior loans, smaller businesses especially in
the commerce sector do not use the additional funds as eectively. Compared with
similar businesses without prior loans, they obtain up to 8% lower sales revenues.
28
How can we explain this dierence? Clients with small businesses might not
be able to use the additional assets as eectively as other clients. While one can
increase the scale of any given business to some extent, a larger increase often re-
quires a new location, new techniques etc. which might not be feasible for very small
businesses, whose owners lack the experience for an operation at a larger scale. This
28
See the coecients of D, D  ln(assets), and D  ln(time) in columns 4 and 5 of table 4.10, with
time = 240 the eects are negative for businesses with assets below 900$US (column 4) or 350$US
(column 5) in 1992 values. When we split the sample into dierent sub-groups by asset size the
eects remain similar.
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could be especially true in the commerce sector where the clients might prefer to
sale at the same spot with the same neighbors even when they could earn more by
moving to a larger location. This could also explain the observation that growth
in business income relative to growth in assets is lower for small businesses, see ta-
ble 4.1. Another explanation for the lower sales revenues of small clients could lie in
the selection of clients. Our selection estimates show that clients applying for small
loans are more likely to obtain a loan than other applicants (see the coecients on
the amount applied for in columns (a) and (b) of table 4.4). If these small businesses
were chosen because they face the highest credit constraints and not because they
have good repayment capabilities, they might not use the additional capital as ef-
fectively as larger businesses who were selected based on their repayment capability
alone. A possible benet of the access to loans could consist in improved account-
ing practices. Through the regular visits of the loan ocers and the regularity of
required repayments, clients might be forced to improve their control of costs and
expenses. This eect most likely is stronger for larger businesses.
While small businesses do not benet as much in terms of additional sales rev-
enues than larger ones, they benet in other ways. The calculation of marginal sales
revenues has shown that the monthly turnover from assets to sales revenues is as
high as 150 percent for small commerce businesses. That is, even if the small busi-
nesses might not use the additional assets very eectively when compared to other
small businesses, these assets are converted to sales revenues at a much faster rate
than in larger businesses.
4.7 Conclusion
The above analysis has examined the inuence of loans from a Bolivian microlender,
Caja Los Andes, on the clients' enterprises. We have shown that these loans raise
productivity and growth for most clients. In particular, we nd a signicant perma-
nent impact of prior loans on assets. That is, assets remain higher than before even
after the repayment of the loan with growth rates in assets being higher for larger
loans. The analysis of the production structure has shown that clients with prior
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loans from Caja Los Andes tend to have higher sales revenues than clients with no
prior loans, where the dierence increases in asset size. Clients in the production
sector with at least one prior loan from Caja Los Andes generate up to 20 percent
higher sales revenues than new clients with the same amount of assets and employ-
ees. In the commerce sector, clients with prior loans and suciently large initial
assets generate up to 12 percent higher sales revenues than new clients. Smaller
commerce businesses, however, seem not to use the additional funds as eectively.
We found that clients with small enterprises in the commerce sector and one or more
prior loans generate up to 8 percent lower sales than clients without prior loans and
the same amount of assets and employees. While these clients are not very ecient
in the use of their assets when compared to other small businesses, we also found
that they have a very high turnover rate. That is, additional assets are turned into
sales revenues at a much faster rate than in larger businesses.
Our estimators explicitly incorporate selection eects. While we found a positive
correlation between loan approval and growth and productivity, we surprisingly
found a negative correlation between the existence of second balance observations
and growth and productivity. That is, the best clients discontinue borrowing
after the rst loan more often than others. Since an increasing number of impact
studies resorts to before-after comparisons and thus relies on the sample of repeat
borrowers (Mosley 2001, Copestake, Bhalotra, and Johnson 2001, for example), the
link between productivity and continuous borrowing from the same lender should
be further explored.
While the estimators were designed to correct for the biases arising from the
bank's decision to approve a loan application and from the client's decision to apply
for repeat loans, we cannot correct for selection bias arising from the client's decision
to apply for a loan since we observe applicants only. When interpreting our results
we thus have to restrict the analysis to micro-enterprises willing to take loans. For
a more comprehensive impact study it would be desirable to have information on a
randomized control group of rejected applicants and of the general population.
Our results have shown evidence for a positive impact of micro-loans on the
enterprises. However, there is no evidence yet on market wide impacts such as
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changes in wages or changes in the incomes of non-participants, it is unclear whether
micro-enterprises eventually provide income above subsistence levels, and there is
very little information about the role of micro-enterprises for economy-wide growth.
Further research could continue in two directions. Firstly, one could examine the
merits of supporting micro-enterprises in comparison to larger and potentially more
ecient enterprises. To what extent is it advisable to support micro-enterprises when
larger enterprises are more ecient? Secondly, it would be interesting to extend the
impact analysis from the micro-entrepreneur's perspective to a general equilibrium
framework where market-wide changes are considered.
4.8. APPENDIX 105
4.8 Appendix
Personal Characteristics
D(single) Marital status = single
D(female) Gender = female
D(on black list) Bad credit record with other banks
ln(age) Log of the client's age
ln(non-business inc.) Log of non-business income
ln(business income) Log of business income
Previous maximum arrears Maximal arrears in previous loan
NUMPRIAP Number of prior loans
APRISIZE Average size of prior loans
ln(time) Log of the number of days since the rst loan
D Dummy: experienced client with  1 prior loan
Business Characteristics
ln(assets) Log assets
ln(employees) Log number of employees including owner
Liabilities/assets Ratio of liabilities over assets
ln(Business Age) Log business age
D(Commerce) Dummy: Commerce Sector (relative to production sector)
D(Service) Dummy: Service Sector (relative to production sector)
Loan Characteristics
ln(approved amount) Log approved amount (loan size)
Appl./appr. amount Amount applied for over approved amount
Length of loan (days) Duration of the loan in days
ln(value of chattel g.) Log value of chattel guarantees
Environment
D(Cochabamba) Dummy: loan disbursed in Cochabamba (relative to La Paz)
D(Sucre) Dummy: loan disbursed in Sucre (relative to La Paz)
D(Santa Cruz) Dummy: loan disbursed in Santa Cruz (relative to La Paz)
D(Trinidad) Dummy: loan disbursed in Trinidad (relative to La Paz)
D(Tarija) Dummy: loan disbursed in Tarija (relative to La Paz)
GROWTH Quarterly growth rate (source: INE)
D(199x) Dummy: Year=199x
Table 4.3: List of variables used for the empirical analysis. All logs are calculated
as log(<variable>+1).
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P(Loan approval)
(a) (b) (a, 1,000) (a, >1,000)
ln(amount applied for) 1.890 2.634 -0.415 2.552
(2.83)** (13.61)** (0.28) (2.43)*
ln(amount applied for)
2
-0.257 -0.380 0.194 -0.396
(2.33)* (11.86)** (0.73) (2.39)*
ln(amount applied for)
3
0.009 0.016 -0.020 0.017
(1.50) (9.07)** (1.26) (2.04)*
liabilities/assets -0.327 -0.172 -0.512
(2.55)* (1.19) (3.39)**
ln(business age+1) -0.029 -0.029 -0.043
(1.39) (0.90) (1.52)
D(single) -0.016 -1.353 -0.011 -0.027
(0.38) (113.40)** (0.16) (0.51)
D(female) -0.013 0.029 -0.021
(0.37) (0.51) (0.47)
D(on black list) -1.349 -0.887 -1.333 -1.382
(11.33)** (13.63)** (7.37)** (8.31)**
D(1993) 1.839 2.857 2.012 1.455
(12.89)** (24.78)** (9.31)** (7.18)**
D(1994) 2.429 2.849 2.789 1.851
(17.54)** (25.99)** (13.11)** (9.47)**
D(1995) 3.116 2.930 3.419 2.578
(22.18)** (26.94)** (15.78)** (13.16)**
D(1996) 3.021 3.048 3.338 2.466
(22.10)** (28.06)** (15.69)** (12.96)**
D(1997) 3.344 3.224 3.629 2.793
(23.92)** (29.47)** (16.44)** (14.55)**
D(1998) 3.181 2.962 3.483 2.609
(22.47)** (27.05)** (15.84)** (13.37)**
D(1999) 2.393 2.536 2.931 1.683
(17.96)** (23.49)** (13.96)** (9.12)**
D(2000) 2.341 2.948 2.933 1.629
(16.87)** (26.80)** (13.00)** (8.57)**
D(Commerce) 0.149 0.102 0.176 0.146
(3.57)** (7.24)** (2.82)** (2.60)**
D(Service) -0.071 -0.017 0.039 -0.136
(1.48) (0.99) (0.50) (2.18)*
Growth of quarterly GDP -2.281 0.159 -2.289 -2.043
(2.60)** (0.51) (1.83) (1.65)
Constant -5.597 -7.039 -2.212 -5.740
(4.22)** (17.71)** (0.84) (2.61)**
Observations 50755 69658 24917 25838
Pseudo-R
2
0.18 0.29 0.17 0.19
Table 4.4: Probit estimates for the approval of the rst loan application. (a) based
on applications with balance info, (b) based on all applications, the third column is
based on observations with balance info and assets  $US 1,000, the fourth column
is based on observations with balance info and assets > $US 1,000. Sectors are
relative to the production sector, branches relative to the main branch in La Paz.
4.8. APPENDIX 107
Rejection with All rejected Approval,
matching balance applications,
obs., N=1,490 N=20,143 N=49,281
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
ln(amount appl. for) 6.106 (1.192) 6.073 (1.190) 5.650 (0.956)
liabilities/assets 0.059 (0.175) 0.030 (0.123)
ln(business age+1) 1.718 (0.881) 1.549 (0.886)
D(on black list) 0.027 (0.163) 0.018 (0.134) 4.10e-03 (0.064)
D(single) 0.239 (0.427) 0.719 (0.449) 0.197 (0.398)
D(female) 0.562 (0.496) 0.612 (0.487)
D(1992) 0.045 (0.208) 0.032 (0.176) 3.64e-04 (0.019)
D(1993) 0.074 (0.262) 0.009 (0.094) 0.026 (0.159)
D(1994) 0.107 (0.309) 0.040 (0.196) 0.101 (0.302)
D(1995) 0.091 (0.287) 0.118 (0.323) 0.165 (0.371)
D(1996) 0.147 (0.354) 0.154 (0.361) 0.219 (0.414)
D(1997) 0.088 (0.284) 0.104 (0.306) 0.166 (0.372)
D(1998) 0.105 (0.306) 0.145 (0.352) 0.149 (0.356)
D(1999) 0.225 (0.418) 0.279 (0.449) 0.118 (0.323)
D(2000) 0.118 (0.323) 0.119 (0.324) 0.055 (0.228)
D(Commerce) 0.474 (0.499) 0.503 (0.500) 0.540 (0.498)
D(Service) 0.260 (0.439) 0.247 (0.431) 0.175 (0.380)
D(Production) 0.266 (0.442) 0.250 (0.433) 0.284 (0.451)
D(Cochabamba) 0.110 (0.314) 0.179 (0.383) 0.105 (0.306)
D(La Paz) 0.467 (0.499) 0.407 (0.491) 0.664 (0.472)
D(Santa Cruz) 0.059 (0.237) 0.040 (0.196) 0.012 (0.110)
D(Sucre) 0.150 (0.358) 0.165 (0.372) 0.105 (0.306)
D(Trinidad) 0.101 (0.302) 0.086 (0.280) 0.042 (0.200)
D(Tarija) 0.112 (0.315) 0.122 (0.328) 0.072 (0.259)
Growth, quart.GDP 0.033 (0.026) 0.032 (0.025) 0.041 (0.025)
Table 4.5: Summary of means by approval of the rst loan application.
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P(2nd balance obs.)
(all) (1,000) (>1,000)
ln(approved loan size) 0.350 0.612 0.091
(4.50)** (2.43)* (0.61)
ln(approved loan size)
2
-0.023 -0.049 -0.002
(3.14)** (1.77) (0.18)
ln(income) 0.025 0.014 0.025
(1.02) (0.41) (0.74)
applied amount/approved amount -0.017 -0.008 -0.029
(2.94)** (1.01) (3.32)**
Latest payment:
D(1 day) 0.025 -0.015 0.063
(0.93) (0.41) (1.56)
D(2 days) -0.199 -0.201 -0.194
(5.14)** (3.63)** (3.58)**
D(3-5 days) -0.236 -0.258 -0.212
(8.71)** (6.63)** (5.55)**
D(6-10 days) -0.791 -0.915 -0.667
(29.13)** (24.28)** (16.88)**
D(11-29 days) -1.602 -1.674 -1.525
(58.05)** (42.54)** (39.19)**
D( 30 days) -2.613 -2.741 -2.516
(50.86)** (32.56)** (38.35)**
length of loan in days 0.019 0.026 0.018
(27.57)** (17.13)** (18.87)**
length in days
2
-8.62e-05 -1.48e-04 -7.95e-05
(21.18)** (10.74)** (15.36)**
length in days
3
1.36e-07 3.38e-07 1.22e-07
(15.49)** (7.28)** (11.63)**
length in days
4
-7.08e-11 -2.62e-10 -6.21e-11
(12.04)** (5.32)** (9.20)**
D(female) 0.134 0.152 0.120
(7.45)** (5.83)** (4.77)**
D(single) -0.072 -0.114 -0.029
(3.22)** (3.69)** (0.88)
ln(business age+1) 0.041 0.046 0.035
(4.28)** (3.48)** (2.44)*
D(Commerce) 0.076 0.105 0.052
(3.84)** (3.82)** (1.78)
D(Service) 0.024 0.046 0.005
(0.92) (1.21) (0.12)
Growth of quarterly GDP -0.697 -0.220 -1.249
(1.88) (0.43) (2.31)*
Constant -2.461 -3.071 -1.666
(5.19)** (3.42)** (2.36)*
Observations 33323 17066 16257
Pseudo-R
2
0.23 0.22 0.23
Table 4.6: Probit estimates for the existence of a second balance information. The
rst column comprises all clients, the second those with assets below $US 1,000,
the third those with assets above $US 1,000. Sample: First loan application in or
before 1997 with a corresponding balance observation. Sectors are relative to the
production sector. Dummy variables for years and branches have been included but
are not reported here.
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No 2nd balance obs. With 2nd balance obs.
N=8,647 N=24,684
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev
ln(approved amount) 5.197 (0.955) 5.221 (0.926)
ln(income) 5.408 (0.570) 5.442 (0.560)
applied/aproved amount 1.820 (1.437) 1.730 (1.390)
maximum arrears 33.50 (131.1) 2.391 (10.54)
loan length in days 149.5 (104.4) 140.0 (82.51)
D(female) 0.585 (0.493) 0.636 (0.481)
D(single) 0.201 (0.401) 0.162 (0.368)
ln(business age+1) 1.562 (0.937) 1.620 (0.918)
D(1992) 0.002 (0.040) 0.000 (0.013)
D(1993) 0.047 (0.211) 0.035 (0.184)
D(1994) 0.130 (0.336) 0.156 (0.363)
D(1995) 0.209 (0.406) 0.255 (0.436)
D(1996) 0.343 (0.475) 0.317 (0.465)
D(1997) 0.270 (0.444) 0.237 (0.425)
D(Commerce) 0.506 (0.500) 0.572 (0.495)
D(Production) 0.186 (0.390) 0.149 (0.357)
D(Service) 0.308 (0.462) 0.279 (0.448)
D(Cochabamba) 0.144 (0.351) 0.107 (0.309)
D(La Paz) 0.657 (0.475) 0.693 (0.461)
D(Sucre) 0.099 (0.298) 0.111 (0.314)
D(Trinidad) 0.014 (0.118) 0.016 (0.125)
D(Tarija) 0.086 (0.280) 0.074 (0.261)
Growth of quart.GDP 0.046 (0.023) 0.045 (0.023)
Table 4.7: Summary statistics for approved loan applications by existence of a second
balance observation, given that the rst loan application was approved no later than
1997.
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Dependent variable: growth in assets
Commerce Production Service
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
ln(assets) -2.332 -2.346 -3.152 -3.152 -1.156 -1.161
(3.38)** (3.40)** (3.51)** (3.52)** (0.97) (0.97)
ln(assets)
2
0.138 0.139 0.293 0.294 0.066 0.066
(2.23)* (2.25)* (3.17)** (3.17)** (0.49) (0.49)
ln(assets)
3
-0.005 -0.005 -0.011 -0.011 -0.003 -0.003
(2.03)* (2.01)* (2.83)** (2.81)** (0.51) (0.51)
ln(income) 0.103 0.103 0.078 0.086 0.240 0.241
(4.84)** (4.71)** (2.66)** (2.92)** (4.21)** (4.18)**
NUMPRIAP -0.034 -0.035 -0.244 -0.256 0.151 0.151
(0.49) (0.50) (2.65)** (2.77)** (0.90) (0.90)
NUMPRIAP*ln(assets) 0.018 0.018 0.041 0.043 -0.012 -0.012
(1.99)* (2.00)* (3.29)** (3.43)** (0.54) (0.54)
APRISIZE / assets 1.314 1.301 0.714 0.717 1.240 1.244
(4.08)** (4.06)** (3.48)** (3.50)** (4.80)** (4.80)**
ln(APRISIZE) 0.165 0.172 0.162 0.163 0.043 0.041
(2.73)** (2.89)** (3.96)** (3.98)** (0.83) (0.79)
ln(time) -0.392 -0.388 -0.267 -0.255 -0.274 -0.274
(18.72)** (19.12)** (11.55)** (11.90)** (7.38)** (7.86)**
D(female) -0.042 -0.042 -0.029 -0.029 -0.036 -0.036
(2.58)* (2.54)* (1.63) (1.62) (1.18) (1.16)
ln(age) -0.505 -0.503 -0.702 -0.696 -0.405 -0.406
(3.21)** (3.20)** (2.77)** (2.74)** (1.25) (1.25)
ln(age)*ln(assets) 0.055 0.055 0.078 0.079 0.033 0.034
(2.42)* (2.41)* (2.19)* (2.22)* (0.76) (0.77)
D(Cochabamba) 0.034 0.047 0.017 0.029 -0.002 -0.007
(1.24) (1.88) (0.51) (0.92) (0.03) (0.11)
D(Sucre) 0.091 0.108 0.041 0.060 0.190 0.186
(2.79)** (3.65)** (0.82) (1.26) (3.57)** (4.05)**
D(Trinidad) 0.022 0.047 0.099 0.132 0.018 0.013
(0.44) (1.11) (0.91) (1.26) (0.23) (0.20)
D(Tarija) -0.063 -0.042 -0.086 -0.061 -0.050 -0.055
(2.24)* (2.26)* (2.15)* (1.78) (0.91) (1.49)

1
0.069 -0.007 0.151 0.081 -0.007 0.013
(0.84) (0.22) (2.01)* (1.95) (0.05) (0.23)

2
-0.114 -0.110 -0.150 -0.147 -0.098 -0.099
(3.44)** (3.31)** (4.35)** (4.28)** (1.86) (1.90)
Constant 13.051 13.088 11.662 11.558 7.365 7.381
(3.25)** (3.26)** (2.73)** (2.72)** (1.31) (1.31)
Observations 14072 14072 6869 6869 3674 3674
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Table 4.8: Estimated growth in assets by sectors. Robust t-statistics are in parenthe-
ses, * indicates signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%. D(.) indicates a dummy vari-
able, dummies for quarters, branches, years, GNP growth and interactions of year
dummies and log assets have been included but are not reported here. Branches
are relative to the main branch in La Paz. Columns (a) correspond to approval
estimates based on balance information (column (a) in table 4.4), columns (b) cor-
respond to approval estimates based on data available for all applicants (column (b)
in table 4.4).
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Dep. variable:
growth in xed assets
(a) (b)
ln(xed assets) -0.857 -0.839
(5.30)** (5.19)**
ln(xed assets)
2
0.110 0.104
(3.48)** (3.29)**
ln(xed assets)
3
-0.006 -0.006
(3.16)** (2.92)**
ln(income) 0.102 0.120
(1.48) (1.68)
NUMPRIAP -0.329 -0.346
(1.87) (1.96)
NUMPRIAP*ln(assets) 0.043 0.046
(1.85) (1.95)
APRISIZE / assets 0.607 0.612
(1.80) (1.80)
ln(APRISIZE) 0.176 0.191
(2.68)** (2.88)**
ln(time) -0.113 -0.078
(2.02)* (1.51)
D(female) -0.122 -0.122
(2.45)* (2.45)*
ln(age) -0.239 -0.226
(2.63)** (2.44)*
D(Cochabamba) 0.083 0.152
(0.85) (1.73)
D(Sucre) 0.198 0.288
(1.71) (2.58)**
D(Trinidad) 0.398 0.549
(2.00)* (3.05)**
D(Tarija) 0.030 0.145
(0.31) (1.81)
Growth of quart.GDP -3.975 -3.886
(3.33)** (3.26)**

1
0.459 0.086
(2.16)* (0.74)

2
-0.241 -0.221
(2.98)** (2.76)**
Constant 1.409 1.444
(0.62) (0.63)
Observations 6873 6873
R-squared 0.09 0.09
Table 4.9: Estimated growth in xed assets for the production sector. * indicates
signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%. D(.) indicates a dummy variable, dummies
for quarters, years, and interaction terms of years and log assets have been included
but are not reported here. Branches are relative to the main branch in La Paz.
Column (a) corresponds to approval estimates based on balance information (col-
umn (a) in table 4.4), column (b) corresponds to approval estimates based on data
available for all applicants (column (b) in table 4.4).
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Dependent variable: ln(sales), Commerce Sector
(a) (b) (OLS) (a) (b) (OLS)
ln(assets) 0.577 0.410 0.407 0.598 0.420 0.417
(11.00)** (7.88)** (7.78)** (11.40)** (8.07)** (7.97)**
ln(assets)
2
/2 0.031 0.061 0.064 0.027 0.059 0.062
(6.55)** (13.62)** (14.32)** (5.62)** (13.04)** (13.76)**
ln(Num.employees) 0.586 0.622 0.616 0.586 0.623 0.618
(4.22)** (4.34)** (4.30)** (4.20)** (4.32)** (4.29)**
ln(employees)
2
/2 0.002 -0.019 -0.014 0.002 -0.019 -0.014
(0.09) (0.68) (0.49) (0.07) (0.68) (0.51)
ln(assets)*ln(empl.) -0.079 -0.079 -0.078 -0.079 -0.079 -0.079
(4.83)** (4.59)** (4.59)** (4.80)** (4.56)** (4.57)**
D 0.037 0.046 0.014 0.057 -0.056 -0.055
(3.74)** (4.55)** (2.09)* (0.85) (0.84) (0.82)
D  ln(assets) 0.037 0.025 0.026
(5.87)** (4.00)** (4.11)**
D  ln(time) -0.056 -0.016 -0.022
(5.10)** (1.46) (2.04)*
liabilities/assets 0.416 0.466 0.463 0.409 0.464 0.460
(8.83)** (10.03)** (9.95)** (8.72)** (9.99)** (9.91)**
D(female) -0.083 -0.038 -0.029 -0.078 -0.033 -0.024
(1.71) (0.77) (0.59) (1.61) (0.66) (0.49)
D(female)*ln(assets) 0.003 -0.004 -0.004 0.002 -0.004 -0.005
(0.40) (0.53) (0.65) (0.32) (0.62) (0.74)
ln(age) 0.331 0.374 0.377 0.335 0.378 0.381
(4.46)** (5.02)** (5.05)** (4.53)** (5.08)** (5.11)**
ln(age)*ln(assets) -0.060 -0.063 -0.067 -0.060 -0.063 -0.067
(5.50)** (5.75)** (6.06)** (5.54)** (5.79)** (6.10)**
ln(busage) 0.181 0.167 0.167 0.195 0.176 0.176
(6.80)** (6.27)** (6.23)** (7.31)** (6.58)** (6.56)**
ln(busage)*ln(assets) -0.013 -0.009 -0.009 -0.014 -0.010 -0.010
(3.25)** (2.35)* (2.31)* (3.70)** (2.63)** (2.61)**
D(Cochabamba) -0.083 0.045 0.068 -0.095 0.042 0.066
(6.54)** (3.98)** (6.28)** (7.38)** (3.73)** (6.05)**
D(Sucre) -0.525 -0.344 -0.320 -0.532 -0.345 -0.321
(38.64)** (32.18)** (30.76)** (38.95)** (32.22)** (30.79)**
D(Trinidad) -0.545 -0.249 -0.221 -0.559 -0.250 -0.222
(21.26)** (11.73)** (10.48)** (21.70)** (11.78)** (10.54)**
D(Tarija) -0.308 -0.075 -0.046 -0.319 -0.076 -0.047
(20.55)** (7.05)** (4.45)** (21.04)** (7.16)** (4.53)**

1
0.920 0.124 0.952 0.125
(23.78)** (10.65)** (24.23)** (10.75)**
D  
2
-0.131 -0.093 -0.097 -0.077
(5.36)** (3.81)** (3.93)** (3.09)**
Constant 1.871 2.777 2.834 1.789 2.749 2.807
(6.30)** (9.41)** (9.57)** (6.02)** (9.32)** (9.48)**
Observations 35796 36805 36805 35796 36805 36805
R-squared 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.62
Table 4.10: Estimated translog production function for the commerce sector. Ro-
bust t-statistics are in parentheses. * indicates signicant at 5%; ** signicant at
1%. D(.) indicates a dummy variable, dummies for years and quarters and GNP
growth variables have been included but are not reported here. Branches are relative
to the main branch in La Paz. Columns (a) correspond to approval estimates based
on balance information (column (a) in table 4.4), columns (b) correspond to ap-
proval estimates based on data available for all applicants (column (b) in table 4.4).
Columns (OLS) report OLS estimates based on the same sample as columns (b).
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Dependent variable: ln(sales), Production Sector
(a) (b) (OLS) (a) (b) (OLS)
ln(assets) 0.761 0.662 0.662 0.774 0.672 0.672
(8.78)** (7.81)** (7.80)** (8.92)** (7.92)** (7.93)**
ln(assets)
2
/2 0.009 0.029 0.029 0.007 0.027 0.027
(1.17) (4.12)** (4.15)** (0.85) (3.83)** (3.84)**
ln(Num.employees) 0.339 0.296 0.290 0.339 0.295 0.289
(4.33)** (3.76)** (3.68)** (4.33)** (3.74)** (3.67)**
ln(employees)
2
/2 -0.027 -0.031 -0.029 -0.027 -0.030 -0.028
(0.78) (0.88) (0.82) (0.76) (0.83) (0.78)
ln(assets)*ln(empl.) -0.026 -0.018 -0.017 -0.026 -0.018 -0.017
(2.47)* (1.65) (1.63) (2.47)* (1.65) (1.63)
D 0.119 0.127 0.059 0.040 -0.105 -0.125
(8.27)** (8.80)** (6.46)** (0.45) (1.17) (1.40)
D  ln(assets) 0.027 0.023 0.028
(2.95)** (2.51)* (3.03)**
D  ln(time) -0.024 0.012 -0.003
(1.63) (0.87) (0.22)
liabilities/assets 0.030 0.162 0.158 0.026 0.161 0.157
(0.29) (1.96)* (1.97)* (0.25) (1.95) (1.96)*
D(female) -0.278 -0.261 -0.262 -0.274 -0.257 -0.257
(4.41)** (4.14)** (4.15)** (4.34)** (4.07)** (4.07)**
D(female)*ln(assets) 0.031 0.029 0.030 0.031 0.029 0.029
(3.51)** (3.29)** (3.34)** (3.45)** (3.23)** (3.26)**
ln(age) 0.445 0.501 0.488 0.450 0.503 0.492
(3.45)** (3.89)** (3.79)** (3.49)** (3.91)** (3.82)**
ln(age)*ln(assets) -0.080 -0.087 -0.087 -0.081 -0.087 -0.087
(4.32)** (4.70)** (4.66)** (4.36)** (4.71)** (4.68)**
ln(business age) 0.058 0.066 0.062 0.068 0.073 0.072
(1.48) (1.68) (1.60) (1.75) (1.87) (1.84)
ln(busage)*ln(assets) -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.83) (0.84) (0.75) (1.06) (1.04) (0.99)
D(Cochabamba) -0.074 0.035 0.039 -0.079 0.035 0.038
(2.93)** (2.02)* (2.29)* (3.06)** (2.03)* (2.25)*
D(Sucre) -0.479 -0.340 -0.331 -0.482 -0.341 -0.331
(15.70)** (16.57)** (16.24)** (15.61)** (16.60)** (16.24)**
D(Trinidad) -0.160 0.049 0.061 -0.169 0.047 0.058
(2.72)** (1.07) (1.34) (2.84)** (1.03) (1.27)
D(Tarija) -0.079 0.100 0.110 -0.083 0.099 0.110
(2.08)* (4.22)** (4.77)** (2.16)* (4.18)** (4.75)**

1
0.597 0.045 0.610 0.046
(6.56)** (2.61)** (6.55)** (2.67)**
D  
2
-0.220 -0.189 -0.207 -0.187
(6.85)** (5.87)** (6.38)** (5.76)**
Constant 1.173 1.740 1.783 1.125 1.725 1.762
(2.31)* (3.52)** (3.60)** (2.21)* (3.49)** (3.56)**
Observations 18233 18644 18644 18233 18644 18644
R-squared 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.55
Table 4.11: Estimated translog production function for the production sector. Ro-
bust t-statistics are in parentheses, * indicates signicant at 5%; ** signicant at
1%. D(.) indicates a dummy variable, dummies for quarters and GNP growth have
been included but are not reported here. Branches are relative to the main branch
in La Paz. Columns (a) correspond to approval estimates based on balance informa-
tion (column (a) in table 4.4), columns (b) correspond to approval estimates based
on data available for all applicants (column (b) in table 4.4), and columns (OLS)
are OLS estimates.
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Dependent variable: ln(sales), Service Sector
(a) (b) (OLS) (a) (b) (OLS)
ln(assets) 0.407 0.271 0.290 0.427 0.277 0.297
(4.16)** (2.80)** (3.00)** (4.34)** (2.85)** (3.06)**
ln(assets)
2
/2 -0.002 0.024 0.025 -0.006 0.023 0.024
(0.26) (2.67)** (2.74)** (0.63) (2.54)* (2.59)**
ln(Num.employees) 0.176 0.128 0.107 0.185 0.131 0.112
(0.92) (0.66) (0.55) (0.97) (0.67) (0.57)
ln(employees)
2
/2 -0.027 -0.046 -0.046 -0.030 -0.047 -0.048
(0.79) (1.24) (1.23) (0.86) (1.27) (1.28)
ln(assets)*ln(empl.) 0.007 0.019 0.021 0.006 0.019 0.021
(0.29) (0.80) (0.91) (0.26) (0.79) (0.90)
D 0.152 0.161 0.089 0.371 0.264 0.263
(6.82)** (7.23)** (6.15)** (2.63)** (1.90) (1.89)
D  ln(assets) 0.034 0.012 0.016
(2.73)** (0.94) (1.27)
D  ln(time) -0.092 -0.037 -0.055
(3.67)** (1.51) (2.31)*
liabilities/assets 0.783 0.890 0.883 0.772 0.887 0.879
(7.40)** (8.37)** (8.29)** (7.30)** (8.34)** (8.25)**
D(female) 0.557 0.621 0.625 0.569 0.626 0.634
(6.47)** (7.20)** (7.25)** (6.59)** (7.24)** (7.33)**
D(female)*ln(assets) -0.045 -0.052 -0.053 -0.046 -0.053 -0.054
(3.73)** (4.36)** (4.40)** (3.83)** (4.41)** (4.48)**
ln(age) 0.423 0.467 0.485 0.427 0.470 0.488
(2.85)** (3.16)** (3.28)** (2.88)** (3.18)** (3.30)**
ln(age)*ln(assets) -0.037 -0.041 -0.047 -0.038 -0.041 -0.047
(1.77) (1.94) (2.22)* (1.79) (1.95) (2.23)*
ln(business age) -0.132 -0.126 -0.131 -0.117 -0.121 -0.124
(2.54)* (2.44)* (2.54)* (2.24)* (2.32)* (2.38)*
ln(busage)*ln(assets) 0.025 0.027 0.028 0.023 0.027 0.027
(3.39)** (3.73)** (3.84)** (3.12)** (3.63)** (3.71)**
D(Cochabamba) -0.118 0.097 0.115 -0.134 0.094 0.111
(3.76)** (3.49)** (4.24)** (4.24)** (3.37)** (4.08)**
D(Sucre) -0.723 -0.455 -0.436 -0.732 -0.454 -0.435
(26.92)** (21.78)** (21.12)** (27.15)** (21.76)** (21.10)**
D(Trinidad) -0.623 -0.169 -0.144 -0.645 -0.171 -0.148
(13.63)** (4.95)** (4.23)** (14.00)** (5.01)** (4.35)**
D(Tarija) -0.432 -0.076 -0.052 -0.444 -0.076 -0.051
(13.39)** (3.36)** (2.37)* (13.67)** (3.34)** (2.35)*

1
1.148 0.098 1.184 0.098
(16.09)** (3.96)** (16.47)** (3.95)**
D  
2
-0.207 -0.191 -0.168 -0.175
(4.47)** (4.17)** (3.56)** (3.73)**
Constant 2.075 3.108 3.074 1.975 3.083 3.041
(3.60)** (5.48)** (5.42)** (3.42)** (5.43)** (5.36)**
Observations 10191 10574 10574 10191 10574 10574
R-squared 0.32 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.30
Table 4.12: Estimated translog production function for the service sector. Robust
t-statistics are in parentheses, * indicates signicant at 5%; ** signicant at 1%.
D(.) indicates a dummy variable, dummies for quarters and GNP growth have been
included but are not reported here. Branches are relative to the main branch in La
Paz. Columns (a) correspond to approval estimates based on balance information
(column (a) in table 4.4), columns (b) correspond to approval estimates based on
data available for all applicants (column (b) in table 4.4), and columns (OLS) are
OLS estimates.
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Figure 4.8: Predicted ratio of monthly sales revenues over assets by business sector
for a male client in La Paz in 1996 with 30 years of age and a 4 year old business.
Chapter 5
Micronance in Times of Crisis:
The Eects of Competition, Rising
Indebtedness, and Economic Crisis
on Repayment Behavior
5.1 Introduction
Most developing countries have a large informal sector, constituted of small unreg-
istered businesses. The majority of these micro-enterprises suers from an inad-
equately low level of capital since their owners do not have access to the formal
banking sector.
1
Since the late 1970's, development policy has increasingly taken
recourse to micronance to improve the access to nancial services for poor house-
holds. Compared to previous attempts to provide credit to the poor, the novelty of
micronance consists rstly in the use of new incentive mechanisms such as group
loans or the choice of collateral based on the borrower's subjective valuation, and
secondly in the attempt to cover costs through high interest rates.
2
In recent years, an increasing number of micronance institutions nds it hard
to maintain high repayment rates. While many micronance institutions were the
1
The term micro-enterprise refers to small businesses in the informal sector. They encompass
a wide range of enterprises from small family run trade shops to production businesses with many
employees and high revenues. Micro-enterprises are typically characterized in terms of number of
employees or assets instead of legal status. The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), for
example, denes a micro-enterprise as having no more than 10 workers and total assets below $US
20.000 (Orlando and Pollack 2000).
2
For more information about micronance see Morduch (2000).
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sole source of reasonably priced loans in their early years of operation, today clients
frequently can choose between institutions. Since funds are not as scarce as they
used to be, the incentives to repay on time and thus to remain in good standing
with the institutions have decreased. In a few areas, notably in Bangladesh and Bo-
livia, the micronance market is close to saturation. Matin (2001) and Chaudhury
and Matin (2001) report that an increasing number of households takes loans from
multiple institutions in Bangladesh and that the repayment performance declines.
The authors report estimates of market coverage between 43% and 59%. For Bo-
livia, Rhyne (2001, pp. 19, 31) estimates that between a quarter and a third of all
micro-enterprises obtain micronance loans. Besides the high supply of loans in the
Bolivian micronance market, the economic environment has been characterized by
severe diculties since 1998. Consumer credit companies (most of which are out
of the market today) have distributed loans to many micro-entrepreneurs. These
borrowers had increasingly high debt levels and repayment obligations, which they
frequently could not fulll. Since the end of 1998, the economy has slowed down
with negative growth in 1999 and a low level of economic activity since. These
developments together led to a crisis in micronance lending which culminated on
July 2nd, 2001, when a group of people from a debtor association took employees
from the superintendency of banks as hostages and demanded debt forgiveness.
3
The Bolivian micronance institutions have faced a strong increase in late pay-
ments during these years. Between 1996 and 2000 the percentage of overdue capital
rose from 2.6% to 12.3% for BancoSol and from 3.97% to 7.7% for Caja Los Andes,
to name two of the largest Bolivian microlenders (ASOFIN 2000). After its strong
initial success, micronance seems to have reached a level where the institutions need
to develop new strategies to maintain their good performance in a more competitive
environment. If micronance is to oer long-term services, it has to prove that it
works in non-monopolistic environments and that it can maintain high repayment
incentives even in the face of increasing saturation and competition.
In the face of these developments, it is essential for micronance institutions to
3
The recent developments in Bolivia are summarized in Von Stauenberg (2001) and a detailed
report has been provided by the BBC on July 4th, 2001. A summary of BBC's reports is listed at
http://nt1.ids.ac.uk/cgap/html/bolbbchl.htm.
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select their clients cautiously and to provide sucient incentives for repayment. The
analysis in the next sections analyzes the repayment behavior of clients from one
bank in Bolivia, Caja Los Andes. Our focus lies on the discussion of the increase in
late payments in recent years. Can we attribute this increase to the eects of the
economic crisis beginning in late 1998, the over-indebtedness of many clients, or the
rising competition? Which of these factors dominates? From a statistical point of
view, the changes in the micronance environment discussed above lend themselves
readily to an econometric analysis. Most of the important changes are exogenous
and their eects can be identied since there is variation over time and also between
dierent geographic locations in Bolivia.
The paper continues with a discussion of repayment incentives and related lit-
erature in section 5.2. Section 5.3 presents the theoretical model underlying our
analysis and section 5.4 briey describes the data set used. Econometric issues are
discussed in section 5.5. Section 5.6 presents the results and section 5.7 discusses
their implications.
5.2 Overview of Repayment Incentives and Related
Literature
Why should clients repay their loans on time? When analyzing repayment determi-
nants for micronance loans, the rst step lies in the analysis of repayment incentives
which largely depend on the terms and conditions of the loan. For individual loans,
we can single out four major incentives for a timely repayment. Firstly, clients lose
their guarantees. All loans are secured by chattel items and/or personal guarantees.
Larger loans also can be secured through mortgages. If the client does not repay
the loan, the chattel items are conscated. The chattel items are selected based on
the client's valuation and not on the resale value of these items which increases the
client's repayment incentives.
Secondly, if the client does not repay the loan, he loses access to future loans.
Caja Los Andes does not grant consecutive loans for defaulting clients and for clients
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with frequent late payments. In addition, the client obtains a bad credit record with
the Bolivian banking supervisory authority. All registered banks and an increasing
number of non-regulated microlenders can access this information and will not grant
loans to this client in the future. As a consequence, the client will have to use
informal sources or moneylenders for future loans. These loans tend to be more
expensive: moneylenders charge higher interest rates and informal loans tend to
have additional social costs.
Thirdly, conditions of the loan improve for clients with timely repayment. Loan
sizes increase and repayment schedules become more exible. Eventually, clients
can obtain an automatic credit line. These improved conditions reduce the non-
pecuniary costs of the loan for the client. Finally, the client's income needs to be
suciently high to enable him to repay the loan on time. If the installments are too
high or if his revenues are lower than expected he cannot repay the loan on time.
If he obtains lower than expected revenues from his business, alternative sources of
income are crucial for his ability to repay.
There is a body of literature that asks whether it can be optimal for a bank to
behave as described above. In particular, when can it be optimal to oer relatively
small loans to new clients although larger loans tend to be more protable? When
can it be optimal for a bank not to grant consecutive loans if the rst loan is not
repaid fully or not on time?
A characteristic crucial for the analysis of micronance markets is the diculty
of nding adequate collateral. Ghosh and Ray (1999) analyze a market for loans
where there is no collateral and there are no credit histories. That is, the bank has no
information about new clients. They show that it is optimal for banks to distinguish
between old and new clients and thus generate inside reputation mechanisms.
New clients are oered small loans to test their repayment behavior. Once the rst
loan has been repaid, clients are oered larger loans at better conditions making it
desirable to repay each loan in order not to lose the preferred client status. This
behavior closely corresponds to patterns observed in micronance markets.
Due to the relatively widespread availability of credit records in the Bolivian mi-
cronance market, reputation eects play a considerable role beyond the borrower-
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lender relationship. In an early analysis of the provision of loans without collateral,
Allen (1981) shows that reputation eects lead to the existence of incentive compat-
ible lending contracts even in the absence of collateral. The model assumes that the
termination threat (i. e. the threat not to extend another loan if the current loan is
not repaid) is credible due to reputation building by the lender, for example. As a
consequence, a borrower repays as long as the present value of future loans is higher
than the current payment due.
Reputation building by the lender seems to play an important role in micro-
nance markets. In a study of ve microlenders that distribute individual loans only,
Churchill (1999) nds that the signals given to other borrowers are among the most
important reasons for the banks not to extend a new loan to defaulting or late pay-
ing clients. The credibility assumption, however, is not as innocuous as it might
seem from these examples since the bank might be able to increase its prots from
future loans and, a priori, it is unclear which eect dominates. Lenders would like to
pre-commit themselves not to extend the credit limit if the borrower cannot repay,
since the expectation of a loan extension changes the borrower's behavior even in
the case of full information as shown in Hellwig (1977). However, it is generally not
optimal for them to follow this policy once the client has defaulted. At this point,
the bank might nd it optimal to distribute a new loan to this client to recover parts
of the old loan, leading to a commitment problem. In a related analysis, Gromb
(2001) shows that the termination threat is credible only if the lender makes zero
prot from renegotiated loans. Hellwig mentions that in all likelihood nancial mar-
kets develop institutions that allow the lender to pre-commit on credit limits. The
Bolivian banking supervisory authority (Superintendencia de Bancos) serves such
a need. The rescheduling of loans, for example, was allowed only if the lender set
aside additional reserve funds.
4
This restriction made reschedulings more costly and
made the bank's commitment not to reschedule more credible.
The special situation of microlenders bears similarities to international lending.
Given that legal enforcement mechanisms are dicult to use and collateral is hard
4
See Rhyne (2001, p. 150). This restriction was temporarily softened in 1999/2000 after the
economic crisis led to severe repayment problems.
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to seize, Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz (1986) argue that loan contracts are oered
only if there are other strong enforcement mechanisms, such as reputation eects on
the side of the borrower. That is, if the borrower loses future access to these funds
in the case of default. If this is not the case, the bank cannot generate sucient
incentives to ensure a repayment of the loan. The limitations of reputation eects
are also highlighted in Bulow and Rogo (1989), who show that reputation eects
alone are not sucient to generate repayment incentives when the borrower has
access to suciently diversied investment opportunities.
The micronance market has seen an enormous capital inow during the last 15
years.
5
When one applies the models in Holmström and Tirole (1997) and Bolton
and Freixas (2000) to this situation, they predict the provision of smaller and riskier
loans. In the beginning, an intermediary can choose high-return, low-risk clients. If
his funds increase, however, these clients eventually are served and he also considers
clients with higher risks. Thus, the increasing supply of funds to the micronance in-
termediaries should lead to increasing default rates because of a change in the client
structure towards riskier clients. In addition, the increasing availability of micro-
nance loans leads to competition and aects the client's outside options. Villas-Boas
and Schmidt-Mohr (1999), for example, show that increasing competition can lead
to rising collateral requirements.
While these and other studies are mostly concerned with the existence and design
of incentive compatible contracts, our approach diers in that we ask what deter-
mines whether or not a client repays, given the credit contract. Based on Bolton and
Sharfstein (1990), Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2000) analyze incentive ef-
fects for individual micronance loans. They show the importance of collateral and
social sanctions and provide an example for a mechanism through which a credi-
ble non-renancing threat leads to a higher eort level of the client. In addition,
regular repayment schedules as used in most micronance institutions are shown to
5
See Morduch (2000) for an overview. The portfolio of the micronance institutions in La Paz,
Bolivia, for example, has approximately increased from $US 10 in 1992 to $US 80 in 2000 per capita
(working age population). Source: calculations based on information from ASOFIN (December
1999, table 2.19) and population data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), La Paz,
http://www.ine.gov.bo.
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work as a disciplining device and, in addition, provide continuous information on
the clients' ability and willingness to repay the loan. Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz
(1986) argue that due to the absence of legal enforcement the bank has to generate
very high incentive eects. These, in turn, reduce the importance of moral hazard
and adverse selection (relative to standard banking).
While there are a number of theoretical studies on repayment behavior, empiri-
cal evidence is scarce due to a lack of adequate data. From a number of interviews
with clients who have individual micronance loans, Churchill (1999) nds that
the continued access to future loans serves as the most important repayment in-
centive. Thus, banks generate high incentives for timely repayment when making
future loans contingent on good repayment performance. Schreiner (1999) estimates
the probability of high arrears for a Bolivian microlender (arrears = days overdue).
Among other things, he nds a signicant inuence of business sectors, loan sizes
(with larger loans being more likely to have high arrears), and in particular of past
repayment behavior. Chaudhury and Matin (2001) describe a sample of Bangladesh
households, nding that households with multiple loans at the same time tend to
have lower repayment rates than others. Greene (1998) analyzes data from a credit
card company and estimates default probabilities with a special emphasis on selec-
tion issues. He nds that when the estimates are based on clients only and selection
issues are ignored, defaults are underestimated.
5.3 Theory
For a better understanding of the contractual obligations and incentive eects at
work, this section begins with the description of a typical loan contract. If a loan
application has been approved, the client and the bank agree on the number and
frequency of the scheduled repayments. These payments typically are of a xed
amount and their size depends on the client's repayment capacity. Suppose, for
example, a client obtains a loan of $US 1,000 with a monthly interest rate of 2.5%.
A typical repayment schedule then would consist of ten monthly installments, that
is, the client has to make ten payments of $114.26 and pays total interest of $142.59.
The rst payment is due 30 days after the client has taken out the loan.
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If payments are late, clients have to pay a penalty in form of higher interest rates.
If the client has not paid after a few days, his loan ocer makes a visit, demands
payment, and delivers an ocial letter reminding of the outstanding payment. In
extraordinary circumstances, the loan ocer might grant a postponement of pay-
ments or a rescheduling (this happens for 1.1% of all loans only). If the payments
are overdue by more than 30 days and no postponement or rescheduling has taken
place, the bank begins to collect collateral or takes the loan to court. In addition,
the credit record is sent to the banking supervisory authority and the bank does not
grant future loans.
To formalize the client's decision whether or not to repay a loan on time consider
the following setting: A borrower has an outstanding loan of size L and non-business
income of size V . He consumes an amount c and invests the remaining amount. The
investment requires personal eort e and yields a return g(V L c; e; A) if successful,
where A represents idiosyncratic characteristics that determine productivity. The
success probability is given by  and the client learns if he will have success before
he chooses his eort and consumption levels.
6
We assume that g() is increasing in
all arguments with decreasing returns in the rst two arguments. Eort is costly in
terms of utility as represented by h(e) with h
e
> 0 and h
ee
> 0. For simplicity, we
assume that the borrower has to repay all of the loan plus interest at the end of the
period, amounting to (1 + r)L.
7
If the loan is not paid on time, the client has to
pay a penalty P . This penalty can consist of higher interest rates if the borrower
pays late or of collateral seizure if he fails to pay at all.
The borrower obtains repeat loans from the same lender only if he has paid back
the rst loan on time. Otherwise, the lender does not grant further loans and the
borrower obtains a bad credit record. From then on, he can obtain a loan from other
lenders at higher interest rates only, if at all. Let B denote the future benets from
6
Extending the model to allow for an inuence of eort on the success probability does not
change the main results.
7
The timing of scheduled payments plays an important role for the bank since late payments
give an early signal of repayment problems. The incentive eects of these payments, however, are
not fundamentally dierent from loans which have to be repaid in one lump-sum and we disregard
the dierences here. For an explicit analysis of frequently scheduled repayments, see Armendáriz de
Aghion and Morduch (2000).
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timely repayment. What determines the size of these benets? First of all, the more
widespread the availability of credit records, , the higher the barrier to obtain future
loans. The higher the supply of loans and the competition among microlenders, the
easier it is to obtain an alternative loan and the lower the benets. Let  capture this
eect. There may be size eects with poorer households being able to borrow from
moneylenders instead. Let initial wealth W and non-business income V represent
this eect. In addition, the rm's leverage, , and current loan size L determine to
what extent the client needs consecutive loans to maintain the scale of his business.
Finally, there may be idiosyncratic characteristics, A. These can be gender, business
sector, or location which signicantly determine alternative borrowing possibilities
and thus the costs of losing access to future loans. In addition, A captures the
client's subjective valuation of paying on time.
To simplify notation we denote everything in present value terms and abstract
from discounting. In addition, let v
RS
= v(V +g(V +L c; e; A) (1+r)L) denote the
second period utility when the client repays and is successful, v
RF
= v(V   (1+r)L)
when he repays and has a business failure, v
DS
= v(V + g(V + L   c; e; A)   P )
when he defaults and is successful, and v
DF
= v(V  P ) when he defaults and has a
business failure. The utilities from repayment (U
R
) and default (U
D
) are given by
U
R
= u(c) +   v
RS
+ (1  )  v
RF
  h(e) + B(V;W;A; ; ; ; L) and(5.1)
U
D
= u(c) +   v
DS
+ (1  )  v
DF
  h(e) :
From a direct comparison of U
R
and U
D
one can see that clients will choose to
repay if interest rates are low, if the penalty P is high, if the future benet from
continued access to loans B is large, or if clients have relatively high returns on
their investments. This is because marginal utility is decreasing and the dierence
between (1 + r)L and P in terms of utility is lower at higher values for g().
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We can divide clients into three dierent groups depending on their optimal repay-
ment behavior.
8
Optimal policy =
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
always repay B  B(V; P; r; L)
repay if successful B(V; P; r; L) > B  B(V; P; r; L; A)
never repay B(V; P; r; L; A) > B ;
(5.2)
where B(V; P; r; L) = v
DF
  v
RF
and B(V; P; r; L; A) = v
DS
  v
RS
, where v
DS
and
v
RS
depend on the optimal values for eort and consumption. B() and B() are
negative if P > (1 + r)L. That is, if the penalty is higher than the loan plus
interest, all clients repay. Since this case does not correspond to what we observe,
the remainder of this section focuses on the case where P < (1 + r)L.
The derivation of (5.2) is based on a comparison of utility from repayment and
utility from defaulting. Given the client has chosen his eort and consumption level,
U
R
> U
D
if v
RF
+ B > v
DF
in case of failure and v
RS
+ B > v
DS
in case of
success. Since v() is increasing and concave, the second conditions holds whenever
the rst does, resulting in the rst line of (5.2). That is, if it is optimal for clients to
repay in case of a business failure, it is optimal to repay in case of success as well.
This is because high business income (a high value for g()) reduces the dierence
between the scheduled repayment (1 + r)L and the penalty P in terms of utility.
The other conditions can be derived similarly.
To analyze optimal eort and consumption levels e

and c

, consider the rst
order conditions u
0
=   v
0
g
1
and h
0
= u
0
g
2
=g
1
. Assuming that g
12
= 0, they
imply that clients who are successful and repay have higher eort and consumption
levels than clients who default (this follows directly from comparisons of v
RS
; v
DS
and v
DF
). In addition, higher non-business income V leads to higher eort and
consumption levels while higher interest rates r and penalties P lead to higher eort
and lower consumption. The eect of higher loan sizes depends on whether or not
clients repay.
8
Optimization proceeds as follows. Firstly, derive conditions determining when it is optimal to
repay for given eort and consumption levels and business outcome. Secondly, derive the optimal
eort and consumption levels for all dominant policies. Thirdly, compare the respective utility
levels and choose the policy with the highest utility.
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Which type of client then is more likely to repay? Firstly, the higher B, the
more clients repay. Secondly, the lower B(), the more clients repay after a business
failure. Thirdly, the lower B(), the more clients repay when successful. Finally, the
client's income needs to be suciently high to enable him to repay. Let us examine
each condition in turn, assuming P < (1 + r)L.
 Higher B.
As discussed above, B = B(V;W;A; ; ; ; L) and it increases for an increasing
availability of credit records, , for higher loan sizes L, and for a higher leverage
of the business, . B decreases for a higher supply of loans in the market and
increasing competition, . The eects of income V and wealth W are unclear.
 Lower B(V; P; r; L) = v
DF
  v
RF
.
We can calculate the following marginal eects
@B()
@V
= v
0
DF
  v
0
RF
< 0 ;
@B()
@P
=  v
0
DF
< 0 ;
@B()
@r
= v
0
RF
L > 0 ;
@B()
@L
= v
0
RF
(1 + r) > 0 :
(5.3)
That is, we expect higher repayment rates for clients with high income and for
high penalties (assuming P < (1 + r)L). Higher interest rates and loan sizes
increase B() and lead to lower repayment rates.
 Lower B(V; P; r; L; A) = v
DS
  v
RS
.
We can again calculate the marginal eects.
@B()
@V
= (v
0
DS
  v
0
RS
)(g
1
+

V
) ;
@B()
@P
=  v
0
DS
+ (v
0
DS
  v
0
RS
)  

P
< 0 ;
@B()
@r
= v
0
RS
L+ (v
0
DS
  v
0
RS
)  

r
;
@B()
@L
= v
0
RS
(1 + r) + (v
0
DS
  v
0
RS
)(g
1
+

L
) ;
(5.4)
where 


= g
2
@e

@
  g
1
@c

@
and e

and c

are optimal eort and consumption
levels.
The eects of the various parameters on B() are less clear since they partly
depend on the households' optimal choices. From the discussion above we
know that 

P
> 0, 

r
> 0, and v
0
DS
  v
0
RS
< 0 (assuming P < (1+ r)L). As a
consequence, we can determine the sign of
@B()
@P
only which is negative. That
is, higher penalties lead to more frequent repayment. The direct eects are as
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follows: higher interest rates increase B() while higher non-business income
V decreases B(). The direct eect of L is unclear.
 Higher incomes V and g(V + L  c; e; A).
In case of failure, clients are able to repay only if V  (1 + r)L. Higher non-
business income (and wealth) thus lead to higher repayment rates while higher
loan sizes and a higher leverage  lead to lower repayment rates.
In case of success, higher business income g(V + L   c; e; A) increases the
money available for repayment. Again, we can calculate marginal eects.
@g()
@V
= g
1
+ 

V
;
@g()
@P
= 

P
> 0
@g()
@r
= g
1
+ 

r
> 0 ;
@g()
@L
= g
1
+ 

L
:
(5.5)
While higher penalties and higher interest rates lead to higher business income,
the eects of higher non-business income V and loans L remain unclear.
We can summarize the predicted eects in the following table.
Variable eect on repayment
V non-business inc. +
W wealth (+)
P penalty ++
r interest rate 
L loan size (-)
 rm's leverage ?
 credit records +
 supply/competition -
Repayment rates should be lower for loans with high interest rates and in areas
with a high supply of micronance loans or high competition among micronance
providers. Repayment rates should be higher the more widespread the availability
of credit records, the higher the penalties in case of default, the higher non-business
income, and for groups with less access to alternative loans (women, low income
clients). We also expect higher repayment rates for clients with higher wealth and
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smaller loans, although the eects are less clear. The inuence of leverage is unclear.
On the one hand, a high leverage indicates that the client heavily depends on outside
nance making the future availability of loans a crucial issue. On the other hand,
it indicates a large exposure and potential repayment problems in times of crisis.
We thus would expect a positive inuence for successful businesses and a negative
inuence otherwise.
9
There are two additional eects we have not yet mentioned. Firstly, the success
probability is also determined by the economic environment. If the success proba-
bility decreases, e. g. through an economic crisis, more clients will default. Secondly,
the success probability and the client's subjective valuation of timely repayment are
in part driven by idiosyncratic characteristics. A poor repayment performance in
one loan thus can be interpreted as an (imperfect) signal for these characteristics
and we would expect a poor repayment performance for the next loan as well.
Throughout the discussion we have made no distinction between clients who pay
a few days late and those who pay very late or never. While the incentives for their
decisions are similar, the relative importance of some of the parameters considered
varies. For the decision whether or not to pay a few days late, for example, a
penalty in form of higher interest rates or the consequences for future loans from
the same bank play an important role. The possibility to lose collateral, to face
a court judgement, or to have a bad credit record all are more important for the
decision not to pay at all.
5.4 Data
This section provides a brief description of the data set and presents details of the
market environment, repayment incentives and repayment behavior. Section 5.4.1
begins with a general description of the data set and its structure. Section 5.4.2
9
Our model assumes that clients choose their eort and consumption levels after they learn
whether or not their business is successful. If they obtain this information after they decide on
consumption and eort levels, our results change slightly only. There is a direct eect on eort
and consumption choice. The decision to repay, however, is still determined by the relative size of
B;B and B(), with a change in B() due to changed optimal values for eort and consumption.
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then analyzes the terms and conditions of the loans and their changes over time.
Finally, section 5.4.3 discusses new variables which we generate to capture the eects
of increasing loan supply and competition, for example.
5.4.1 General Description
The data we use for our analysis has been provided by Caja Los Andes, Bolivia. It
consists of information about 76.000 clients and 28.000 rejected loan applications
and covers the time from Mai 1992 to June 2000. Caja Los Andes FFP S.A. is a
registered savings and loan company with its main branch in La Paz, Bolivia.
10
In
December 1999, Caja Los Andes was serving 36,815 clients with outstanding loans
amounting to $US 35.9 Mio.
Caja Los Andes oers individual loans only and secures the loans through chattel
items such as televisions or other household items. Besides chattel items, personal
guarantees are used and larger loans can be secured by mortgages as well. When a
new client applies for a loan, the loan ocer records the application. He visits the
client's business and estimates balance sheet data if there are no obvious reasons for
a rejection of the loan (these could be the age of the client, less than one year of
business experience, or a bad repayment record with other banks). The loan ocer
then suggests whether and for which amount this loan should be approved and a
committee decides. When the client later on applies for a consecutive loan, the loan
ocer visits again and makes an update of the balance information. Clients with
a very good repayment performance eventually obtain an automatic credit line and
balance information is collected irregularly. While Caja Los Andes initially gave
loans to micro-enterprises only (i. e. very small enterprises), the target group has
broadened in recent years. The median loan amount disbursed has increased from
$US 367 in 1992 to $US 565 in January-June 2000. The data set is discussed in more
detail in chapter 3. More information about micronance in Bolivia is provided in
Rhyne (2001).
10
The legal category FFP (Fondo Financiero Privado) has been created as an institutional form
for small banks in Bolivia, see Rhyne (2001, pp. 118.).
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5.4.2 Loan Conditions, Repayment Incentives and Behavior
This section begins with a description of the various stages a loan goes through and
then discusses the details of loan conditions and repayment behavior.
5.4.2.1 The Life of a Loan
After a prospective client applies for a loan, the bank decides whether or not to
grant the loan and whether to grant the full amount. Typically, the approved loan
is smaller than the amount applied for (with a median of 80% for new clients). De-
pending on the client's repayment capacity, both agree on the number and frequency
of the scheduled repayments, which typically are of a xed amount. In most cases,
the rst repayment begins immediately (i. e. after a week or a month).
When payments are due, 27% are made early, 46% on the date due, and 27% are
late. If payments are late, clients have to pay a penalty in form of higher interest
rates which increases after 30, 60, and 90 days (from 0.83% to 1.11% to 1.38% to
1.94% per month).
11
If the client has not paid after a few days, the loan ocer
visits the client and delivers an ocial letter from Caja Los Andes reminding of the
outstanding payment. Since a signicant part of the loan ocer's salary depends
on the punctuality of his clients' payments, he has high incentives to collect due
payments. In extraordinary circumstances (e. g. severe illness) Caja Los Andes
might grant a postponement of payments, where interest is accumulated but no
penalties are applied (0.74% of all loans). In recent years, Caja Los Andes has
also agreed on a rescheduling for some loans since some of its clients were not able
to repay the scheduled amounts due to excessively high debt levels and repayment
obligations (0.45% of all loans). Most clients, however, eventually make their overdue
payments and also pay the penalties accumulated. If the payments are overdue by
more than 30 days, Caja Los Andes begins to collect collateral or takes the loan to
court (685 court cases since 1996, 0.25% of all loans). Loans are never written-o
in the internal accounting systems and Caja Los Andes attempts to recollect the
capital by all possible means.
11
This describes the regime applied in most recent loans.
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Caja Los Andes closely monitors late payments and uses an internal risk classi-
cation depending on the maximal and the average number of days a loan is overdue.
If one payment is ve or more days overdue, the loan is considered problematic. If
it is 30 or more days overdue or if the average of all payments is ten or higher, the
loan is classied in the highest risk category and the client is not granted future
loans.
5.4.2.2 Development of the Terms and Conditions of Loans over Time
In the rst years of operation, a typical loan required frequent regular repayments
and was of a relatively short duration. Over time, however, the frequency of repay-
ments has decreased and the duration of the loans has increased. In 1992, the largest
part of the loans required weekly repayment (76%), with 23% requiring fortnightly
repayment. Over time this distribution changed towards monthly repayment (72%
in 2000) and an increasing fraction of irregular payment schedules which are tailored
to the needs of the clients (from 8% in 1997 to 25% in 2000). The mean length of
loans in days has increased from 80 in 1992 to 528 in January to June 2000. These
changes cannot be explained by increasing loan sizes alone. For loans between $US
400 and $US 600, for example, 76% required weekly payment in 1992 compared to
0.6% in 2000. The mean duration of these loans has increased from 81 days to 431
days, while the mean number of repayments has been roughly constant over time at
14.8. Interest rates have decreased slightly over time. The mean monthly interest
rate for loans of a size below $US 1,000 in 1992 values and denoted in ination ad-
justed Bolivianos, for example, has dropped from 2.5% in 1992 to 2.22% in January
to June 2000.
All loans are secured through chattel items. The median coverage ratio (value
of chattel items over loan size) has increased from 200% to 420% between 1992
and 1994 and dropped to 260% since. While chattel guarantees have always been
required, the use of personal guarantees has increased considerably over time. These
are mainly used for larger loans and for loans that are high relative to the client's
assets or combined with a relatively low value of chattel guarantees. While in 1992
personal guarantees have been used by 12% of loans above $US 1,000, they were used
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by 53% of these loans in 1999. This increased guarantee requirement corresponds
to the ndings of Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) who predict an increase in
guarantee requirements when competition is high.
5.4.2.3 Benets for Clients with Good Repayment Records
Clients taking repeat loans obtain loan sizes that correspond more closely to their de-
sired amount. The approved amount was on average 38% below the desired amount
for all rst approved loan applications in 1994, for example, 20% below the desired
amount for second applications of these clients and only 13% below for the 5th ap-
plications of these clients.
12
Over time, the average for rst applications declined
from 43% in 1993 to 15% in 1999. The increase in loan sizes can also be seen from
the median loan growth between two consecutive loan applications which is 42%.
Growth rates are higher for smaller loans and between the rst loans, lower there-
after. For example, the median loan growth rates of clients with a rst loan in 1996
was 64% between the rst and the second loan, 47% between the second and the
third loan, and 39% between the third and the fourth loan.
An increasing number of clients benets from preferential loans, which have been
introduced in 1996. Of all clients who had their rst loan in 1997, 14% of their fth
loans and 37% of their seventh loans have been preferential loans, to give a few
examples.
Caja Los Andes states that it does not grant future loans to clients with high
arrears ( 30 days for at least one payment). How does this hold up in practice?
From 70,455 rst loans with no high arrears, 46,074 (64%) clients have obtained a
second loan. From 5,322 clients with high arrears, 368 (7%) clients obtain a second
loan.
13
While the fraction is considerably lower for clients with high arrears, it is
still surprisingly high when taking into consideration Caja Los Andes' ocial policy.
12
For these calculations the ratio is truncated to one whenever the approved amount was higher
than the desired amount. Besides reduced restrictions from the side of the loan ocers, a part of
the decrease could also be due to learning on the side of the clients.
13
Throughout this analysis, we exclude loans disbursed to renance prior loans from the analysis
of repeat loans.
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5.4.2.4 Market Characteristics
Since the early 1990's, the supply of micro-loans and competition have increased
substantially in the Bolivian micronance market. The fraction of Caja Los Andes'
clients holding simultaneous loans from other institutions has increased from 5% to
24% from 1995 to June 2000 in La Paz, for example. The portfolio per capita (work-
ing age population) of the micronance institutions in La Paz has approximately
increased from $US 10 in 1992 to $US 80 in 2000 (see also section 5.4.3). Credit
records are provided by the banking supervisory authority and have become widely
used in the micronance sector. The number of entries with bad credit records has
increased from 52 in 1992 to 6,945 in 1999.
Economic growth has been moderate until 1997/98. Beginning in late 1998,
however, an economic crisis emerged. GDP per capita decreased by 2.2% in 1999
(source: Worldbank). The micro-enterprise sector was hit severely by this crisis. For
production businesses in La Paz, for example, median annualized growth in prots
between two consecutive balance observations was -0.4% in the rst quarter of 2000
and -1.9% in the second quarter.
14
5.4.2.5 Repayment
The frequency of late payments has increased considerably over time. Portfolio at
risk (the percentage of outstanding capital that is at least 30 days overdue) has
increased from 0.5% in 1995 to 7.3% in mid 2000. While in 1995 payments were 0.9
days late on average, they were 7.8 days late in the rst half of 2000. Reacting on
the rise in late payments, Caja Los Andes enforced timely repayment more strictly
in 1999/2000 and the percentage of punctual repayments rose to 75% after being
64% in 1998. The fraction of payments a few (one to nine) days late decreased
correspondingly from 28% to 13%. The fraction of payments ten or more days late,
however, continued to increase from 8% in 1998 to 12% in mid 2000.
When we compare rst loans of new clients with repeat loans, we nd that
repayment behavior deteriorates for repeat loans. For loans distributed in 1998, for
14
For a more detailed account of the eects of the economic crisis on the micro-enterprise sector
see Rhyne (2001).
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example, 15% of all rst loans had at least one payment  30 days overdue, 17% of
all second loans, and 18% of all third loans. This increase in arrears could indicate
that clients are aware of Caja Los Andes' strict repayment policy when they take
their rst loans, but then nd that the policy is not so strict after all and relax. The
deterioration is consistent with the ndings by Schreiner (1999).
When a client faces unexpected harsh conditions, he can negotiate a postpone-
ment of payments with Caja Los Andes. While interest is accumulated, the client
does not pay any punishment for the late payments and resumes regular repayment
at the end of the postponed period. The fraction of loans postponed has decreased
from 8% in 1992 to 0.5% in 1994 and increased to 1.9% in 1999. In the rst half of
2000, the fraction was 0.7%.
Due to the increasing supply of micro-loans and the move of consumer credit
companies into the same market, many households were lured into taking multiple
large loans which frequently left them with regular repayment obligations which
they could not pay out of their incomes. This over-indebtedness of many clients
created severe repayment problems beginning in 1998. In addition, the economic
crisis in Bolivia reduced the incomes of many clients. To acknowledge the reduced
repayment capacity of many clients, the banking supervisory authority in Bolivia
reduced the required provisions for rescheduled loans, making it cheaper for banks
to reschedule loans (Rhyne 2001, p. 150). Caja Los Andes thereafter rescheduled
some of the loans, 1354 in 1999 and 876 in the rst half of 2000. This amounts to
3.7% of outstanding loans in 1999 and to 2.3% in the rst half of 2000.
5.4.3 Additional Variables
To capture the repayment incentives outlined in section 5.3, we generate a number
of new variables which are described in the following paragraphs.
Business Environment We use GDP data from the Instituto Nacional de Es-
tadística (INE), La Paz, http://www.ine.gov.bo and calculate growth rates of real
quarterly GDP compared to the same quarter in the previous year. The value of
GROWTH is depicted in gure 5.1. Between 1996 and 1998, growth rates were close
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Figure 5.1: Growth in real quarterly GDP, same period (GROWTH). Source: INE
to 5% on average. In 1999 they dropped below zero and remained around 2% in
2000.
Increasing supply of loans and competition As a proxy for the increasing
supply of loans we construct a variable from data about the portfolio of micronance
institutions from ASOFIN (December 1999, table 2.19) and population data from
INE. From this data we calculate the portfolio per capita (working age) of the largest
micronance institutions and denote it RELPORT.
15
Its development over time is
depicted in gure 5.2. There has been a strong increase over time from below $10
in 1992 to above $60 in 2000. The portfolio is highest in La Paz with a maximum
of $80 in 1999.
As a proxy for competition, we calculate the fraction of clients with loans from
other institutions by quarter and branch, which we denote OTHERLOAN. While
this fraction increases with the supply of loans, it strongly depends on competi-
tion which can induce clients to take loans from multiple institutions at the same
time in spite of additional transaction costs. The increasing number of clients with
loans from other institutions is seen with concern by the micronance institutions
15
While this information is imperfect since it does not cover all institutions (it covers member
institutions of ASOFIN, Cipame, and Finrural only), it is the only available information about
supply.
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MF-Portfolio per capita
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Figure 5.2: Proxy variable for the supply of micronance loans in the branches
Cochabamba, La Paz, and Sucre: RELPORT.
and seems to capture competition quite well.
16
OTHERLOAN varies considerably
between the branches and it increased substantially in 1998-2000, see gure 5.3.
OTHERLOAN and RELPORT are compared in gure 5.4.
Availability of credit records The data set contains information about bad
credit records only. While these are high especially in the years of the economic
crisis, they provide a reasonable proxy for the number of credit records as a whole.
We use the number of new bad credit records each quarter as a proxy variable and
denote it NEWBLOCK. It has increased from 50 per quarter in 1992 to 2000 per
quarter in the rst half of 2000.
Enforcement of repayment As a proxy for the fervor used to enforce timely
repayment we use the ratio of payments one or two days late relative to punctual
payments per quarter and denote it ENFORCE. Payments that are one or two
days late most likely are caused by negligence rather than by an inability to repay
and a decrease in these payments proxies the enforcement of punctual repayment.
Figure 5.5 shows the development of this ratio for the three oldest branches. The
16
An exception are the rst quarters after the opening of a new branch, where the fraction of
clients with other loans is very high.
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Fraction of clients with other loans
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Figure 5.3: Proxy variable for competition in the branches Cochabamba, La Paz,
and Sucre: OTHERLOAN.
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Figure 5.4: Proxy variables for the supply of micronance loans and competition by
branch (Cochabamba, La Paz, Sucre, and Tarija): OTHERLOAN and RELPORT.
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Fraction of payments 1-2d late over punct. payments
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Figure 5.5: Enforcement of punctual repayment in the branches Cochabamba, La
Paz, and Sucre: ENFORCE. High values indicate low enforcement, low values high
enforcement.
fraction of late payments increases gradually until 1998 and drops sharply thereafter
in Cochabamba and La Paz.
17
Some of the variables described above are generated from the same data on
loans that we use for our regressions and we will continue with a brief discussion
of identication and endogeneity issues. Take OTHERLOAN, for example. How
can we identify the eects of an increase in the fraction of clients with other loans
when we also use a dummy variable for a client's individual level of indebtedness as
explaining variable? Identication is possible since OTHERLOAN is an average of
all clients (the fraction of clients with other loans) and thus measures a characteristic
of the market rather than an individual characteristic. That is, a high value for
OTHERLOAN indicates a high level of competition for all clients at the same time
in the same branch, whilefrom a client perspectivehaving loans from another
institution indicates that the client is more active in the loan market for a given level
of competition. There are many clients who have no loans from other institutions
17
Anecdotes about stronger enforcement abound. In La Paz, loan ocers met on weekends and
collectively went to their clients in order to cash in due payments. In addition, the computer
system was modied to issue early warning signals if clients were overdue.
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even in a market where most other clients do so (corresponding to a high value for
OTHERLOAN). Identication thus is possible because we use the individual level of
indebtedness and the market level of indebtedness as separate explaining variables.
Moreover, OTHERLOAN is a valid independent variable since we take the mean
by quarter and branch. While the mean may inuence individual behavior, the
inuence of individual behavior on the mean is negligible due to the large number of
observations and there is no endogeneity. We can make a similar case for ENFORCE
which is also calculated from client data.
5.5 Estimation Strategy
The empirical analysis focuses on the prediction of loan default and late payments.
The analysis uses a two-fold approach in that we use two dierent units of obser-
vation. Firstly, we consider loans. The analysis of loans is in the spirit of credit
scoring models, predicting which loans are likely to be overdue frequently or by a
long time.
18
Its results are particularly helpful for future decisions about which
loans to approve and which to reject. However, we observe the full duration of these
loans only if they are distributed no later than mid-1998. As a consequence, we lose
valuable information since we cannot incorporate loans distributed in the years of
the economic crisis and of increasing levels of indebtedness. In addition, the analysis
of loans poses statistical diculties since the loans are characterized by frequently
scheduled payments and the structure of the loans (number and timing of scheduled
payments, duration etc.) varies strongly. To acknowledge these issues, we change
the unit of observation and supplement the analysis of loans with an explicit analysis
of each payment in turn.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. Section 5.5.1 begins with
the analysis of loans and discusses estimation issues. The unit of observation then
is changed in section 5.5.2, where we analyze payments. In particular, we rst
18
While most banks in developed countries use some variant of credit scoring to decide whether
or not to grant a loan, this procedure is rarely used in micronance institutions who emphasize
the importance of a personal relationship between the loan ocers and their clients. For more
information about the applicability of credit scoring to micronance see Schreiner (1999).
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examine the probability that a payment is late and then estimate the number of
days a payment is late with a duration analysis.
5.5.1 Prediction of Loan Default
For the prediction of defaults, many banks take recourse to credit scoring which
traditionally is based on discriminant analysis. This paper uses a random utility
model instead which allows us to estimate the probability that a loan is problematic
based on individual characteristics. Discriminant analysis yields consistent estimates
only if the independent variables are normally distributed. Since this assumption is
violated for many of the independent variables used in our model, notably for the
dummy variables, a discriminant analysis would yield inconsistent estimates (Press
and Wilson 1978, McFadden 1976).
The analysis of repayment behavior is based on data from clients with approved
loans. This data is no random sample of micro-entrepreneurs since we can expect
rejected applicants to dier considerably from clients who obtained a loan. Further
along time, clients obtain repeat loans only if they have a good repayment record.
This selection can considerably bias the results of a repayment analysis since loans
are approved only if the loan ocer thinks that the client will repay the loan. If we
predict repayment behavior of the general population from clients who obtained a
loan, our estimates are biased towards good repayment behavior (assuming the loan
ocer's assessment is correct on average).
We can describe the selection structure of the model with a random utility model
based on the theoretical model presented above. Clients repay if U
R
> U
D
and
default otherwise. Let X
0
denote the observed client characteristics that determine
whether or not a client repays. X
0
thus includes loan size, interest rates, penalties,
the client's income and wealth, and so on. A linearized representation of the two
dierent utilities can be denoted as U
R
= 
R
X
0
+
R
, and U
D
= 
D
X
0
+
D
. Let the
binary variable D denote default, where D = 1 if a client defaults and 0 otherwise.
The probability that a client defaults thus can be expressed as P (D = 1) = P (U
D
>
U
R
) = P ((
D
  
R
)X
0
+ 
D
  
R
> 0) = P (X
0
+ 
0
> 0). Whether or not a client
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defaults, however, is observed only if the client's rst loan application is approved.
Let z denote a binary variable with a value of one if the loan is approved and let X
1
denote client characteristics that determine this probability. Formally,
P (z = 1) = X
1
 + 
1
; and
P (D = 1) = X
0
 + 
0
with (
1
; 
0
)  N(0; 0; 1; 1; ) ; (5.6)
where we assume that the errors are jointly normally distributed and  is the coef-
cient of correlation between 
1
and 
0
. The probability of default, conditioned on
loan approval, then can be written as
P (D = 1jz = 1) =
P (D = 1 [ z = 1)
P (z = 1)
=

2
(X
0
; X
1
; )
(X
1
)
; (5.7)
where ;
2
are the univariate and bivariate normal cumulative probabilities. Se-
lection is of no consequence if  = 0. If  < 0, clients who are more likely to obtain
a loan are less likely to default and P (D = 1jz = 1) < P (D = 1). Equation (5.7)
can be estimated by maximum likelihood (e. g. through a bi-variate probit with
selection), see Boyes, Homan, and Low (1989) or Greene (1998) for more details.
While the above discussion has focused on the estimates for clients with rst
loans, the structure for second loans is similar. The corresponding selection process
describes whether or not clients obtain a second loan. That is, z = 1 if they obtain
a second loan and z = 0 otherwise. In this case,  measures the correlation between
the probability of obtaining a second loan and the probability of default. For the
analysis of second loans we disregard potential selection eects stemming from the
approval of the rst loan for two reasons. Firstly, we nd that these selection eects
are insignicant even for rst loans. Secondly, the results of this estimation should
help the bank to decide whether or not to grant a second loan. As such, they are
not meant to be applicable to the general population but to clients after a rst loan.
While the two-step estimator is consistent, identication is weak if X
1
= X
0
. If
the same factors determine whether or not a client obtains a loan and whether or
not he pays late, the eects of these factors are hard to pin down and identication
completely relies on modeling assumptions (e. g. the joint normality of the error
terms). One possibility to circumvent this problem is to impose exclusion restric-
tions, that is, to include variables in X
1
(selection equation) that are not included
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in X
0
(main equation).
19
When estimating the probability of loan approval, we in-
clude the amount applied for and its higher order terms which are excluded from the
estimation of default. The amount applied for is mostly driven by a lack of personal
funds or by unexpected cash shortages, both of which do not determine the client's
future repayment behavior. When estimating the probability of a second loan, we
use the length of the prior loan in days as explaining variable which is excluded
from the estimation of defaults. The length of the loan is mainly determined by the
client's repayment capacity and by the use of the loan and should thus be unrelated
to future repayment behavior.
After discussing the estimation strategy, we have to dene what exactly we mean
with default. To capture repayment behavior, the analysis requires a measure of
default that applies to all types of loans, in particular to loans with dierent repay-
ment schedules. To reduce the inuence of the number of scheduled repayments, we
consider the average number of days overdue per payment for each loan. That is, if a
client has a loan with ten scheduled repayments and is six days late for the last two
payments, the average would be 12/10=1.2 days. The distribution of this average,
however, depends on the number of scheduled payments. Given an identical mean,
a higher number of payments leads to a lower variance. In addition, there might be
intrinsic dierences in the expected number of late days between, say, weekly and
monthly payments which can be captured by dummy variables.
One way to circumvent these issues would be to conne our estimates to loans
with identical repayment structures. Doing this, however, would strongly bias our
sample since Caja Los Andes has changed its policy of distributing loans over time.
In later years, duration of loans has increased and the repayment frequencies have
decreased, see section 5.4.2.2. That is, clients who would have obtained a loan with
10 weekly installments in 1995 most likely would have obtained a loan with a longer
duration and, say, 5 monthly installments in 1999. Acknowledging these changes, we
pool loans with dierent repayment structures and correct for dierent means and
variances through the use of a robust variance estimator, through dummy variables
for weekly and fortnightly schedules, and for the number of scheduled payments,
19
See Vella (1998) for a more detailed discussion of identication issues.
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and through the estimation of a heteroscedastic probit model. For the average to
be a meaningful measure, we exclude all loans with less than six installments.
20
Our analysis distinguishes between loans with few late payments that are overall
unproblematic and between loans with many very late payments that increase the
bank's capital at risk substantially and we calculate two sets of estimates. The rst
set calculates the probability that a loan has average arrears of at least one day (we
denote this a late loan from now on) and the second calculates the probability that
a loan has average arrears of at least ten days (we denote this loan default from
now on). We choose the second threshold (ten days) since it corresponds to Caja
Los Andes' internal risk evaluation. Clients with average arrears of ten days or more
belong to the highest risk category andin most casesdo not obtain future loans.
5.5.2 Analysis of Payments
While the unit of observation was the loan in the previous section, we now turn to
individual payments since they allow a more direct assessment of the inuence of
the economic environment at the time a payment is due. Moreover, the statistical
diculties in the analysis of loans are not prevalent in the analysis of payments, the
latter thus provides a test for the robustness of the results. We analyze payments in
two steps. Section 5.5.2.1 begins with a probit analysis to determine payments that
are at least one day late and those that are at least 10 days late. Section 5.5.2.2
then analyzes the length of each payment spell in the form of a duration analysis.
5.5.2.1 Late Payments
To begin with, we estimate the probability that a payment is at least one day late
and the probability that a payment is at least ten days late. In analogy to above we
refer to the former as late payments and to the latter as defaults. Since there is
20
Means and standard deviations of average arrears dier by payment form, they are 2.5, 5.05,
and 6.58 (means) and 31.6, 16.8, and 32.3 (variances) for weekly, fortnightly, and monthly schedules.
While the underlying distributions dier to some extent, pooling the estimates is necessary to
avoid a biased sample. Control regressions using other measures than the average numbers of days
overduee. g. the maximum number or a dummy variable indicating whether a part of the loan
is unpaid after the nal payment was dueshow a similar structure of the results, except for the
estimated inuence of the payment schedule.
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detailed payment information since mid 1995 only, we exclude all loans distributed
before 1996.
21
For the analysis of payments, the number of the payment is very
important. Shortly after the loan has been disbursed, the client should nd it easy
to pay the installments since he still has access to the loan. Eventually, however, the
loan-money has been used for other purposes and repayment becomes more dicult.
For loans with 10 scheduled repayments, for example, 1% of rst payments are late,
6% of fth payments, and 10% of nal payments. In addition, prior late payments
strongly increase the probability of being late for the consecutive payment.
The ideal way to take into account this time dependence would be to conne the
analysis to loans with identical repayment schedules. As mentioned above, however,
the policy of loan distribution has changed over time and such a sample would
be biased (frequently scheduled payments, for example, were used for clients with
potential repayment problems in 2000 while they were used for most clients in 1996).
To reduce the inuence of these changing characteristics, we again disregard loans
with less than six installments and conne our analysis to the rst, middle, and
nal payments for each loan. The analysis disregards selection eects of the form
discussed in section 5.5.1 and includes rst loans as well as repeat loans.
5.5.2.2 Duration Analysis
Besides the probability that a payment is late, we are interested in the number of
days each payment is overdue. After how many days overdue does a repayment
any time soon become unlikely? That is, if a payment is overdue for two days,
for example, what is the probability that it is made the next day? How does this
probability change when the payment is three days overdue? This time pattern is
important for the determination of repayment policy and the decision when to call
in overdue loans.
To describe this time dependence formally, let t denote the time a payment
is outstanding (days outstanding = days late +1), where f(t) denotes its density
function, and F (t) its cumulative distribution function. We then can dene the
21
Earlier loans contain information about the maximum number of days overdue only.
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survivor function as
S(t) = P (T > t) = 1  F (t) ; (5.8)
where S(t) determines the probability that the payment has not been made on day
t after it was due. An alternative characterization of the time structure is given by
the hazard rate, which is dened as
(t) =
f(t)
S(t)
: (5.9)
(t) determines the probability that a client pays the next day, given that the pay-
ment is t days outstanding today. The shape of (t) depends on the underlying
distribution of t. To model the inuence of individual characteristics on the hazard
rate we use a proportional hazard rate model which species the hazard rate as
(t; x; ) = (x; )  
0
(t). This specication assumes that personal characteristics
as captured in x proportionally shift the hazard rate (t; x; ). That is, higher non-
business income, for example, leads to a lower probability of paying on the rst day
overdue and to a proportionately lower probability of paying on the thirtieth day
overdue. Our estimation is based on the Cox-proportional hazard rate model which
assumes (x
0
) = e
x
0

and non-parametrically estimates . The model allows strati-
cation, that is, 
0
(t) may dier among groups of observations while the inuence of
individual variables () is the same for all observations. The estimates are derived
with maximum likelihood. For more details, see Kiefer (1998), for example. We use
the same sample as before and again focus on rst, middle, and nal payments.
5.6 Estimation Results
This section presents the estimation results and is organized identically to the previ-
ous section.
22
We begin with a brief description of the selection processes relevant for
22
For the estimation, we adjust the sample as follows. The analysis is conned to the commerce,
production, and service sectors. Information from the youngest branch, Santa Cruz, is dropped
since it began its operations in 1999 only. Loans and balance observations are kept only if the dates
match and the calculated income after repayment is consistent (leading to a loss of 40% of our
observations). Estimates for the second selection process (existence of a 2nd balance observations)
are calculated for those clients only who had their rst loan in or before 1997 to allow sucient
time for a second balance observation to occur. Observations with missing data were not used.
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our analysis in section 5.6.1. Section 5.6.2 then presents the results for the analysis
of loans, and section 5.6.3 changes the unit of observation and discusses payments.
5.6.1 Selection Processes
5.6.1.1 Loan Approval
The estimate of the probability of a loan approval is based on basic data available
for all applications such as the amount applied for, business sectors, civil status, and
branch specic information.
23
The results of the probit estimates are displayed in
table 5.2. We nd that loans of a size between $US 150 and $US 400 are most likely
to be approved while the approval of smaller and larger loans is less likely. Having a
bad repayment record with other banks (being on Caja Los Andes' black list which
is based on credit records from the banking supervisory authority) has a signicant
negative impact on loan approval. Single clients are less likely to obtain a loan than
others and clients in the commerce sector are more likely to obtain a loan (relative to
the production sector).
24
The probability decreases when there are many new bad
credit records (NEWBLOCK) and in areas with high competition (OTHERLOAN),
while it increases in areas with a high supply of micronance loans (RELPORT).
That is, the probability that the application of a client of a given risk category is
approved is higher in areas with a higher supply of loans. This nding corresponds
to theoretical analyses predicting that an increased inow of funds leads to the
disbursement of loans to riskier clients (Holmström and Tirole 1997, Bolton and
Freixas 2000). The change in the client structure is also evident from a comparison
of new clients' characteristics over time presented in table 5.3. The mean of the
log of non-business income has decreased over time, reducing the regular income
While a substantial amount of data was lost this way, the selection is not systematic since most
inconsistencies are due to errors when the data was entered.
23
There is balance information for a part of all rejected loan applications. During the time period
examined here, however, the sample of rejected applicants with balance information is very small
(181 observations). To asses the inuence of these variables I ran separate regressions including
these variables which are available on request. The estimated coecients of the main equation are
qualitatively identical.
24
We do not control for gender since it is frequently not recorded for rejected applicants (although
marital status is).
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from which to repay the loan in case of business problems. Liabilities over assets
and the fraction of clients with other loans, on the other hand, have increased (all
these changes are signicant at the 1% level). Summary statistics for approved and
rejected applications can be found in table 5.4.
25
The model is signicant with a Chi2
value of 8317.9 (18 degrees of freedom) and the explanatory power is relatively good
with a Pseudo-R
2
of 0.33 and 84% correct in-sample predictions (using a threshold
of 50%).
5.6.1.2 Observation of Second Loans
Next we estimate the probability that a client takes out a second loan given that the
rst loan application has been approved. We nd that the observation of a second
loan is more likely for women, for non-singles, younger clients, older businesses, and
clients with higher incomes. The probability of a second loan diminishes strongly if
the client has a bad credit record before the rst loan or a bad repayment record
as captured by average and maximal days overdue.
26
This dependence reects Caja
Los Andes' policy of rejecting applications from clients with a bad repayment record.
The model is signicant with a Chi2 value of 3686.39 (36 degrees of freedom) and
the explanatory power is relatively high with a Pseudo-R
2
of 0.42. The full results
of the probit estimates can be found in table 5.5, the dependence of repayment for
the second loan on prior arrears is summarized in table 5.6, and additional summary
statistics are listed in table 5.7.
5.6.2 Prediction of Late and Default Loans
This section discusses the results of the bivariate probit estimation for the probability
that a loan is late and the probability that there is a loan default. As dened in
section 5.5.1, late loans are characterized by an average of at least one day overdue
per payment, while default loans are characterized by an average of at least ten
days. The results for both sets of estimates can be found in table 5.8.
25
For a more detailed discussion of this selection process see section 4.5.
26
We include both the maximum and the average number of arrears since they capture dierent
aspects of repayment behavior, particularly so for loans with many scheduled repayments.
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The independent variables can be divided into four categories. The rst are
personal characteristics such as marital status, gender, age and prior repayment
behavior. In addition, we include the clients' business and non-business income.
These variables capture the idiosyncratic eects discussed in our theoretical model.
We expect clients with less access to alternative sources of funds (clients with low
income, women), with a higher risk tolerance (a higher number of previous days
overdue), or with lower expected business and non-business income to pay late more
frequently than others. The second category contains information about the clients'
businesses such as the amount of assets, business age and business sector. We
also include the ratio of liabilities over assets and a dummy variable if the client
has loans from other sources which we interact with year dummies. Our model
predicts a positive inuence of assets on repayment while the inuence of a high
liabilities over asset ratio is unclear. The third category contains the terms and
conditions of the loans such as interest rates and repayment schedules. The fourth
category contains information about the market environment. Here we include the
variables OTHERLOAN and RELPORT to capture competition and the supply
of micro-loans, and the variables ENFORCE, NEWBLOCK and GROWTH (see
section 5.4.3). From our model, high competition and supply should lead to worse
repayment while an increased number of credit records, higher enforcement, and
higher growth should lead to better repayment.
The bivariate probit estimates are presented in columns (1), (4), (5), and (6) of
table 5.8. Columns (2) and (3) present slightly dierent sets of estimates discussed
below. With respect to personal characteristics, we nd that being single, young,
or on the black list increases the probability of late loans and defaults. For second
loans, the size of average and, in particular, maximal arrears during the rst loan
has a very strong negative inuence on repayment behavior. As predicted, we nd
a high inuence of risk-related, idiosyncratic characteristics.
Late and default loans are more likely for businesses with a high liabilities over
asset ratio. For rst loans, there is an interesting change over time in the inuence
of loans from other sources. Clients with prior loans from other sources were less
likely than others to be late or default for loans distributed in 1996 (coecient
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on D(other loan)) but more likely than others for loans distributed in 1997 and
1998 (coecient of the interaction terms). These ndings are consistent with a
prediction from our model: a higher dependence on outside funds should lead to
better repayment behavior in a good economic environment (loans distributed in
1996) and to worse repayment behavior in an adverse economic environment (loans
distributed in 1997 and 1998). An alternative interpretation, however, could lie in an
unobserved change in the structure of other loans. While most other loans were from
micronance institutions in 1996, a larger part was from consumer credit companies
in 1998. Consumer loans are more likely to exceed the clients' repayment capacity
and thus could lead to more frequent late payments. Since we do not observe the
source of the other loans, we cannot control for these eects.
The environment at the time the loan is distributed plays a signicant role only
for the probability that a loan is late, not for the probability of a default. Higher
competition as approximated by OTHERLOAN leads to a higher probability, while a
higher supply of loans (RELPORT) leads to a lower probability of late loans. There
are signicant time eects: the probability that a loan is late increases for loans
distributed in 1997 and 1998, while the probability of a default is not aected. The
analysis of the business environment at the time the loans are distributed, however,
provides limited information for the analysis of repayment for the loan since the
environment changes over the course of the loan. This eect could also explain the
unexpected positive sign on the GROWTH and NEWBLOCK variables implying
that higher growth and an increase in the number of bad credit records lead to
worse repayment. The change in the environment over the course of the loan is
explored through the analysis of payments in the next section.
27
Terms and conditions of the loan also have a signicant inuence on repayment
behavior. These variables have to be interpreted cautiously, however, since they
suer from endogeneity bias. That is, when a loan ocer suspects that a client is
not going to repay very well, he might distribute a small loan only with relatively
frequent repayments and require extra guarantees. This is most evident in the ratio
27
In principle, we could calculate statistics describing the average competition during the course
of the loans, for example. However, this would not lead to models usable for prediction.
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of applied over approved amount. Clients who obtain a loan relatively far below
their desired amount are more likely to be late or default. In addition, higher loan
sizes (for rst loans), higher interest rates (for rst loans), the existence of a personal
guarantee, and fortnightly or weekly repayments (compared to monthly repayments)
increase the probability that a loan is late or default. These dependencies suggest
that the loan ocer's assessment provides a good indicator for the client's repayment
behavior. Clients who are seen to be potentially bad risks are given relatively small
loans, are required to repay frequently, and a personal guarantee is required. Our
results show that clients whose loans have these characteristics indeed have a worse
repayment behavior than others.
To assess the robustness of our results with respect to endogeneity bias, we
run separate regressions excluding variables determined by the loan ocer. The
results are presented in column (2) of table 5.8. While most coecients remain
qualitatively similar, the coecients on the year dummies change and the coecient
of the clients' income become negative. That is, clients with higher income are
found to pay more punctual than others as predicted by our theoretical model. This
change in coecients suggests that the loan ocer determines the conditions of
the loan such that they oset the negative incentive eects of low incomes. When
we estimate a heteroscedastic probit (see column 3 in table 5.8) the results show
a signicant inuence of payment schedules on the variance. While the variance
equation is signicant at the 1% level, the coecients of the main equation remain
qualitatively similar.
Our estimates for rst and second loans show that selection eects () are in-
signicant. That is, we do not nd evidence that Caja Los Andes selects those clients
that have a good repayment behavior and we do not nd evidence that clients with
second loans have a better expected repayment behavior than clients without second
loans. The nding that Caja Los Andes does not seem to select clients according
to their repayment behavior is no contradiction to the fact that their policy is suc-
cessful. On the contrary, the lacking evidence of selection bias makes our results
applicable to all applicants, not only to clients.
The overall explanatory power is relatively high for late loans, but low for de-
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faults. The out-of-sample predictive power presented in tables 5.9 and 5.10 is rel-
atively low. Using a threshold value of 15%, for example, we correctly predict 631
late loans (40% of all late loans) but incorrectly classify 656 loans that are not late
(27% of all loans that are not late). Taken together, we correctly classify 59.7%
of all observations only.
28
The low predictive power, however, is common to credit
scoring models of this type (Greene 1998, Schreiner 1999, for example). Our anal-
ysis of second loans fares slightly better. Using a threshold of 40%, for example,
we correctly predict 545 late loans (54%) while we incorrectly classify 330 (28%).
Taken together, we classify 64% of second loans correctly.
5.6.3 Analysis of Payments
After the analysis of loans, we now change the unit of observation and examine in-
dividual payments. This analysis allows us to examine the inuence of the economic
environment at the time each payment is due. In addition, the analysis sheds light
on a change in repayment behavior between 1998 and 2000. While there has been
an increase in the number of clients paying punctual, the number of clients with
payments overdue for many days has increased during this period (see table 5.11).
5.6.3.1 Late Payments
This section discusses probit estimates for the probability of late and default pay-
ments, where we dene a late payment as a payment that is  1 day overdue and a
default payment as a payment  10 days overdue. The results are presented in table
5.13, descriptive statistics can be found in table 5.14. Columns (1) to (3) contain
estimates for late payments, columns (4) to (6) contain estimates for default pay-
ments. We report results for rst payments, nal payments, and pooled estimates
for rst, middle, and nal payments. Column (6) excludes potentially endogenous
variables to check the robustness of the results. The pooled sample allows us to
analyze the inuence of the number of the payment, the number of the loans, and
28
The threshold denes the level used for classifying loans as late. In this example, we classify a
loan as late if the predicted probability to be late is at least 15%. Since our sample is unbalanced,
using the typical threshold of 50% would not be adequate.
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prior arrears. Since the use of multiple observations of the same clients leads to
heteroscedasticity, we use robust variance estimates.
29
The analysis of payments broadly shows the same inuence factors as the analysis
of loans and we discuss the additional ndings only. Perhaps suprisingly, we nd
that women are more likely to pay late than men when we consider the full sample,
so are old businesses. Being late in prior loans and prior payments of the current loan
are highly signicant indicators for future late and default payments. In contrast
to the analysis of loans, we nd no signicant inuence of the liabilities over asset
ratio. Having loans from other sources increases the probability of late payments,
especially so in the years 1999 and 2000 (see the interaction with the dummy variable
for 1999/2000). The eects of other loans in 1999 and 2000 are stronger for default
payments than for late payments. Taken together, this result corresponds to a
prediction from our model: clients with large/multiple loans face higher repayment
problems in times of the economic crisis (the year corresponds to the time the
payment was due). As mentioned above, however, this eect could also be caused
by an increase in consumer lending.
Our pooled estimates (columns (3), (5)-(6)) show that the probability of a late
payment is considerably higher for middle and nal payments and for repeat loans,
while the probability of a default payment is signicantly lower for repeat loans.
There are two possible explanations for this dierent structure. Firstly, clients
might learn that a limited number of days in arrears does not impede their future
access to loans (Schreiner (1999) reports analogous ndings). Secondly, there could
be selection eects determining whether or not clients obtain repeat loans (this
interpretation stands in contrast to the insignicant selection eects for second loans
discussed above but could be explained by unobserved characteristics). That is,
clients obtaining repeat loans are less likely to have default payments than others.
Competition (OTHERLOAN) and supply (RELPORT) have a highly signicant
negative eect on late payments when we consider all loans and all payments. That
29
Additional estimates for middle payments show similar results and are available upon request.
The inuence of the terms and conditions of the loans diers considerably from the above analysis
of loans. This is largely due to dierent samples since the analysis of payments additionally includes
loans distributed between June 30th, 1998 and 2000.
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is, a client with given characteristics has a better repayment behavior at a time
and in a branch with high competition and high supply of micro-loans than else-
where. This dependency could have two possible sources. Firstly, clients could be
more aware of the importance of timely repayment in an environment with a high
availability of micro-loans. Secondly, being aware of the possible negative incentive
eects of high supply, institutions could have developed higher repayment incen-
tives and/or more ecient screening to compensate for high competition and supply
(through measures unobserved in our data set). Higher enforcement (a lower value
of ENFORCE) leads to a lower probability of making both late and default pay-
ments (defaults to a lesser extent though). The latter eect indicates that Caja
Los Andes' strengthening of enforcement has not only reached sloppy clients but
has also decreased the probability of default payments. The eect of GROWTH
is negative as well, indicating that low economic growth leads to worse repayment,
although the coecients are insignicant. Since we include dummy variables for
the dierent years, GROWTH mainly captures variations within the years which
we nd to be insignicant. In two sets of control regressions rstly without year
dummies and secondly with an alternative measure of growth calculated from ob-
served micro-enterprise prots, however, GROWTH remained insignicant or had
a signicant positive coecient. We are left to conclude that either both measures
of growth do not capture the economic environment of micro-enterprises, or that
the eect of the economic environment is very small and that the deterioration of
repayment in 1999 and 2000 has not been driven by the economic crisis.
The overall explanatory power is relatively good when we consider nal pay-
ments or pooled estimates with Pseudo-R
2
values between 0.14 and 0.24, lower for
rst payments (which are very punctual on average), and generally lower for the
probability of paying late than for default payments. Out-of-sample predictions are
presented in table 5.15. Using a threshold of 20%, for example, we predict 2,003 late
payment correctly (64% of all late payments) and wrongly predict 3,098 payments
that are not late (20%). Taken together, we correctly predict 77.1%.
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Figure 5.6: Kaplan-Meier estimates of the hazard rate function (t). Interpretation:
for any value of t, the value of (t) indicates the probability that the client pays on
day t, given the payment has not yet been made (that is, it is t-1 days overdue).
Assume, for example, a payment was due on the 1st of the month and has not been
made until the bank opens on the 10th of the month (it is 9 days overdue). (10)
then denotes the probability that the client pays on the 10th.
5.6.3.2 Duration Analysis
After discussing the probability that payments are a certain number of days late,
we now examine the length of each spell a payment is (over-) due in more detail and
begin with a few descriptive analyses. Figure 5.6 depicts the Kaplan-meier estimated
hazard rate (t) for rst, middle, and nal payments (see equation 5.9).
30
That is,
it shows the probability that the client pays on day t, given that the payment has
not yet been made (it is t  1 days overdue). The gure shows that the hazard rate
decreases strongly initially, and slowly thereafter. That is, the probability that a
client makes a due payment decreases strongly for the rst few days overdue and
only marginally thereafter. More than 70% of clients pay on the rst day the loan
is due. Of those who do not pay on the rst day, only 27% pay on the second day
due (that is, on the rst day overdue). From then on, the fraction of clients making
30
The estimation takes into account that a number of observations is censored since we do not
observe payments made after June 30th, 2000.
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Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by Payment
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Figure 5.7: Kaplan-Meier estimates of survivor functions for rst, middle, and nal
payments. Interpretation: for any value on the x-axis the value on the y-axis in-
dicates the probability of being at least x days outstanding. That is, the survival
estimate for 20 days, S(20), denotes the probability that the loan is outstanding at
least 20 days (that is, it is at least 20-1=19 days overdue). Sample: rst, middle,
and nal payments of loans with  6 installments.
their overdue payments declines to below 10%. That is, if clients are a few days late
with their payments, the probability that they repay any time soon is very low. In
the light of this structure, Caja Los Andes' policy to follow up on overdue payments
immediately makes good sense.
To assess whether the structure of repayments diers between various groups
of clients, we can plot separate estimates for these groups. For this comparison,
we depict the survival functions S(t) corresponding to equation (5.8). S(t) denotes
the probability that a payment is at least t days outstanding (t  1 days overdue).
Figure 5.7 divides the sample between rst, middle, and nal payments and shows
that rst payments are punctual most frequently and have the lowest fraction with
high arrears. The dierence is highly signicant with a p-value below 0.0001 (log-
rank test). The mean time a payment is due is 1.59 days for rst payments, 5.01
days for middle and 7.01 days for nal payments. When comparing nal payments
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in dierent years (gure 5.8) we nd that the curves cross, indicating that repayment
behavior has changed considerably. The frequency of late payments has increased
from 1996 to 1998 and decreased again in 1999 (see the upper left corner of the
graph). The probability of high arrears (e. g. of 40 days), however, has increased
continuously over time. This graph depicts the same structure as table 5.11: while
the fraction of payments that are ten or more days late has increased continuously
since 1996, the fraction of punctual payments has decreased until 1998 and increased
since. The dierences by year again are highly signicant with a p-value below
0.0001 (log-rank test) and the mean time a payment is outstanding has increased
continuously from 5.12 days in 1996 to 9.78 days in 1999.
To asses the inuence of prior arrears, we divide nal payments into two groups
dependent on whether or not the rst payment of the same loan was punctual or
not. Figure 5.9 shows a strong increase in the survivor function for the group with
late rst payments. That is, if the rst payment of the loan was late, the probability
that the nal payment is punctual decreases from 73% to 44%, the probability that
it is at least twenty days outstanding increases from 1% to 14%. The dierence
between the two curves again is highly signicant and the mean number of days a
nal payment is due is 5.52 days for punctual rst payments and 16.26 days for late
rst payments.
Besides a descriptive analysis, we can estimate a Cox-proportional hazard model
as described in section 5.5.2.2 to incorporate the explanatory variables used in the
other regressions. This analysis explores the full information about days overdue
and not only a binary representation as the probit estimates discussed above. The
estimated coecients are presented in table 5.16 (the coecients are in percentage
terms). A negative coecient implies that a high value of the corresponding variable
decreases the hazard rate for all t. In other words, negative coecients imply a lower
probability of repayment at all times and a higher mean number of days outstanding.
The structure of the results is similar to the probit estimates discussed above and
we describe some prominent ndings only. The probability that single clients make
their payments, for example, is 1.55% lower than the probability for non-singles
(e
 0:01557
= 0:98455). It is 0.58% lower for women than for men and 13.69% lower
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Figure 5.8: Kaplan-Meier estimates of survivor functions for nal payments in 1996,
1997, 1998, and 1999. Sample: nal payments of loans with  6 installments. Loans
distributed since 1996.
for clients on the black list. Clients having loans from other sources have a 1.31%
lower probability of making their payments. If payments for these clients are due in
either 1999 or 2000, the probability decreases by a further 2.22%. Businesses in the
commerce sector have a 1.23% higher probability of making their payments than
businesses in the production sector.
The inuence of competition as measured by OTHERLOAN is highly signicant
when we consider all loans and all payments and leads to an increase in hazard
rates, that is, to a decrease in average time overdue. If 40% of all clients have other
loans, for example, the probability that clients repay is 5.65% higher than if none
of the clients had other loans (e
0:137450:4
= 1:05652). If only 20% of all clients have
other loans, the probability increases by 2.79%. Besides the inuence of competition,
higher enforcement leads to signicantly higher hazard rates (earlier repayment), so
does a high growth rate (insignicant).
The explanatory power for rst payments of rst loans is very low with a Chi2
statistic of 58.80 only (44 degrees of freedom, likelihood ratio test). As mentioned
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Figure 5.9: Kaplan-Meier estimates of survivor functions for nal payments by punc-
tuality of rst scheduled repayment. The probability of having arrears of, e. g., 20
days is considerably higher if the rst payment was late. Sample: loans with  6
installments.
above, rst payments of rst loans are virtually always punctual. The only signicant
variables are enforcement and weekly and fortnightly repayment. When we take
together all payments and all loans, however, most variables are signicant and the
explanatory power is high with a Chi2 statistic of 6386 and 61 degrees of freedom
(Wald test).
31
The structure of the results is very similar to the probit estimates presented
above. The results of all our analyses are consistent with few exceptions only and the
main ndings thus show a high level of robustness. With respect to our theoretical
predictions, we nd a strong negative inuence of indebtedness in the years of the
economic crisis that corresponds to our prediction. The predicted positive eect
of non-business income on repayment behavior seems to be neutralized by the
bank's repayment schedule. Surprisingly, we found no negative inuence of supply
and competition, and no signicant inuence of credit records. The examination of
penalties suered from endogeneity problems.
31
Separate estimates for middle and nal payments are available on request.
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5.7 Discussion
The above paragraphs have discussed various aspects of repayment behavior for
loans from Caja Los Andes, one of the leading micronance institutions in Bolivia.
The analysis has focused on the years 1996 to 2000 which were characterized by
strongly increasing competition and supply in the micronance market, high levels
of indebtedness, and the onset of an economic crisis. How did these factors aect
repayment behavior?
The fraction of clients taking loans from multiple institutions has increased sub-
stantially (from 13% in 1996 to 24% in 2000 for new clients). While there is some
evidence that these clients paid more punctual than others for loans distributed in
1996, they have a worse repayment behavior than others in later years, especially
so in the years of the economic crisis.
The fraction of overdue payments has increased continuously until 1998. Since
then, Caja Los Andes has enforced timely repayment to reduce portfolio at risk. Our
results show that increased enforcement leads not only to a higher probability that
clients pay punctual, but also to a lower probability that clients have high arrears
( 10 days).
With respect to the market environment, we nd that high competition and
supply, by themselves, are not responsible for high arrears. The analysis of payments
shows that a client with given characteristics has a better repayment behavior at a
time and in a branch with high competition and high supply of micro-loans than
elsewhere. This dependency could have two possible sources. Firstly, clients could
be more aware of the importance of timely repayment in an environment with a
high availability of micro-loans. Secondly, being aware of the possible negative
incentive eects of high supply, institutions could have developed higher repayment
incentives and/or more ecient screening to compensate for high competition and
supply (through measures unobserved in our data set). While the analysis of loans
gives a slightly dierent picture with competition leading to more defaults, the
analysis regards competition at the time of disbursement only.
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The last two years in our sample are characterized by a severe economic cri-
sis. Our estimates show that the inuence of the economic crisis is negative but
insignicant. It remains unclear whether this is because our measure of growth
(changes in real quarterly GDP) does not capture the economic environment of
micro-enterprises, or because the eect of the economic environment is very small
and the deterioration of repayment in 1999 and 2000 has not been driven by the
economic crisis (contrary to what Bolivian microlenders claim).
Throughout our analysis we nd a very strong negative inuence of prior late
payments. If clients had overdue payments in prior loans, they are signicantly more
likely to pay late in future loans as well. If clients have arrears for the rst payment
of a loan, they are signicantly more likely to have arrears for later payments as
well. When analyzing the length of time a payment is overdue, we nd that the
probability that the client pays today decreases strongly in the rst few days. That
is, once the payment is three days overdue, for example, the probability that the
client pays the following day is below 15% and declines further each day. These
strong and highly signicant inuence structures suggests that an early-on focus on
clients with arrears is advisable.
Taken together, our results suggest that the following factors contributed to
rising arrears. Firstly, distributing more loans to clients who already have other
loans leads to lower repayment rates. Secondly, clients with overdue payments in
their prior loans are signicantly more likely to pay late for future loans as well.
This strong correlation suggests that arrears could be reduced by following a stricter
policy in rejecting loans for clients with a bad repayment record stemming either
from prior loans with Caja Los Andes or from the credit bureau. Thirdly, a tolerance
of payments with a few days overdue leads not only to a higher probability that
payments are late but also to a higher probability that they remain overdue for
many days and add to capital at risk.
The analysis of the eects of terms and conditions of each loan suered from
endogeneity problems. Further research thus could use a controlled experiment to
determine the inuence of repayment schedules, for example. In addition, similar
analyses could be carried out in other countries, notably Bangladesh, to disentangle
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further the eects of the economic crisis, consumer loans, and rising competition.
Since all eects are concurrent in Bolivia, one could gain additional insights from
an analysis in other countries where only some of these changes occur.
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5.8 Appendix
Personal Characteristics
D(single) Marital status = single
D(female) Gender = female
D(on black list) Bad credit record with other banks
ln(age) Log of the client's age
ln(non-business inc.) Log of non-business income
ln(business income) Log of business income
Previous average arrears Average arrears (days overdue) in previous loan
Previous maximum arrears Maximal arrears in previous loan
Business Characteristics
ln(assets) Log assets
Liabilities/assets Ratio of liabilities over assets
D(other loans) Dummy: client has loans from other sources
ln(Business Age) Log business age
D(Commerce) Dummy: Commerce Sector (relative to production sector)
D(Service) Dummy: Service Sector (relative to production sector)
Loan Characteristics
ln(approved amount) Log approved amount (loan size)
Appl./appr. amount Amount applied for over approved amount
D(preferential) Dummy: preferential loans (automatic credit line)
Interest Rate Interest rate
Flat rate commission Commission charged on each payment
D(old penalty code) Dummy: old penalties system for late payments
D(weekly) Dummy: weekly repayments
D(fortnightly) Dummy: fortnightly repayments
D(irregular) Dummy: irregular repayments (since 1997)
Length of loan (days) Duration of the loan in days
D(... installments) Dummy: number of scheduled repayments
ln(value of chattel g.) Log value of chattel guarantees
D(pers. guarantee) Dummy: existence of a co-signer/guarantor
Environment
D(Cochabamba) Dummy: loan disbursed in Cochabamba (relative to La Paz)
D(Sucre) Dummy: loan disbursed in Sucre (relative to La Paz)
D(Trinidad) Dummy: loan disbursed in Trinidad (relative to La Paz)
D(Tarija) Dummy: loan disbursed in Tarija (relative to La Paz)
OTHERLOAN Fraction of clients with loans from other sources
RELPORT Portfolio of MF institutions per capita
ENFORCE Tolerance of one or two days overdue
NEWBLOCK Number of new entries with bad credit records
GROWTH Quarterly growth rate (source: INE)
D(199x) Dummy: Year=199x
Table 5.1: List of variables used for the empirical analysis. All logs are calculated
as log(<variable>+1).
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Dependent variable:
approval of rst loan application
ln(applied amount) 2.055
(7.02)**
ln(applied amount)
2
-0.271
(5.72)**
ln(applied amount)
3
0.010
(4.16)**
On black list -0.740
(6.88)**
D(single) -1.372
(72.50)**
D(1997) -0.065
(0.76)
D(1998) -0.303
(2.25)*
D(Cochabamba) -0.451
(3.67)**
D(Sucre) -0.236
(1.62)
D(Trinidad) 0.082
(0.30)
D(Tarija) -0.543
(5.49)**
D(Commerce) 0.076
(3.28)**
D(Service) -0.019
(0.67)
OTHERLOAN -2.768
(5.05)**
RELPORT 0.028
(5.42)**
ENFORCE -1.328
(2.28)*
NEWBLOCK -6.29e-05
(4.26)**
GROWTH -1.743
(2.58)**
Constant -3.539
(5.63)**
Observations 29356
Percentage approved 72.74
Pseudo-R
2
0.33
Chi2 (18) 8317.9
Log Likelihood -11465.96
Table 5.2: Selection estimates for the approval of the rst loan application. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, ** denotes signicant at the 1% level, * at the
5% level. Sample: new applications between Jan. 1st 1996 and June 30th 1998.
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Statistics for new clients.
1996 1998 2000
Personal Characteristics
D(single) 0.208 (0.406) 0.192 (0.394) 0.285 (0.452)
D(female) 0.631 (0.483) 0.589 (0.492) 0.575 (0.494)
D(on black list) 4.38e-03 (0.066) 4.56e-03 (0.067) 5.35e-03 (0.073)
ln(age) 3.594 (0.284) 3.568 (0.282) 3.581 (0.310)
ln(non-business income) 2.671 (2.247) 2.597 (2.322) 2.448 (2.310)
ln(business income) 4.925 (0.779) 5.022 (0.805) 4.775 (0.921)
Business Characteristics
ln(assets) 6.879 (1.172) 7.098 (1.155) 7.214 (1.179)
Liabilities over assets 0.018 (0.062) 0.026 (0.083) 0.057 (0.136)
D(other loan) 0.134 (0.340) 0.146 (0.353) 0.236 (0.425)
ln(Business Age) 1.491 (0.984) 1.261 (0.797) 1.804 (0.704)
D(Commerce) 0.557 (0.497) 0.522 (0.500) 0.486 (0.500)
D(Service) 0.155 (0.362) 0.199 (0.399) 0.227 (0.419)
Observations 6,341 4,821 1884
Table 5.3: Summary statistics for new clients by years. Sample: A 70% random
sample of rst loans in or after 1996 with at least six installments.
Approved loans Rejected Applications
N=21,353 N=8,010
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
ln(applied amount) 5.788 (1.025) 5.869 (1.160)
On black list 4.50e-03 (0.067) 0.011 (0.102)
D(single) 0.195 (0.396) 0.743 (0.437)
D(1997) 0.365 (0.481) 0.329 (0.470)
D(1998) 0.178 (0.382) 0.181 (0.385)
D(Cochabamba) 0.126 (0.332) 0.323 (0.468)
D(Sucre) 0.102 (0.302) 0.203 (0.402)
D(Trinidad) 0.044 (0.204) 0.113 (0.317)
D(Tarija) 0.094 (0.291) 0.179 (0.383)
D(Commerce) 0.539 (0.498) 0.519 (0.500)
D(Service) 0.180 (0.384) 0.249 (0.433)
OTHERLOAN 0.096 (0.061) 0.138 (0.081)
RELPORT 38.06 (14.07) 28.17 (11.30)
ENFORCE 0.176 (0.024) 0.169 (0.034)
NEWBLOCK 700.0 (807.2) 732.6 (844.9)
GROWTH 0.048 (0.018) 0.047 (0.017)
Table 5.4: Mean and standard deviations by loan approval. Sample: new applica-
tions between Jan. 1st 1996 and June 30th 1998.
5.8. APPENDIX 165
Dependent variable:
existence of a second approved loan
ln(appr.amount) 0.034 ln(income) 0.153
(1.04) (4.42)**
D(on black list) -0.470 Appl./appr.am. -0.030
(2.50)* (2.61)**
D(single) -0.067 Av.arrears -0.262
(2.03)* (14.66)**
D(female) 0.116 Av.arrears
2
3.31e-03
(4.21)** (9.29)**
D(1997) 0.105 Max.arrears -0.069
(0.59) (11.16)**
D(1998) -1.507 Max.arrears
2
1.81e-03
(5.13)** (12.95)**
D(Cochabamba) -0.516 Max.arrears
3
-1.14e-05
(2.36)* (10.29)**
D(Sucre) 0.296 Max.arrears
4
6.01e-09
(0.90) (8.97)**
D(Trinidad) -1.123 Loan length 0.015
(2.01)* (17.32)**
D(Tarija) 0.038 Loan length
2
-5.07e-05
(0.16) (17.68)**
D(Commerce) 0.079 Loan length
3
3.49e-08
(2.58)** (12.59)**
D(Service) 0.015 D(8-10 inst.) -0.022
(0.38) (0.62)
OTHERLOAN 2.836 D(11-14 inst.) -0.023
(3.55)** (0.57)
RELPORT 3.33e-03 D(15-18 inst.) -0.048
(0.27) (0.98)
ENFORCE -6.035 D(19-24 inst.) -0.069
(5.81)** (1.00)
GROWTH 0.416 D(25-30 inst.) 0.019
(0.56) (0.11)
ln(assets) -4.19e-03 D(>30 inst.) -0.308
(0.20) (1.36)
Liab./assets 0.105 ln(age) -0.152
(0.55) (3.24)**
Constant 0.375 ln(bus. age) 0.039
(0.76) (2.50)*
Observations 17537
Pct. with 2nd loans 66.04
Pseudo-R
2
0.42
Chi2 (36) 3868.39
Log-Likelihood -6507.86
Table 5.5: Selection estimates for the existence of second loans. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses, ** denotes signicant at the 1% level, * at the 5% level.
Sample: rst loans distributed between 1995 to mid 1998. Variables refer to obser-
vations made when the rst loan was distributed.
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Arrears for Previous Previous
second loans average arrears max. arrears Observations
Av. Arrears < 1 0.26 (0.80) 1.49 (3.93) 12,135
Av. Arrears  1 0.70 (1.50) 3.26 (5.83) 5,610
Av. Arrears < 10 0.36 (1.00) 1.88 (4.49) 16,648
Av. Arrears  10 1.04 (1.88) 4.59 (6.70) 1,097
no 2nd loan 22.4 (78.4) 60.8 (169.5) 5,963
Table 5.6: Average arrears of current loans depending on previous repayment be-
havior. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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No 2nd loan With 2nd loan
N=5,963 N=17,089
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
ln(appr.amount) 5.507 (0.997) 5.181 (0.907)
D(on black list) 6.35e-03 (0.079) 2.28e-03 (0.048)
D(single) 0.226 (0.418) 0.184 (0.387)
D(female) 0.568 (0.495) 0.640 (0.480)
D(1997) 0.369 (0.483) 0.251 (0.433)
D(1998) 0.249 (0.432) 0.009 (0.092)
Cochabamba 0.147 (0.354) 0.138 (0.344)
Sucre 0.105 (0.307) 0.130 (0.337)
Trinidad 0.041 (0.198) 0.016 (0.127)
Tarija 0.104 (0.305) 0.095 (0.294)
D(Commerce) 0.485 (0.500) 0.580 (0.494)
D(Service) 0.218 (0.413) 0.155 (0.362)
OTHERLOAN 0.098 (0.062) 0.095 (0.068)
RELPORT 39.40 (14.53) 29.63 (13.84)
ENFORCE 0.179 (0.025) 0.173 (0.022)
GROWTH 0.048 (0.019) 0.044 (0.022)
ln(assets) 7.068 (1.211) 6.914 (1.219)
Liab./assets 0.022 (0.074) 0.020 (0.066)
ln(income) 5.397 (0.574) 5.385 (0.573)
Appl./appr.am. 1.615 (1.046) 1.662 (1.117)
Av.arrears 22.37 (78.35) 0.403 (1.092)
Max.arrears 60.81 (169.5) 2.053 (4.703)
Loan length 226.4 (125.9) 140.4 (68.69)
D(8-10 inst.) 0.342 (0.474) 0.316 (0.465)
D(11-14 inst.) 0.314 (0.464) 0.268 (0.443)
D(15-18 inst.) 0.113 (0.317) 0.096 (0.295)
D(19-24 inst.) 0.055 (0.229) 0.025 (0.156)
D(25-30 inst.) 0.010 (0.100) 3.59e-03 (0.060)
D(>30 inst.) 4.34e-03 (0.066) 1.86e-03 (0.043)
ln(age) 3.571 (0.286) 3.591 (0.281)
ln(bus. age) 1.391 (0.893) 1.546 (0.916)
Table 5.7: Summary statistics by existence of a second loan. Variables refer to ob-
servations made when the rst loan was distributed. Sample: rst loans distributed
between 1995 and mid-1998.
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First loans: Second loans:
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
P (late) P (late) P (late) P (default) P (late) P (default)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Personal Characteristics
D(single) 0.101 0.160 0.106 0.221 0.052 -0.010
(1.62) (2.53)* (3.95)** (2.32)* (1.51) (0.19)
D(female) 6.04e-03 0.013 0.012 -0.012 0.039 4.46e-04
(0.29) (0.65) (0.60) (0.41) (1.36) (0.01)
D(on black list) 0.341 0.326 0.357 0.413 0.551 0.622
(2.49)* (2.41)* (2.78)** (2.34)* (2.88)** (2.74)**
ln(age) -0.131 -0.142 -0.129 -0.086 -0.291 -0.304
(3.63)** (4.06)** (3.49)** (1.63) (5.81)** (4.23)**
ln(non-business inc.) 0.012 -0.006 0.011 0.004 0.019 9.44e-03
(2.25)* (1.22) (2.20)* (0.55) (2.67)** (0.93)
ln(business income) 0.040 -0.057 0.045 0.024 0.092 7.72e-03
(1.88) (2.83)** (2.18)* (0.72) (2.96)** (0.17)
Previous average arrears 0.156 0.167
(4.12)** (3.74)**
(Prev.av.arrears)
2
-1.13e-03 -0.010
(0.37) (2.87)**
Previous max. arrears 0.157 0.132
(10.47)** (6.60)**
(Prev.max.arrears)
2
-0.012 -0.013
(8.17)** (5.62)**
(Prev.max.arrears)
3
2.94e-04 4.63e-04
(5.83)** (4.78)**
(Prev.max.arrears)
4
-2.10e-06 -4.90e-06
(4.63)** (4.27)**
Business Characteristics
ln(assets) -0.025 -0.065 -0.019 -0.053 -0.022 -0.041
(1.53) (3.99)** (1.18) (2.13)* (0.91) (1.16)
Liabilities/assets 0.381 0.402 0.356 0.533 0.105 0.639
(2.20)* (2.36)* (2.05)* (2.23)* (0.44) (2.09)*
D(other loans) -0.117 -0.129 -0.123 -0.108 0.162 -0.165
(1.90) (2.12)* (2.17)* (1.12) (1.79) (1.05)
D(other loans)*D(1997) 0.150 0.137 0.153 0.078 -0.030 0.152
(1.96)* (1.81) (2.06)* (0.68) (0.28) (0.86)
D(other loans)*D(1998) 0.162 0.163 0.184 0.126 -0.054 0.059
(1.84) (1.87) (2.07)* (1.02) (0.42) (0.30)
ln(Business Age) 0.018 0.019 0.018 -0.027 0.032 -0.013
(1.45) (1.57) (1.54) (1.47) (1.83) (0.46)
D(Commerce) -0.105 -0.124 -0.098 -0.140 0.008 0.037
(3.97)** (5.46)** (3.62)** (3.72)** (0.24) (0.75)
D(Service) 0.038 0.062 0.045 -0.012 0.130 0.197
(1.23) (2.19)* (1.47) (0.27) (2.97)** (3.25)**
Table 5.8: Results from bivariate probit analysis.
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Loan Characteristics
ln(approved amount) 0.338 0.647 0.356 0.708 -0.043 0.062
(3.45)** (7.15)** (3.48)** (4.62)** (0.30) (0.30)
ln(approved amount)
2
-0.035 -0.042 -0.038 -0.056 -0.005 -0.007
(4.20)** (5.53)** (4.19)** (4.31)** (0.40) (0.40)
Appl./appr. amount 0.036 0.033 0.066 0.095 0.199
(3.68)** (3.43)** (5.52)** (2.88)** (4.71)**
Interest Rate 0.037 0.041 0.126 0.055 0.003
(1.08) (1.16) (2.59)** (1.15) (0.05)
Flat rate commission -0.126 -0.144 -0.220 -0.278 0.334
(1.31) (1.38) (1.78) (1.80) (1.46)
D(old penalty code) 0.007 0.013 -0.123 -0.091 -0.273
(0.16) (0.28) (1.81) (1.61) (3.20)**
D(weekly) 0.391 0.443 0.041 0.226 -0.170
(3.66)** (3.31)** (0.23) (1.43) (0.59)
D(fortnightly) 0.297 0.434 0.062 0.242 0.228
(4.86)** (6.12)** (0.64) (2.78)** (1.57)
Length of loan (days) 0.011 9.38e-03 6.96e-03 7.12e-03 5.31e-03
(12.78)** (8.30)** (5.41)** (6.40)** (2.86)**
Length of loan
2
-1.64e-05 -1.34e-05 -9.02e-06 -8.90e-06 -4.38e-06
(8.38)** (5.42)** (3.48)** (3.68)** (1.29)
Length of loan
3
8.36e-09 6.67e-09 3.93e-09 4.32e-09 1.18e-09
(5.30)** (3.45)** (2.08)* (2.41)* (0.53)
D(8-10 installments) -0.036 -0.043 -0.024 -0.113 -0.139
(0.93) (1.12) (0.39) (1.56) (1.28)
D(11-14 installments) -0.109 -0.138 -0.070 -0.152 -0.245
(1.93) (2.31)* (0.77) (1.65) (1.68)
D(15-18 installments) -0.172 -0.243 -0.048 -0.233 -0.417
(2.23)* (2.81)** (0.38) (1.97)* (2.17)*
D(19-24 installments) -0.171 -0.281 -0.075 -0.303 -0.447
(1.73) (2.56)* (0.47) (2.10)* (1.88)
D(25-30 installments) -0.084 -0.197 0.116 -0.427 -0.643
(0.57) (1.23) (0.53) (2.43)* (2.15)*
D(>30 installments) -0.541 -0.700 -0.898 -0.275 -0.489
(2.76)** (2.63)** (2.28)* (1.21) (1.19)
ln(value of chattel g.) -0.010 -0.011 0.021 -0.009 0.025
(2.25)* (2.35)* (3.21)** (1.56) (3.00)**
D(pers. Guarantee) 0.199 0.187 0.231 0.160 0.182
(9.96)** (7.38)** (7.79)** (5.94)** (4.68)**
Table 8 continued.
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Environment
Cochabamba -0.457 -0.177 -0.473 0.343 -0.048 0.564
(3.17)** (1.27) (3.14)** (1.60) (0.21) (1.53)
Sucre -0.407 0.032 -0.417 -0.444 -0.201 -0.206
(2.34)* (0.19) (2.17)* (1.93) (0.76) (0.60)
Trinidad -1.836 -0.979 -1.866 -0.572 -0.910 0.473
(5.73)** (3.18)** (4.98)** (1.29) (1.85) (0.69)
Tarija -0.047 0.174 -0.052 0.069 -0.211 0.061
(0.41) (1.55) (0.41) (0.46) (1.28) (0.29)
OTHERLOAN 4.808 2.994 4.718 -0.105 2.283 -1.904
(7.16)** (4.72)** (6.34)** (0.09) (2.00)* (0.91)
RELPORT -0.021 -8.37e-03 -0.022 -4.00e-03 -0.011 7.68e-03
(3.34)** (1.35) (3.09)** (0.48) (1.13) (0.64)
ENFORCE -0.865 -0.812 -0.977 0.033 -1.923 -0.936
(1.10) (1.07) (1.29) (0.03) (1.64) (0.55)
NEWBLOCK 2.98e-05 5.86e-05 3.26e-05 -2.60e-06 -7.40e-06 -2.57e-05
(1.81) (3.87)** (2.04)* (0.11) (0.37) (0.89)
GROWTH 2.266 3.222 2.314 -0.074 -0.667 -2.572
(3.20)** (4.87)** (3.35)** (0.07) (0.75) (1.97)*
D(1997) 0.407 0.378 0.425 -0.014 0.468 -0.170
(4.13)** (3.95)** (3.80)** (0.10) (3.29)** (0.90)
D(1998) 0.675 0.626 0.699 0.136 0.571 -0.087
(4.31)** (4.08)** (3.92)** (0.64) (2.49)* (0.29)

1
(Appr. of 1st loan) 0.028 -0.043 -0.077
(0.28) (0.43) (0.52)

2
(Exist. of 2nd loan) 0.039 0.115
(0.44) (0.92)
Constant -2.282 -1.749 -2.195 -4.378 -0.557 -2.003
(5.24)** (4.57)** (4.96)** (6.74)** (0.86) (2.11)*
Variance equation
Number of installments 0.013
(2.03)*
D(weekly) -0.211
(1.66)
D(fortnightly) -0.321
(3.65)**
Wald Chi(3) 16.17
Observations 29220 29221 21218 29220 17342 17342
Percentage late/default 30.0 30.0 30.0 7.28 33.33 7.16
Wald Chi(43(27)/49) 1339.02 879.31 312.16 748.57 995.89 425.06
Log Likelihood -23556.36 -23884.65 -12110.12 -16477.34 -12982.81 -9178.48
Table 8 continued: Results from bivariate probit analysis. First loans include
8,002 censored observations, second loans 5,956. Columns (1), (4), (5), and (6) are
bivariate probit analyses with selection. Column (2) excludes variables that are
potentially endogenous. Column (3) is based on a heteroscedastic probit. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, ** denotes signicant at the 1% level, * at the
5% level. Sample: Loans distributed between Jan. 1st 1996 and June 30th 1998 with
corresponding balance observations and at least six scheduled repayments. Second
loans of clients who had rst loans before 1995 are excluded due to incomplete
information on prior arrears.
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p10 p15 p20
late=1 0 1 0 1 0 1 Total
0 1,045 1,355 1,744 656 2,148 252 2,400
(26.2) (34.0) (43.8) (16.5) (53.9) ( 6.3) (60.3)
1 452 1,130 951 631 1,347 235 1,582
(11.4) (28.4) (23.9) (15.9) (33.8) ( 5.9) (39.7)
Total 1,497 2,485 2,695 1,287 3,495 487 3,982
(37.6) (62.4) (67.7) (32.3) (87.8) (12.2) (100.0)
Table 5.9: Out-of-sample predictive power for rst loans. Calculations are based
on a probit estimate for the probability that loans are late using loan data from
1996 and 1997, predictions are made for the rst half of 1998. Percentages are in
parentheses.
p30 p40 p50 p60
late=1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 Total
0 500 674 844 330 1,010 164 1,100 74 1,174
(0.23) (0.31) (0.39) (0.15) (0.46) (0.08) (0.50) (0.03) (0.54)
1 204 808 467 545 665 347 829 183 1,012
(0.09) (0.37) (0.21) (0.25) (0.30) (0.16) (0.38) (0.08) (0.46)
Total 704 1,482 1,311 875 1,675 511 1,929 257 2,186
(0.32) (0.68) (0.60) (0.40) (0.77) (0.23) (0.88) (0.12) (1.00)
Table 5.10: Out-of-sample predictive power for second loans. Calculations are based
on a probit estimate for the probability that loans are late using loan data from
1996 and 1997, predictions are made for the rst half of 1998. Percentages are in
parentheses.
Year 0 1-9 10-29 30
1996 75.1 21.8 2.5 0.5
1997 68.0 25.7 4.9 1.4
1998 63.9 27.6 6.2 2.3
1999 75.5 15.5 5.4 3.6
2000 75.5 12.9 6.5 5.2
Table 5.11: Fraction of payments that are punctual, one to nine, ten to 29, or 30
and more days late (in %). Sample: all payments due between January 1st 1996
and June 30th 2000.
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late loans not late default no default
Personal Characteristics
D(single) 0.182 (0.386) 0.224 (0.417) 0.190 (0.392) 0.264 (0.441)
D(female) 0.619 (0.486) 0.596 (0.491) 0.617 (0.486) 0.558 (0.497)
D(on black list) 3.94e-03 (0.063) 5.79e-03 (0.076) 4.24e-03 (0.065) 7.74e-03 (0.088)
ln(age) 3.587 (0.283) 3.561 (0.281) 3.582 (0.283) 3.541 (0.279)
ln(non-business inc.) 2.682 (2.278) 2.527 (2.314) 2.657 (2.284) 2.369 (2.341)
ln(business income) 4.974 (0.801) 5.037 (0.784) 4.981 (0.798) 5.142 (0.766)
Business Characteristics
ln(assets) 6.981 (1.217) 7.122 (1.189) 7.002 (1.215) 7.286 (1.130)
Liabilities / assets 0.019 (0.067) 0.023 (0.075) 0.020 (0.068) 0.027 (0.082)
D(other loans) 0.079 (0.270) 0.093 (0.290) 0.082 (0.274) 0.098 (0.297)
D(other loans)*D(1997) 0.029 (0.167) 0.038 (0.191) 0.031 (0.173) 0.039 (0.194)
D(other loans)*D(1998) 0.015 (0.120) 0.027 (0.161) 0.017 (0.128) 0.037 (0.188)
ln(Business Age) 1.401 (0.912) 1.444 (0.861) 1.413 (0.901) 1.430 (0.850)
D(Commerce) 0.556 (0.497) 0.501 (0.500) 0.545 (0.498) 0.467 (0.499)
D(Service) 0.166 (0.372) 0.213 (0.410) 0.177 (0.382) 0.220 (0.414)
Loan Characteristics
ln(approved amount) 5.390 (0.991) 5.579 (0.958) 5.420 (0.984) 5.791 (0.941)
Appl. / appr. amount 1.564 (0.989) 1.548 (0.958) 1.556 (0.982) 1.603 (0.949)
Interest Rate 3.214 (0.376) 3.181 (0.397) 3.210 (0.380) 3.134 (0.418)
Flat rate commission 0.996 (0.089) 0.993 (0.109) 0.996 (0.093) 0.988 (0.116)
D(old penalty code) 0.517 (0.500) 0.401 (0.490) 0.496 (0.500) 0.310 (0.463)
D(weekly) 0.162 (0.368) 0.094 (0.292) 0.148 (0.355) 0.056 (0.230)
D(fortnightly) 0.487 (0.500) 0.411 (0.492) 0.473 (0.499) 0.357 (0.479)
Length of loan (days) 191.2 (105.8) 235.8 (114.3) 200.0 (108.3) 262.4 (118.5)
D(8-10 installments) 0.373 (0.484) 0.368 (0.482) 0.374 (0.484) 0.346 (0.476)
D(11-14 installments) 0.302 (0.459) 0.327 (0.469) 0.307 (0.461) 0.343 (0.475)
D(15-18 installments) 0.108 (0.310) 0.110 (0.313) 0.108 (0.310) 0.121 (0.326)
D(19-24 installments) 0.041 (0.199) 0.055 (0.228) 0.044 (0.205) 0.060 (0.237)
D(25-30 installments) 6.21e-03 (0.079) 0.011 (0.105) 7.12e-03 (0.084) 0.015 (0.121)
D(>30 installments) 4.08e-03 (0.064) 4.54e-03 (0.067) 4.44e-03 (0.067) 1.29e-03 (0.036)
ln(val. chattel items) 5.738 (2.244) 5.661 (2.454) 5.704 (2.300) 5.855 (2.423)
D(pers. Guarantee) 0.431 (0.495) 0.527 (0.499) 0.448 (0.497) 0.612 (0.487)
Environment
Cochabamba 0.113 (0.317) 0.156 (0.363) 0.123 (0.328) 0.165 (0.371)
Sucre 0.094 (0.291) 0.120 (0.325) 0.105 (0.306) 0.064 (0.245)
Trinidad 0.042 (0.200) 0.048 (0.214) 0.044 (0.206) 0.034 (0.182)
Tarija 0.085 (0.278) 0.115 (0.319) 0.091 (0.288) 0.128 (0.335)
OTHERLOAN 0.095 (0.060) 0.101 (0.064) 0.096 (0.061) 0.097 (0.062)
RELPORT 37.81 (13.61) 38.64 (15.10) 37.74 (14.04) 42.15 (13.85)
ENFORCE 0.175 (0.023) 0.177 (0.026) 0.176 (0.024) 0.181 (0.026)
NEWBLOCK 670.3 (780.4) 769.5 (862.8) 690.3 (800.3) 823.6 (881.2)
GROWTH 0.047 (0.018) 0.049 (0.019) 0.047 (0.018) 0.050 (0.019)
D(1997) 0.350 (0.477) 0.398 (0.490) 0.362 (0.481) 0.401 (0.490)
D(1998) 0.151 (0.358) 0.241 (0.428) 0.167 (0.373) 0.311 (0.463)
Observations 14895 6372 19717 1550
Table 5.12: Summary statistics by repayment behavior for rst loans. Standard
deviations are in parentheses.
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P( 1 day late) P( 10 day late)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1st loans, 1st loans, All loans, 1st loans, All loans, All loans, ,
1st paym. nal paym. all paym. nal paym. all paym. all paym. .
Personal Characteristics
D(single) 0.071 0.052 0.040 0.078 0.042 0.061
(2.32)* (1.98)* (4.38)** (2.29)* (2.99)** (4.43)**
D(female) -0.018 0.014 0.034 0.022 0.013 0.015
(0.67) (0.64) (4.47)** (0.75) (1.10) (1.25)
D(on black list) 0.485 0.296 0.277 0.329 0.376 0.381
(3.33)** (2.08)* (6.82)** (1.94) (6.96)** (7.06)**
ln(age) -0.113 -0.145 -0.194 -0.126 -0.137 -0.172
(2.46)* (3.74)** (14.57)** (2.44)* (6.48)** (8.27)**
ln(non-bus. income) 8.58e-03 6.78e-03 6.96e-03 4.28e-03 1.10e-03 -8.17e-03
(1.33) (1.24) (3.75)** (0.59) (0.38) (2.87)**
ln(bus. income) 0.026 0.038 0.064 0.053 0.020 -0.016
(1.08) (1.81) (8.00)** (1.89) (1.52) (1.33)
Av. Arr. prior loan 0.101 0.053 0.051
(13.55)** (5.59)** (5.47)**
(Av. Arr. pr. loan)
2
-2.47e-03 -8.43e-04 -7.92e-04
(5.58)** (2.38)* (2.22)*
Max. Arr. prior loan 0.024 0.045 0.045
(12.02)** (10.27)** (10.24)**
(Max. Arr. pr. loan)
2
-7.57e-04 -1.80e-03 -1.68e-03
(10.55)** (6.38)** (5.94)**
(Max. Arr. pr. loan)
3
4.10e-06 2.44e-05 2.19e-05
(7.95)** (4.18)** (3.71)**
(Max. Arr. pr. loan)
4
-4.44e-09 -1.05e-07 -9.27e-08
(7.48)** (3.07)** (2.68)**
Arrears rst paym. 0.144 0.156 0.134 0.140 0.142
(14.46)** (37.12)** (13.93)** (34.51)** (35.08)**
(Arrears rst paym.)
2
-2.15e-03 -2.74e-03 -1.81e-03 -2.22e-03 -2.26e-03
(7.32)** (14.30)** (6.25)** (13.08)** (13.22)**
Arr. middle paym. 0.132 0.121 0.116 0.112 0.114
(37.59)** (38.29)** (39.50)** (41.85)** (42.55)**
(Arr. middle paym.)
2
-8.84e-04 -9.40e-04 -7.91e-04 -8.30e-04 -8.36e-04
(17.92)** (11.79)** (17.60)** (11.68)** (11.68)**
(Arr.1st)*(Arr.mid.) -3.62e-03 -2.64e-03 -2.87e-03 -2.45e-03 -2.50e-03
(7.01)** (5.75)** (6.72)** (7.21)** (7.45)**
Business Characteristics
ln(assets) -4.49e-03 0.012 7.59e-03 -0.053 -0.021 -0.042
(0.23) (0.69) (1.31) (2.33)* (2.27)* (4.61)**
Liabilities over assets -0.139 -0.018 1.22e-03 -0.065 0.028 0.033
(0.69) (0.12) (0.05) (0.35) (0.97) (1.23)
D(other loans) 0.123 0.094 0.073 0.012 0.012 0.019
(2.48)* (2.24)* (6.21)** (0.21) (0.66) (1.03)
D(o. l.)*D(1999/2000) 0.126 0.070 0.039 0.179 0.123 0.112
(1.64) (1.18) (1.85) (2.36)* (4.05)** (3.73)**
ln(Business Age) 0.018 -0.010 0.014 8.82e-03 2.14e-03 7.03e-03
(1.15) (0.68) (2.88)** (0.46) (0.26) (0.87)
D(Commerce) -0.032 -0.036 -0.041 -0.057 -0.028 -0.048
(0.95) (1.28) (4.41)** (1.49) (1.97)* (3.77)**
D(Service) 0.026 0.028 0.038 0.029 0.057 0.058
(0.66) (0.84) (3.28)** (0.66) (3.20)** (3.50)**
Table 5.13: Probit estimates for the probability of late payments.
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Loan Characteristics
ln(approved amount) 0.379 0.294 0.102 0.338 0.283 0.286
(2.86)** (2.75)** (2.85)** (2.26)* (4.92)** (5.46)**
ln(approved amount)
2
-0.038 -0.032 -0.014 -0.031 -0.025 -0.016
(3.30)** (3.45)** (4.87)** (2.40)* (5.43)** (3.92)**
Applied/appr. amount 0.041 0.027 0.032 0.021 0.047
(3.33)** (2.54)* (6.38)** (1.41) (6.93)**
D(preferential loan) -0.291 -0.644
(3.05)** (2.92)**
Interest Rate -0.014 0.024 0.034 0.055 0.014
(0.31) (0.63) (2.72)** (1.06) (0.74)
at rate commission 0.017 -0.201 0.091 -0.254 -0.017
(0.16) (2.13)* (2.42)* (2.12)* (0.32)
D(old penalty code) -0.015 0.105 -0.010 2.97e-03 -0.025
(0.23) (2.23)* (0.62) (0.05) (1.03)
D(weekly repayment) -0.339 -0.322 -0.245 -0.495 -0.337
(2.81)** (3.03)** (7.82)** (3.36)** (6.69)**
D(fortnightly repaym.) -0.203 -0.105 -0.053 -0.135 -0.080
(2.95)** (1.72) (2.94)** (1.64) (2.83)**
D(irregular repayment) 0.245 0.282 -0.173 -0.074 -0.103
(1.06) (1.26) (4.48)** (0.22) (1.73)
Length of loan in days -1.82e-04 4.40e-04 3.63e-04 3.03e-04 6.52e-04
(0.52) (1.35) (4.79)** (0.72) (5.86)**
D(8-10 installments) -5.14e-03 0.129 0.083 0.199 0.080
(0.11) (3.29)** (5.18)** (3.61)** (3.13)**
D(11-14 installments) 0.014 0.231 0.137 0.308 0.120
(0.21) (4.05)** (7.19)** (3.97)** (4.00)**
D(15-18 installments) 0.033 0.301 0.178 0.434 0.177
(0.35) (3.69)** (7.15)** (3.90)** (4.53)**
D(19-24 installments) 0.049 0.385 0.204 0.491 0.210
(0.40) (3.66)** (6.85)** (3.43)** (4.46)**
D(25-30 installments) 0.044 0.675 0.200 0.502 0.197
(0.22) (4.18)** (5.67)** (2.29)* (3.49)**
D(>30 installments) 0.168 0.365 0.255 0.614 0.298
(0.69) (1.72) (5.82)** (2.19)* (4.28)**
ln(val. chattel items) 0.014 -6.19e-03 0.003 7.83e-03 0.010
(1.99)* (0.96) (1.48) (0.94) (3.24)**
D(Pers. Guarantee) 0.164 0.118 0.124 0.210 0.183
(6.38)** (5.46)** (17.36)** (7.24)** (16.29)**
D(second loan) 0.025 -0.137 -0.127
(2.52)* (8.85)** (8.47)**
D(third loan) 0.034 -0.200 -0.185
(2.92)** (10.70)** (10.43)**
D(fourth loan) 0.018 -0.233 -0.215
(1.36) (10.64)** (10.34)**
D(fth loan) 4.91e-03 -0.263 -0.245
(0.31) (10.38)** (10.11)**
D(sixth loan) 0.061 -0.208 -0.191
(3.29)** (7.07)** (6.76)**
D(seventh loan) 0.058 -0.231 -0.219
(2.63)** (6.37)** (6.23)**
D(eighth or higher l.) 0.047 -0.233 -0.239
(2.33)* (7.23)** (7.73)**
D(middle payment) 0.507 0.617 0.592
(59.17)** (40.63)** (39.42)**
D(nal payment) 0.453 0.720 0.654
(44.07)** (42.47)** (40.44)**
Table 13 continued: Probit estimates for the probability of late payments.
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Environment
D(Cochabamba) 0.068 0.137 0.013 0.318 0.089 0.049
(0.81) (1.97)* (0.56) (3.51)** (2.44)* (1.38)
D(Sucre) -0.103 0.079 -0.048 -0.085 -0.222 -0.293
(1.12) (1.07) (2.02)* (0.86) (5.92)** (8.09)**
D(Trinidad) -0.067 0.257 0.114 0.064 -0.039 -0.134
(0.47) (2.21)* (2.86)** (0.42) (0.64) (2.29)*
D(Tarija) 0.188 0.220 0.090 0.094 0.127 0.074
(2.69)** (3.84)** (4.67)** (1.27) (4.52)** (2.67)**
OTHERLOAN 0.030 -0.175 -0.378 -1.122 -0.494 -0.800
(0.07) (0.48) (3.17)** (2.32)* (2.56)* (4.24)**
RELPORT -3.10e-03 2.69e-03 -2.83e-03 1.10e-03 - -2.88e-03 -4.94e-03
(1.17) (1.28) (4.05)** (0.41) (2.72)** (4.93)**
ENFORCE 4.242 4.756 4.939 1.806 2.108 1.913
(11.95)** (18.07)** (53.55)** (5.42)** (15.72)** (14.78)**
NEWBLOCK -6.30e-06 9.40e-06 3.80e-06 -1.34e-05 -1.39e-05 -8.70e-06
(0.25) (0.46) (0.62) (0.50) (1.44) (0.95)
GROWTH -0.854 -0.280 -0.242 -0.500 -0.698 -0.336
(0.89) (0.33) (0.96) (0.44) (1.74) (0.88)
D(1997) 0.053 -0.117 -0.067 -0.079 -0.015 0.101
(0.72) (2.41)* (4.27)** (1.18) (0.62) (4.80)**
D(1998) 0.048 -0.118 -0.097 -0.022 0.006 0.226
(0.49) (1.63) (4.19)** (0.22) (0.18) (7.61)**
D(1999) -0.069 -0.249 -0.161 -0.110 -0.027 0.277
(0.52) (2.74)** (5.46)** (0.91) (0.60) (7.37)**
D(2000) -0.038 -0.236 -0.071 7.91e-03 0.048 0.449
(0.23) (1.90) (1.82) (0.05) (0.78) (8.54)**
D(2nd quarter) -0.011 0.030 0.016 -0.072 -0.049 -0.021
(0.32) (0.98) (1.66) (1.84) (3.13)** (1.41)
D(3rd quarter) -0.048 -0.146 -0.075 -0.206 -0.090 -0.041
(1.14) (4.13)** (6.72)** (4.42)** (5.10)** (2.39)*
D(4th quarter) -0.107 -0.116 -0.065 -0.108 -0.083 -0.015
(2.74)** (2.91)** (5.51)** (2.06)* (4.38)** (0.87)
Constant -2.525 -2.026 -2.083 -2.378 -3.032 -2.431
(5.30)** (5.09)** (14.94)** (4.36)** (13.64)** (13.20)**
Observations 21680 20039 186729 20039 186729 186729
Percentage late/default 10.1 31.32 26.0 11.18 6.2 6.2
Pseudo-R
2
0.04 0.16 0.14 0.24 0.23 0.23
Chi2 (LR/Wald) 588.73 4061.13 19180.89 3357.57 13304.96 12781.50
Degrees of Freedom 47 52 67 52 68 51
Log Likelihood -6797.28 -10500.57 -91843.50 -5393.09 -33153.08 -33502.95
Table 13 continued: Probit estimates for the probability of late payments for rst
and nal payments, column (6) excludes potentially endogenous variables. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses, ** denotes signicant at the 1% level, * at the
5% level. Sample: A 70% random sample of all loans with  6 installments, all
installments due between January 1996 and June 2000.
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rst payment middle payment nal payment
First loans
 1 day late 10.03 25.29 31.32
 10 days late 1.10 6.53 11.18
All loans
 1 day late 13.91 28.81 32.81
 10 days late 1.12 6.25 11.32
Table 5.14: Percentage of late payments for rst, middle, and nal payments for
rst loans of new clients and for all loans together. Calculations are based on the
sample used for the regression analyses, that is, loans with at least six scheduled
repayments, payments in 1996 to 2000, and corresponding balance observations in
the non-agricultural sectors.
p10 p20 p30
late1 0 1 0 1 0 1 Total
0 7,943 7,433 12,278 3,098 13,580 1,796 15,376
(42.9) (40.1) (66.3) (16.7) (73.3 ( 9.7 (83.0)
1 488 2,664 1,149 2,003 1,572 1,580 3,152
(2.6) (14.4) ( 6.2) (10.8) ( 8.5 ( 8.5 (17.0)
Total 8,431 10,097 13,427 5,101 15,152 3,376 18,528
(45.5) (54.5) (72.5) (27.5) (81.8 (18.2 (100.0)
Table 5.15: Out-of-sample predictive power for late payments. Calculations are
based on a pooled probit estimate for the probability that a payment (rst, middle
or nal) is at least one day late using data from 1996 to 1999, predictions are made
for 2000. Percentages are in parentheses.
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First loans. All loans. First loans. All loans.
rst paym. all paym. rst paym. all paym.
Personal Characteristics Loan Characteristics
D(single) -1.786 -1.557 ln(approved amount) -6.886 -7.629
(0.99) (3.64)** (0.94) (5.06)**
D(female) 0.452 -0.581 ln(approved amount)
2
0.746 0.732
(0.30) (1.72) (1.18) (5.91)**
D(on black list) -9.409 -14.723 Applied/appr. amount -1.011 -1.780
(0.95) (6.26)** (1.30) (7.12)**
ln(age) 2.205 5.951 D(preferential loan) -1.802 1.529
(0.85) (10.26)** (0.03) (1.20)
ln(non-bus. income) -0.127 -0.129 Interest Rate 1.447 -0.155
(0.34) (1.54) (0.54) (0.28)
ln(bus. income) 0.180 -1.039 at rate commission 0.628 -0.695
(0.13) (3.06)** (0.10) (0.45)
Av. Arr. prior loan -2.925 D(old penalty code) 2.018 -0.562
(8.92)** (0.50) (0.72)
(Av. Arr. pr. loan)
2
0.039 D(weekly repayment) 15.100 12.170
(4.50)** (2.24)* (9.47)**
Max. Arr. prior loan -0.996 D(fortnightly repaym.) 10.158 5.205
(7.34)** (2.61)** (6.95)**
(Max. Arr. pr. loan)
2
0.020 D(irregular repaym.) -4.673 5.749
(3.85)** (0.33) (4.20)**
(Max. Arr. pr. loan)
3
-9.21e-04 Length of loan in days 0.017 -0.017
(2.45)* (0.89) (5.64)**
(Max. Arr. pr. loan)
4
9.79e-07 D(8-10 installments) -0.414 -3.054
(1.88) (0.16) (4.51)**
Arrears rst paym. -6.027 D(11-14 installments) -1.632 -4.213
(18.72)** (0.45) (5.27)**
(Arrears rst paym.)
2
0.077 D(15-18 installments) -2.915 -6.311
(7.60)** (0.55) (6.03)**
Arr. middle paym. -5.935 D(19-24 installments) -3.424 -7.434
(38.63)** (0.50) (6.03)**
(Arr. middle paym.)
2
0.036 D(25-30 installments) -5.075 -7.366
(14.34)** (0.47) (4.95)**
(Arr.1st)*(Arr.mid.) 0.099 D(>30 installments) -8.761 -9.386
(8.54)** (0.64) (5.19)**
Business Characteristics ln(val. chattel items) -0.409 -0.289
ln(assets) -0.375 0.136 (0.97) (3.26)**
(0.34) (0.57) D(Pers. Guarantee) -3.579 -6.406
Liabilities over assets 3.154 0.010 (2.42)* (20.01)**
(0.34) (0.01) D(second loan) 1.747
D(other loans) -2.191 -1.321 (4.08)**
(0.79) (2.37)* D(third loan) 2.912
D(o. l.)*D(1999/2000) -0.935 -2.248 (5.70)**
(0.23) (2.74)** D(fourth loan) 3.676
ln(Business Age) 0.079 -0.224 (6.34)**
(0.09) (1.02) D(fth loan) 4.357
D(Commerce) -0.623 1.224 (6.34)**
(0.33) (2.96)** D(sixth loan) 3.314
D(Service) -1.404 -2.321 (4.10)**
(0.62) (4.39)** D(seventh loan) 1.932
(1.93)
D(eighth or higher l.) 2.805
(3.23)**
Table 5.16: Cox proportional hazard estimates for the duration of arrears.
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Environment
D(Cochabamba) -3.576 -2.994
(0.72) (2.99)**
D(Sucre) 3.693 6.503
(0.68) (6.36)**
D(Trinidad) 6.536 1.542
(0.78) (0.91)
D(Tarija) -4.714 -3.521
(1.10) (3.77)**
OTHERLOAN 5.370 13.745
(0.21) (2.79)**
RELPORT 0.074 0.098
(0.47) (3.17)**
ENFORCE -52.601 -91.874
(2.70)** (22.47)**
NEWBLOCK -4.20e-04 3.78e-02
(0.03) (1.30)
GROWTH 23.711 11.637
(0.41) (0.98)
D(2nd quarter) 0.437 1.385
(0.22) (3.26)**
D(3rd quarter) 1.668 2.668
(0.68) (5.54)**
D(4th quarter) 2.262 2.758
(1.00) (5.50)**
Observations 21683 186729
Chi2 (LR/Wald) 58.80 6386.57
Degrees of Freedom 44 61
Log Likelihood -176279.33 -1579305.22
Table 16 continued: Cox proportional hazard estimates for the duration of arrears
for rst and nal payments. The Cox estimates are listed in percentage terms
(multiplied by 100). Stratication: by year for the rst payment. Joint estimates
(last column): additional strata for being late in the rst and/or middle payment
and for middle and nal payments. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, **
denotes signicant at the 1% level, * at the 5% level. Sample: A random sample of
70% of all loans with  6 installments, all installments due between January 1996
and June 2000.
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All loans, all payments
punctual payments late payments
Personal Characteristics
D(single) 0.179 (0.383) 0.199 (0.400)
D(female) 0.638 (0.481) 0.643 (0.479)
D(on black list) 5.69e-03 (0.075) 9.17e-03 (0.095)
ln(age) 3.634 (0.281) 3.610 (0.271)
ln(non-business income) 2.611 (2.283) 2.538 (2.302)
ln(business income) 5.070 (0.792) 5.136 (0.777)
Av. Arrears previous loan 0.329 (1.377) 0.568 (2.169)
Max Arrears previous loan 1.684 (5.190) 2.588 (7.263)
Days in Arrears rst paym. 0.149 (1.033) 0.912 (3.220)
Days in Arr. middle paym. 0.189 (1.511) 1.841 (6.040)
Business Characteristics
ln(assets) 7.234 (1.175) 7.274 (1.155)
Liabilities over assets 0.033 (0.154) 0.030 (0.090)
D(other loan) 0.177 (0.382) 0.176 (0.381)
D(other loan)*D(1999/2000) 0.081 (0.273) 0.052 (0.223)
ln(Business Age) 1.763 (0.803) 1.802 (0.796)
D(Commerce) 0.579 (0.494) 0.556 (0.497)
D(Service) 0.150 (0.357) 0.170 (0.375)
Observations 143390 49132
Table 5.17: Summary statistics for punctual and late payments for rst, middle, and
nal payments of all loans with  six installments.
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All loans, all payments
punctual payments late payments
Loan Characteristics
ln(approved amount) 5.851 (0.966) 5.872 (0.947)
Applied over appr. amount 1.253 (0.682) 1.298 (0.665)
D(preferential loan) 0.016 (0.124) 1.70e-03 (0.041)
Interest Rate 3.192 (0.439) 3.190 (0.409)
at rate commission 0.998 (0.095) 0.998 (0.106)
D(old penalty code) 0.318 (0.466) 0.340 (0.474)
D(weekly) 0.124 (0.330) 0.105 (0.306)
D(fortnightly) 0.353 (0.478) 0.405 (0.491)
D(irregular) 0.041 (0.199) 0.013 (0.115)
Length of loan in days 299.6 (162.8) 288.9 (138.0)
D(8-10 installments) 0.212 (0.409) 0.216 (0.411)
D(11-14 installments) 0.326 (0.469) 0.328 (0.470)
D(15-18 installments) 0.161 (0.368) 0.161 (0.368)
D(19-24 installments) 0.130 (0.336) 0.140 (0.347)
D(25-30 installments) 0.056 (0.230) 0.053 (0.224)
D(>30 installments) 0.042 (0.202) 0.036 (0.187)
ln(value of chattel items) 5.799 (2.148) 5.884 (2.137)
D(pers. Guarantee) 0.463 (0.499) 0.510 (0.500)
Environment
Cochabamba 0.105 (0.307) 0.124 (0.330)
Sucre 0.111 (0.314) 0.147 (0.354)
Trinidad 0.034 (0.182) 0.043 (0.203)
Tarija 0.072 (0.259) 0.076 (0.265)
OTHERLOAN 0.126 (0.078) 0.109 (0.071)
RELPORT 48.52 (20.80) 42.42 (16.42)
ENFORCE 0.151 (0.069) 0.179 (0.048)
NEWBLOCK 969.9 (804.3) 853.0 (817.0)
GROWTH 0.039 (0.023) 0.044 (0.022)
D(1997) 0.240 (0.427) 0.289 (0.453)
D(1998) 0.196 (0.397) 0.285 (0.451)
D(1999) 0.171 (0.376) 0.142 (0.349)
D(2000) 0.158 (0.365) 0.077 (0.267)
D(2nd Quarter) 0.274 (0.446) 0.285 (0.451)
D(3rd Quarter) 0.270 (0.444) 0.228 (0.419)
D(4th Quarter) 0.225 (0.418) 0.232 (0.422)
Observations 143390 49132
Table 17 continued:Summary statistics for punctual and late payments for rst, middle,
and nal payments of all loans with  six installments.
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